The problems of economic development spare no country. For Vietnam, this issue is made more difficult because of the country's enrollment in a 30-year war which left a legacy of incalculable destruction. The demanding task of development therefore has to be stimultaneously managed alongside the equally formidable challenge of post-war reconstruction. Above all, Vietnam has to tackle enormous problems requiring immediate decisions within a fixed ideological framework that imposes constraints upon the choices and manoeuvres available.

This study is essentially an examination of the dilemma and options faced by the Vietnamese leadership in planning reconstruction and development within the paramaters of socialism. Chapters I and II trace the problems posed and approches adopted by the decision-makers from 1954 to 1974 and after liberation from 1975 to 1979. In each period, the pressing difficulties of a war-time situation as well as post-war conditions have compelled Vietnamese leaders to make frequent shifts in policies in response to immediate circumstances. But the ultimate goal of building a centrally-planned society which satisfies every individual according to his needs is neither neglected nor forgotten. Nonetheless, in the short-term, intractable realities dictate tactical compromises to create a workable economy before proper socialist construction can be effected. Chapter III looks at the confluence of forces which left Vietnamese planners in September 1979 with few expedient choices -- and official endorsement was accorded to a new approach which appears to depart from orthodox courses acceptable within the socialist framework.

Economic relations through trade between India and the five member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – formed in 1967 – namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, have a long history. This is especially so in the case of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand where the influence of Indian culture is readily evident even today and is reinforced by a sizeable population of Indian origin living in these countries. Even the settlement of some Indians in the Philippines is a story which is a few decades old. Our purpose is not to authenticate this part of the world history but, within this historical background, to trace the present state of economic relations between India and the ASEAN countries especially since 1970 and to analyse the prospects for economic co-operation among these countries in the near future.

In this context, economic relations can be conveniently divided into three parts, namely, trade-based relations, investment- (and joint venture) based relations, and all other economic relations based on services such as tourism, shipping, and banking. Accordingly, this paper is divided into three main sections. Section I deals with the survey of trade relations; Section II with the survey of investment relations with special reference to the joint industrial ventures; and Section III with the survey of “other” economic relations. The concluding section (Section IV) highlights some of the prospective areas for expanding economic co-operation between India and the ASEAN countries.

TRADE RELATIONS

Table 1 presents data relating to India's exports, imports, and trade balance with the ASEAN countries and the world for the year 1971/72 and 1976/77 to 1979/80. Table 2 presents the rates of growth of exports and imports based on Table 1.

Growth of Trade

Trade between India and the ASEAN countries as a regional grouping as well as with the individual countries of this grouping grew at a rapid rate during the decade 1971/72 to 1979/80.

INTRODUCTION

Nepal's economic relations with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), mainly through trade and in a very small way through investment in joint ventures, are of relatively recent origin. From time immemorial, Nepal's economic relations have been primarily confined to its large neighbour, India. This was so until the early 1970s. Thus, as late as in 1974/75, Nepal's exports to the group of five ASEAN countries (namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) constituted only 2 per cent of its total exports to the world, whereas its exports to India constituted 84 per cent of its total exports (see Table 2). Similarly, Nepal's imports from all the ASEAN countries in the same year made up nearly 2 per cent of its total imports from the world whereas the corresponding proportion of imports from India was 81 per cent. This position can easily be explained by the land-locked nature of the country and the traditional open border and easier transportation links existing with India for centuries, and also by the similarities in cultural, social, and religious values between the two countries. Until the 1960s, Nepal had exclusively depended on India for providing transit facilities for its trade with the countries overseas. Transportation links with its other large neighbouring country, China, have traditionally been weaker due to high mountains and difficult terrain.

It was only during the seventies that Nepal consciously started programmes of diversification of its economic relations with countries other than India, especially with the other countries of South Asia and the ASEAN grouping. This paper traces the changing profile of Nepal's economic relations with the ASEAN countries since 1974/75. The data base for Nepal's economy is quite weak. However, to the extent that data are available, we will draw upon them from the national and international sources. While the primary focus of the study will be on trade relations (Section II), “other economic relations” (such as investment in joint ventures in industries) will also be touched upon (Section III).

The problems of peace were no less than the problems of war. For the leaders of the Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP) as well as their revolutionary counterparts of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam, the unconditional surrender of the Republic of Vietnam forces on 30 April 1975 marked the realization of a course to which they had devoted a greater part of their lives. The euphoria of victory could not last long, harsh realities of post-war reconstruction had to be faced at once.

To rebuild a country after 30 years of warfare was without doubt an arduous task. For a start, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) leadership had to cope with an almost double increase in territory and an additional 21 million people after the liberation of the South. There was the urgency of providing subsistence, order and employment to a war-weary population. Furthermore, fundamental issues of reunification and socialist transition had to be met. One scholar, Huynh Kim Khanh, summarized the situation as follows:

That the two Vietnams, regardless of their differences, must be united and that South Vietnam must be transformed from capitalism to socialism were constants for the leadership. The questions in point were the timing and the pace of accomplishing these two missions.

Initial post-war uncertainties invited caution in dealing with South Vietnam's economy.

It was the seriousness of the economic crisis of 1979 which compelled bold responses from the Vietnamese leadership. But the new economic policies recommended at the Party Central Committee's Sixth Plenum (Fourth Party Congress) — intended to save the situation — were not immediately implemented. And it took further deterioration of already desperate conditions, even bringing about food riots and peasant unrest in late 1980, to evoke concerted efforts to liberalize the economy and thus prevent a disastrous breakdown.

Political Bureau member, Le Due Tho, in a speech in April 1980 had already made this complaint:

Another Vietnamese, an agricultural expert, Chau Tarn Luan was more explicit in his assessment of the “difficulties” of translating the new economic policies into practice:

The 1975 line for agriculture (that is, collectivization) was not very correct. The campaign to correct (that line) launched at end of last year (1979) has opened up new avenues, but conservative elements have hastened to close them again, and right now I don't see now things can change.

The reference to “conservative elements” indicates the strong disagreement of some Party leaders and cadres to the liberal reforms introduced at the Sixth Plenum — providing further evidence of continuing debates among decision-makers on the most appropriate measures to resolve the country's economic problems.

Opposition certainly delayed the introduction of the new economic policies throughout Vietnam. Those who argued against the use of economic levers and material incentives to bring about increase in productivity warned against the promotion of “individualism and excessive attention to personal interests”.

Towards a Definition of Desired Development Contributions

In an empirical investigation to establish and describe the actual contribution made by small and medium entrepreneurs to development, it must be known from the outset which section of the complexities of reality is to observed. Similarly, considerations about possible contributions to development presuppose the specification of what could or should be reached. It must therefore be established which values and contexts are being referred to when talking about development within a society. On analytical grounds, we propose a distinction between societal, social, and economic components.

The societal objective in many South and Southeast Asian countries – as indeed in Indonesia and Malaysia – has been determined by a fundamental political decision to strive for a parliamentary-democratic system with a mixed economy of the free enterprise type. This calls for efficient political and economic institutions as well as responsible individuals who are capable of actively organizing and operating them. Small and medium entrepreneurs can support societal development in this sense by their independent and autonomous action and activity. What is sought is a strong; dynamic, entrepreneurial middle class which is economically efficient, acts in a socially responsible manner and lends political support to the concepts of human rights and freedoms, 1iberal-democratic-social and governmental structures, and government by the rule of law.

The social objective – to set at least a minimum standard – is to ensure satisfaction of the basic material needs of the entire national population (that is, nourishment, clothing, accommodation, health care, and education). Entrepreneurs and managers in the private sector bear a social duty to contribute towards ensuring employment and income opportunities, a sufficient supply of goods, better living conditions for the work-force, their families and those otherwise concerned with the enterprise.

The economic objective is to deploy the national resources according to the principles of economics.

The institutional framework for the evolution and development of industrial relations comprises mainly the institutions of workers, employers, and the government which institutionalizes public labour policies through various means such as legislative enactments, executive or administrative orders, and judicial reviews. The objectives and functions of each of the three sides are either facilitated or constrained by environments. Two such important environments under which industrial relations operate are the economic and labour market environments. Their main features pertaining to the ASEAN countries were discussed in the preceding chapter. This chapter examines firstly, the institutional framework with focus on some of the important aspects of the evolution of industrial relations in the ASEAN countries. It then takes up the question of the hypothesized relationship between levels of structural transformation and patterns of industrial relations with specific reference to the ASEAN countries.

For the sake of expositional convenience, we will begin with an examination of the evolution of labour movements and industrial relations in the ASEAN region on a country-by-country basis. This will be followed by a comparison of similarities and differences among national industrial relations systems of the ASEAN countries.

Indonesia

In Indonesia, there are three main pieces of legislation that provide the legal framework for industrial relations. They are: a) the Collective Bargaining Laws of 1954 and 1963, b) the Labour Code (Conditions of Employment) of 1948, and c) the Labour Disputes Acts of 1957 and 1964. In addition to these labour legislation, various labour laws have come into force in the forms of governmental decrees and ministerial regulations.

Since 1974, the government has been actively promoting the state labour policy called Pancasila labour relations. This policy is based upon the Pancasila philosophy which emphasizes the following five principles:

1. Belief in the One Supreme God;

2. Just and civilized humanity:

3. The unity of Indonesia;

4. Democracy wisely led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives;

5. Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

From the outset, Vietnam's ideological world view prescribes the boundaries within which all policies may be debated, adopted, implemented and altered. The country's socialist framework forms the unquestioned basis for its leadership to draft economic guidelines to meet the people's needs and wants. In other words, there is consensus among the decision-makers on the fundamental meaning of “socialist development” and basic socialist principles are upheld in economic planning.

Socialism dictates its own directions and goals. The ideology which stems from the objective of ending exploitation of man by man requires, as a first step towards attaining its objectives, the abolition of feudal and bourgeois political and economic power. The latter is to be achieved by expropriation of private property of the former ruling class and transformation into public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange. Much emphasis is accorded to radically changing the economic structure because, in Marxist theory, the economic structure determines the legal, political and ideological superstructure:

Extrapolating from Marxist theory into the Vietnamese context, Party Secretary-General Le Duan wrote:

For Vietnam, this ultimate objective is to be achieved through the creation of centrally planned, modern industrial society because, as Lenin has stressed during his time “(the) only possible economic foundation of socialism is large scale machine industry”.

It is indeed an honour and a privilege to have been invited to give a talk on “Family and other aspects of life in Burma”. In the next forty-five minutes or so, I'll try to justify the confidence thus reposed in me.

My aim is to inform as well as to induce reflection. My approach will be to deal briefly with Burma in relation to the Third World; describe the characteristic family; and, finally, within this framework, unfold other aspects of life by sketching an imaginary biography of one of its members, centred around the salient features of my life and my own observations, viewed both introspectively and retrospectively.

For our present purpose, “The Third World” means not all the developing countries that occupy the space between the capitalist Western bloc, including Japan, and the non-capitalist bloc of the East, but only those which share Buddhist culture – that is, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.

Burma was a monarchical state from 1044 to 1886 when it fell into British hands. The Japanese occupied it from 1942 to 1945. It regained its independence in 1948. It is a tropical country, which has vast jungles and high mountains. It abounds in large rivers and fertile plains. It is rich in mineral resources, but is underdeveloped and underpopulated. Its size is more than three times that of Great Britain, yet it has a population less than half that of Great Britain. It is essentially an agricultural country, and the majority of the people are contented with their lot: their needs are modest compared to those of their counterparts in the West, and they need not exert themselves too much for what they want.

Due chiefly to adherence to the teaching of the Buddha and to underdeveloped technology, and the environmental set-up, life in Burma (and in other Buddhist countries too) meanders along, and people's standards and values are different from those in the West: materialism is subordinated to idealism; contentment takes precedence over dissatisfaction; and moral and spiritual attainment is preferred to intellectual achievement.