ADUL TULYANON

Adul was born on 24 October 1920 in Bangkok to Praya Prawatsuthikorn (Charoen) and Aian. He is married to Pranee. He attended the Naval Academy, the Naval Command and General Staff Colleges in both Thailand and England, the Naval War College, and the National Defence College. With the rank of Vice-Admiral and the position of Commander of the Royal Thai Fleet, Adul was appointed to the National Administrative Reform Assembly. Subsequently, as Commandant of Sattahip Naval Base he was appointed to the National Legislative Assembly and then as Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Fleet he was appointed to the Senate.

AMNUAY IAMSURO

Amnuay was born on 20 February 1926 in the Ban Pho district of Chachoengsao province to Pin and Poo. His wife is Ranee. He attended the Naval Academy, the Naval Command and General Staff College, and the Armed Forces Staff College. He has had training experience abroad. As Rear-Admiral and Commandant of the Bangkok Naval Station, Amnuay was appointed to the Senate.

AMORN SIRIGAYA

Amorn was born on 5 June 1918 in the Lang Suan district of Chumphon province. He is the son of Khun Pranatnarabot and Suphap. He is married to Lady Panee. He attended the Naval Academy. As Admiral, Amorn was appointed to the Senate.

AMPOL NABANGCHANG

Ampol was born on 29 January 1925 in Bangkok to Col. Luang Krainarai and Chalaem. He is married to Weera. He attended the Naval Academy, the Naval Command and General Staff College, and the Armed Forces Staff College, and has had training experience abroad. Ampol was appointed to the National Administrative Reform Assembly and subsequently to the National Legislative Assembly with the rank of Rear-Admiral and the position of Director of the Intelligence Department.

ANANDA NATEROT

Ananda was born on 16 July 1911 in the Muang district of Chachoengsao.

The following quantitative analysis and description is based on the recording of seven weekdays. It describes the programmes as they have been really telecast and deviates slightly from the printed programme schedules, since it takes into account those changes which occur without prior announcements.

The tables in the Appendices which break down the total air-time into time-slots allocated to different languages, programme types, and so forth, do not take into account those “hidden” programme types which are never published, although they are telecast each day and take up a considerable amount of air-time. They comprise commercials, internal publicity of the television station, national policy messages, and presentation of national symbols. Taking these programmes statistically correct into account would have required an enormous time-taking effort, since these programmes, in particular the commercials, are quite unevenly distributed, so that some popular dramas are surrounded and interrupted up to five times by over forty advertisements, while other programmes are not affected at all. Time for these programme types has been taken cumulatively but, nevertheless, carefully. The exact timing of these short items (often less than 20 seconds), however, is prone to marginal errors. In addition, the necessary change of cassettes was made on four days during a commercial interval between programmes; the missing data have been averaged from the remaining three days.

Figures, which as a whole are taken as approximating the average television week in Singapore, have been rounded so as to add up to 100%. Hence, small differences in quantitative value should not be taken as a basis for far-reaching conclusions. None of the findings of this study will be based on small nominal differences.

Type of Programmes: Categories

The categories used to describe the different types of television programmes are not fully mutually exclusive. It is not always easy to separate one category from another. The ensuing difficulties in unambiguously describing actual television programmes by means of these categories is enhanced by the fact that an individual programme may contain elements which fall into different categories.

Ko-tai performances usually start at 8 p.m. and end before midnight. The four-hour performances are normally divided into four parts: 1) popular songs; 2) comic sketch; 3) instrumental interlude by the band, and popular songs; 4) comic sketch II. Although each show has the same format, different songs and skits are presented each night.

After a brief discussion of the nature of the songs rendered, I shall analyse in detail the content of the comic sketches performed. Such uneven treatment is justified in view of the fact that for the audience, the comic sketches are the highlights of the evening. Their popularity, I shall argue, is directly related to their content which by and large focuses on issues relevant to the lower-class Chinese audience. In this regard, the ko-tai is not just a colourful variety show.

Popular Songs

Popular songs are presented by a succession of female and male singers dressed in Western clothes and accompanied by electric-guitar bands. The repertoire usually includes Mandarin, Cantonese, and Hokkien songs made popular in Taiwan and Hong Kong and which are available on cassette tapes, records or even played over the state radio in Malaysia. Occasionally, American and English top hits are also presented, while local Chinese, Malay, and Indian songs are increasingly sung. These songs deal with themes which attract the younger generation. For example, some songs such as the one below remind those in the audience who have come from the rural areas, of life in the village:

Since 1932 military intervention in Thai politics has become the most dominant and decisive factor in the changing face of Thai political life. The Thai military has overwhelmingly dominated political institutions and processes since then.

