Vietnam entered a grim period in 1979. The cumulation of unresolved economic problems together with the unfavourable confluence of politico-strategic factors left the country in a situation that might even be described as desperate. There were many constraints and little room for manoeuvre.

Reports from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) showed that by the end of 1978, Vietnam's outstanding disbursed debt in convertible currencies stood at US$1,100 million of which US$400 million were in commercial loans of three to five years maturity and the remaining bilateral loans on concessionary terms. With the socialist bloc, in the same period, the debt (in non-convertible currencies) reached the equivalent of US$1,400 million. The same IMF study noted that debt servicing in 1978 in convertible currencies alone had exceeded Vietnam's export receipts in these currencies thereby aggravating the country's already bad balance-of-payment deficits. Additionally, Hanoi's involvement in the war inside Democratic Kampuchea (DK) drew away much scarce resources from the over-stretched economy to the defence industry. But what followed from the December 1978 invasion of Kampuchea proved far more expensive than the leadership had anticipated. The country had to contend with a blitzkrieg attempt at “punishment” from China as well as placement of troops in constant preparedness against a possible second “punishment”. worse, it had to confront a generally hostile environment with its condemnations and embargoes — retaliations which added incalculable strains to the weak economy. As early as June 1978, Sino-Vietnamese quarrels had already cost the country a massive price when China terminated all aid estimated at US$900 million. However, with international retaliations, Hanoi lost a further US$78.5 million in bilateral aid and US$99 million in multilateral aid which had been pledged before the invasion of Kampuchea. Without doubt, the loss of badly needed foreign assistance exacerbated the heavy debt-servicing burden. While the SRV membership in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) as well as its increasingly close ties with the Soviet Union did offer some economic relief in the short-term, the partnership also exacted its price.

Introduction

Shipping has been in the domain of the developed world since the earliest days when European sailors braved the uncharted seas in search of new worlds and trade. The Europe-Far East trades became increasingly competitive during the 1800s and that era saw the advent of European dominated shipping cartels called liner conferences. Even the development of the Panamanian flag of convenience was evidence of the United States' entrepreneurial spirit in shipping in the 1920s. Today, for the countries of the developed world, shipping is a mature industry with slow growth, and the focus of many traditional shipowning nations has changed accordingly.

Beginning in the early 1970s, many developing nations aspired to participate equitably in world prosperity and achieve a redistribution of world income; these aspirations culminated in calls by the United Nations for a New International Economic Order. In shipping and trade, the way was paved for the governments of the developing world to undertake fleet promotion strategies as one means of achieving wealth redistribution.

The particular reasons why many developing countries have become interested in fleet promotion are varied but are often related to real or perceived inequalities in the international ocean transport system. This chapter will address these reasons for five of the ASEAN countries and detail the subsequent legislative measures each has taken to promote national flag shipping. Each country has followed more than one course of action, some with a greater degree of success than others; fleet growth and the use of government equity to achieve that growth will be discussed in later chapters. In the last chapter, some comparative comments on the approaches of developing and developed countries to shipping policies will be made.

Singapore

Singapore's shipping policy in general reflects the country's overall government economic policy, which is to promote free enterprise with a minimum of official interference.

“A lexicographer's life is a dog's life; but a lexicographer generally lives to an old age”, so said the late Dr T.C. Onions, a most distinguished editor of the Oxford English Dictionary, when I met him at Oxford about fifteen years ago. I fully subscribe to the first part of his statement, but I should like to add to the second part the words, “even if he has to spend his old age in a lunatic asylum”.

Many of you will have read the excellent objective account of the Burmese-English Dictionary by Mr J. Okell in the Britain-Burma Society Bulletin. In it he “has tried to suggest the immensity of the task, to outline the method of compilation, and to mention some of the difficulties – both those inherent in the nature of the work and those which have occurred incidentally in the history of this particular Dictionary”. My talk, in which I shall be treading on very much the same ground, will be more subjective in approach; I am too much involved with this Dictionary.

I have been associated with the Dictionary for the last twenty-eight years, as a part-time voluntary helper from 1939 to 1946, a paid assistant from 1946 to 1948, and a joint editor since then. We have so far published four out of a possible thirty parts, and Part V is near completion. Yet I feel, in the words of Sir Isaac Newton, “I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been only a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me”.

The scope of the Dictionary is vast, the standard aimed at extremely high, and the work entailed most intricate and demanding. The compilation consumes a great deal of time, energy, and learning, chiefly due to the inadequacy of reference works and studies of Burmese language and literature.

It was with both pride and humility that I accepted the kind invitation extended to me by the Director of the Ostasiatisches Seminar, University of Frankfurt, to come and deliver a lecture on any aspect of Burmese literature. I was especially proud when I learnt that this was to inaugurate a course in Burmese language and literature at the University: this, I believe, is the only course of its kind outside Burma. At the same time I was filled with humility at the thought of having to do justice to this momentous occasion. With such mixed feelings, I shall now read the paper “Burmese Poetry, AD 1450-1885: Its Scope and Nature”.

The Burmese have a vast store of literature on stone, on palm leaf, and in printed book form from the twelfth century to modern times. Today, however, I will address myself to only a few representative kinds of Burmese imaginative literature, all drawn from the poetry which dominated the scene from AD 1450 to 1885, before the West had made its impact on Burmese culture: in other words, the poetry that made its debut in what is usually referred to as the Golden Age of Burmese literature, and ended with the downfall of the Burmese monarchy. This poetry was written on palm leaf with a stylus, as printing was not widely used in Burma before the end of the nineteenth century.

The two major contributory factors in the birth and development of this imaginative literature are Buddhism and the Burmese kings. The establishment of Theravada, or conservative, Buddhism long before the eleventh century in Burma, and its dissemination of education not only in the religious language, Pali, but also in the language of the country, gave the Burmese a script of their own, produced numerous poets, and provided themes for the poetry.

The problems of economic development spare no country. For Vietnam, this issue is made more difficult because of the country's enrollment in a 30-year war which left a legacy of incalculable destruction. The demanding task of development therefore has to be stimultaneously managed alongside the equally formidable challenge of post-war reconstruction. Above all, Vietnam has to tackle enormous problems requiring immediate decisions within a fixed ideological framework that imposes constraints upon the choices and manoeuvres available.

This study is essentially an examination of the dilemma and options faced by the Vietnamese leadership in planning reconstruction and development within the paramaters of socialism. Chapters I and II trace the problems posed and approches adopted by the decision-makers from 1954 to 1974 and after liberation from 1975 to 1979. In each period, the pressing difficulties of a war-time situation as well as post-war conditions have compelled Vietnamese leaders to make frequent shifts in policies in response to immediate circumstances. But the ultimate goal of building a centrally-planned society which satisfies every individual according to his needs is neither neglected nor forgotten. Nonetheless, in the short-term, intractable realities dictate tactical compromises to create a workable economy before proper socialist construction can be effected. Chapter III looks at the confluence of forces which left Vietnamese planners in September 1979 with few expedient choices -- and official endorsement was accorded to a new approach which appears to depart from orthodox courses acceptable within the socialist framework.

Economic relations through trade between India and the five member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – formed in 1967 – namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, have a long history. This is especially so in the case of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand where the influence of Indian culture is readily evident even today and is reinforced by a sizeable population of Indian origin living in these countries. Even the settlement of some Indians in the Philippines is a story which is a few decades old. Our purpose is not to authenticate this part of the world history but, within this historical background, to trace the present state of economic relations between India and the ASEAN countries especially since 1970 and to analyse the prospects for economic co-operation among these countries in the near future.

In this context, economic relations can be conveniently divided into three parts, namely, trade-based relations, investment- (and joint venture) based relations, and all other economic relations based on services such as tourism, shipping, and banking. Accordingly, this paper is divided into three main sections. Section I deals with the survey of trade relations; Section II with the survey of investment relations with special reference to the joint industrial ventures; and Section III with the survey of “other” economic relations. The concluding section (Section IV) highlights some of the prospective areas for expanding economic co-operation between India and the ASEAN countries.

TRADE RELATIONS

Table 1 presents data relating to India's exports, imports, and trade balance with the ASEAN countries and the world for the year 1971/72 and 1976/77 to 1979/80. Table 2 presents the rates of growth of exports and imports based on Table 1.

Growth of Trade

Trade between India and the ASEAN countries as a regional grouping as well as with the individual countries of this grouping grew at a rapid rate during the decade 1971/72 to 1979/80.

INTRODUCTION

Nepal's economic relations with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), mainly through trade and in a very small way through investment in joint ventures, are of relatively recent origin. From time immemorial, Nepal's economic relations have been primarily confined to its large neighbour, India. This was so until the early 1970s. Thus, as late as in 1974/75, Nepal's exports to the group of five ASEAN countries (namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) constituted only 2 per cent of its total exports to the world, whereas its exports to India constituted 84 per cent of its total exports (see Table 2). Similarly, Nepal's imports from all the ASEAN countries in the same year made up nearly 2 per cent of its total imports from the world whereas the corresponding proportion of imports from India was 81 per cent. This position can easily be explained by the land-locked nature of the country and the traditional open border and easier transportation links existing with India for centuries, and also by the similarities in cultural, social, and religious values between the two countries. Until the 1960s, Nepal had exclusively depended on India for providing transit facilities for its trade with the countries overseas. Transportation links with its other large neighbouring country, China, have traditionally been weaker due to high mountains and difficult terrain.

It was only during the seventies that Nepal consciously started programmes of diversification of its economic relations with countries other than India, especially with the other countries of South Asia and the ASEAN grouping. This paper traces the changing profile of Nepal's economic relations with the ASEAN countries since 1974/75. The data base for Nepal's economy is quite weak. However, to the extent that data are available, we will draw upon them from the national and international sources. While the primary focus of the study will be on trade relations (Section II), “other economic relations” (such as investment in joint ventures in industries) will also be touched upon (Section III).