Socio-political milieux conducive to the patterns and processes of military intervention in Thai politics, including its effects on Thai society, have analytically been studied by a number of Thai and foreign scholars. The most direct intervention of the military in Thai politics has been the seizure of power by means of a coup. Once in control, the military junta tends to give first priority to the maintenance of power by advancing and protecting corporate interests. Key positions in the structure of government, that is, cabinet and legislature, are filled by the leading members of the junta to assure the stability of the regime. Rivals and potential rivals are either eliminated or curtailed or both. Potential allies are co-opted and rewarded.

Since there are limited seats in the cabinet and legislature, the most important posts will be assumed by key leaders and the less important ones will be allocated to the active participants and co-opted allies. Thus, the appointment of these military officers to political posts, whether they be in the cabinet or legislature, not only identifies the participants in any military intervention, but also signifies the potential officers who are in a position to perpetuate military rule or at least to dictate the political life of the country in the future.

This compilation of biographical data on the military officers in the National Administrative Reform Assembly (1976-77), the National Legislative Assembly, and/or the Senate (1979 to the present) is therefore meant to provide base-line data for further study of military intervention in Thai politics. It also provides the officers' social background, military rank and position at the time they were appointed to their political positions.

Ironically, although ko-tai performances are founded on religious festivals, the content of the comic sketches and songs is far from sacred. Sketches do not include deities and rarely mention them. Many of the older generation, in fact, see the ko-tai as a crude and meaningless source of amusement, a mere adjunct to a festival and in their own words, “a lot of shouting, joking, and jumping around on stage”.

However, as we have tried to show, the ko-tai is not meaningless. It is also not just a commercial enterprise, as claimed by many of the older generation. In fact, the ko-tai serves many functions. Firstly, it has succeeded in drawing large crowds of the younger Malaysian-born generation to religious festivals. To a certain extent, it has revived interest among the young in these celebrations. As a result, support (in terms of donations) for the festivities have been more extensive since those who come to watch the ko-tai ultimately feel obliged to pray and to contribute in kind to the deity concerned.

Secondly, the ko-tai has provided an opportunity for both the young (who come mainly to watch the ko-tai) and the old (who come to pray as well as to take part in the celebrations) in the community to socialize. On other days, most families gather around the television set. Thus, the ko-tai is not only a means for accomplishing communal celebration of ritual events (as entertainment for the gods) but it is also a means of communication.

Thirdly, the ko-tai serves as an outlet for the younger generation to laugh away their tensions and frustrations through the banters on their families, the authorities, and through ethnic jokes. The audience is also able to release its emotions through verbal responses to the buffoonery on stage.

Fourthly, the ko-tai is didactic and tries to impart morals and standards of behaviour to the younger generation through the sketches based on urban Malaysian settings.

Television and the Issue of Identity

It is a commonly shared belief not only among laymen but also among scholars that mass media, in particular television, have a strong impact on their audience. While most people believe that the media have a direct effect on the attitudes and behaviour of the individual, the experts have become more careful. They define the role of mass media as factors in socialization, as mediators of knowledge and world-views, and regard them as instruments of enculturation, which contribute to the shaping of a cultural identity, mainly by means of their explicit contents. Even television, however, with its apparently truthful reflection of reality is not a replica-like representation of actual society, but rather a symbolic reflection of its value structure. The iconic signs of television meet a whole range of cultural meanings, which on a higher level are integrated into a comprehensive cultural picture of the world — a world-view. The cultural determination of television systems and programmes is often asserted, but seldom is the specific manner and manifestation of a cultural influence disclosed — apart from a rather global juxtaposition of American and non-American (European or Third World countries) cultures. What is usually lacking are thorough analyses of the content and form of television programmes and their relation to the specific socio-cultural and socio-political context in which they appear.

A discussion of mass media in developing countries or regions almost inevitably turns to the issue of media, tradition and change, and to the role television plays in the preservation and formation (or deformation) of cultural and national identities. In Singapore, these questions are rendered even more complex since Singaporeans are faced with the problem of: