Buddhism was first introduced into China during the Han dynasty, around the first century CE. However, it was only after the downfall of the Han, when China was once again divided by ethnic and territorial wars and Confucianism lost its footing as the state-endorsed ideology, that Buddhist ideas were given serious consideration. Over the third and fourth centuries CE, during the Wei dynasty (220–65) and then the Jin (265–420), Buddhist religious and philosophical notions were put through intensive scrutiny, and those who sought to promote this “foreign” ideology primarily articulated its ideas in the language of existing terms and ideas in Chinese thought, especially those aligned with Daoism. Buddhist thought in China was significantly shaped by the ideas of the Xuanxue (mysterious learning) thinkers, who were known collectively by this title as they were preoccupied with the profound, mysterious dao (Chan 2009: 303). It was not until the fifth century that Chinese Buddhism began to establish its ideas in its own terms. In the course of this process, doctrinal differences were articulated, resulting in the development of different strands of Chinese Buddhism. From then, Chinese Buddhist doctrine stood apart from Indian Buddhism, while also establishing itself as a Chinese tradition, distinctive from Confucianism and Daoism.

Given the extended period of development of Chinese Buddhism and its eventual division and definition into different strands, the discussion in this chapter will focus on key points of philosophical interest. It is important first to understand the fundamental tenets of Indian Buddhist thought; the sketch here presents brief details of its elements that are relevant to our understanding of Chinese Buddhism. The second section explores the early stages of the introduction of Buddhism into China up until around the fourth century. The discussion here also highlights elements of the indigenous philosophies of China, especially Xuanxue thought, that shaped Chinese Buddhist thought. Third, there will be an overview of the main strands of Chinese Buddhist doctrine, a few of which began to establish distinctive views from around the fifth century. The discussion will centre on developments across the two or three centuries from the fifth century. The final section of this chapter considers some distinctive features of Chinese Buddhist philosophy in light of its engagement with Chinese thought and its contributions to Chinese intellectual history.

Game theory studies decisions in which the outcome depends partly on what other people do. Chess is a paradigmatic example. Before I make a move, I always carefully consider what my opponent's best response will be, and if the opponent can respond by doing something that will force a checkmate, she can be fairly certain that I will do my best to avoid that move. Both I and my opponent know all this, and this assumption of common knowledge of rationality (CKR) determines which move I will eventually choose, as well as how my opponent will respond. I do not consider the move to be made by my opponent to be a state of nature that occurs with a fixed probability independently of what I do. On the contrary, the move I make effectively decides my opponent's next move.

Chess is, however, not the best game to study for newcomers to game theory. This is because it is such a complex game with many possible moves. Like other parlor games, such as bridge, monopoly and poker, chess is also of limited practical significance. In this chapter we will focus on other games, which are easier to analyze but nevertheless of significant practical importance. Consider, for example, two hypothetical supermarket chains, Row and Col. Both have to decide whether to set prices high and thereby try to make a good profit from every item sold, or go for low prices and make their profits from selling much larger quantities. Naturally, each company's profit depends on whether the other company decides to set its prices high or low.

If both companies sell their goods at high prices, they will both make a healthy profit of $100,000. However, if one company goes for low prices and the other for high prices, the company retailing for high prices will sell just enough to cover their expenses and thus make no profit at all ($0), whereas the other company will sell much larger quantities and make $120,000. Furthermore, if both companies set their prices low each of them will sell equally much but make a profit of only $10,000. Given that both companies wish to maximize their profit, what would you advise them to do? Consider the game matrix in Table 11.1.

Axiom: An axiom is a fundamental premise of an argument for which no further justification is given. Example: According to the asymmetry axiom, no rational agent strictly prefers x to y and y to x.

Bargaining problem: The bargaining problem is a cooperative game with infinitely many Nash equilibria, which serves as a model for a type of situation that arises in many areas of society: A pair of players are offered to split some amount of money between the two of them. Each player has to write down his or her demand and place it in a sealed envelope. If the amounts they demand sum to more than the total amount available the players will get nothing; otherwise each player will get the amount he or she demanded. The players are allowed to communicate and form whatever binding agreements they wish. A general solution to this problem was offered by Nash, who based his proposal on a small set of intuitively plausible axioms.

Bayes’ theorem: Bayes’ theorem is an undisputed mathematical result about the correct way to calculate conditional probabilities. It holds that the probability of B given A equals the probability of B times the probability of A given B, divided by the following two terms: the probability of B times the probability of A given B and the probability of not-B times the probability of A given not-B. Put in symbols:

Bayesianism: The term ‘Bayesianism’ has many different meanings in decision theory, statistics and the philosophy of those disciplines. Most Bayesian accounts of decision theory and statistics can be conceived of as claims about the correct way to apply Bayes’ theorem in various real-life contexts. In decision theory, Bayesianism is particularly closely associated with the view that probabilities are subjective and that rational decision makers seek to maximize subjective expected utility.

Cardinal scale: Cardinal scales are used when we measure objects numerically and differences or ratios between measurement points are preserved across all possible transformations of the scale. Example: Time, mass, money and temperature can be measured on cardinal scales. Cardinal scales can be divided into two categories, namely interval scales and ratio scales.

Mohist thought is named after its alleged founder, Mozi (c. 480 BCE–c. 390 BCE). Some vignettes of Mozi's life have been constructed on the belief that he was anti-Confucian. For example, Mozi was said to have interacted with a group of Ruist scholar-officials who were preoccupied with the study of texts, ceremonial ritual and the cultivation of a privileged lifestyle. According to this account, Mozi reacted to these aspects of Ruist doctrine and is said to have praised Confucius but rejected the other Ruists he met (see Schwartz 1985: 133, 138–9). None of these accounts can be treated with certainty, however, so our picture of Mozi is primarily constructed from what he is supposed to have said in the Mozi. Consideration of these interpretive issues raises the important methodological question of whether we read the Mozi as “a master with disciples and opponents bringing about a text” or as “a text describing (and thereby creating) a master, disciples, and opponents” (Defoort and Standaert 2013: 4).

There are almost as many definitions of Bayesianism as there are decision theorists. The following broad definition proposed by Richard Bradley is, however, a fairly uncontroversial characterization of the main idea.

According to this definition, Bayesianism has two distinct components. The first tells you what your state of mind ought to be like, while the second tells you how you ought to act given that state of mind. Let us call the two components the epistemic and the deliberative component, respectively. The epistemic component of Bayesianism is a claim about what rational agents ought to believe, and which combinations of beliefs and desires are rationally permissible. In essence, the theory holds that one is free to believe whatever one wishes as long as one's beliefs can be represented by a subjective probability function, and those beliefs are updated in accordance with Bayes’ theorem (see Chapter 6). This means that Bayesian epistemology offers virtually no substantial advice on how one ought to go about when exploring the world. The theory merely provides a set of structural restrictions on what it is permissible to believe, and how one is permitted to revise those beliefs in light of new information. Bayesians thus maintain that all beliefs come in degrees, and that the theory of subjective probability provides an accurate account of how degrees of belief ought to be revised. (Some Bayesians advocate objective versions of the theory, according to which probabilities are objective features of the world such as relative frequencies or physical propensities. Naturally, the mathematical framework for how probabilities ought to be updated is the same.)

Confucius’ vision for rectifying society was idealistic: good government begins with the moral self-cultivation of able leaders. At times, the Analects acknowledges that the chances of such rectification were low (Analects 7:26; 9:13). Nevertheless, its theme of self-cultivation (xiushen) has had far-reaching effects in Chinese society and culture. The belief that education begets moral wisdom was articulated in the Chinese Civil Service Examination system for recruiting officials. The system, which had its beginnings during the Sui dynasty (581–618) and which thrived during the Qing (1644–1911), employed men who performed well in examinations based largely on Confucian texts. It was believed that scholars of the classical texts would also be ethically adept practitioners of good government (Elman 2009).

The Confucians were optimistic, yet to some extent pragmatic, in their assessment of human moral capacities and how these could be shaped to produce more fruitful outcomes for society. Self-cultivation played a central role in the Confucian hope for a better, more ethically focused society. Both Mencius (c. 385 BCE–c. 312 BCE) and Xunzi (c. 310 BCE–c. 219 BCE) reflected on the resources available to humanity for its cultivation. They discussed the human capacity to be moral and the fabric or infrastructure of society that supported its development. They drew different conclusions, however. Mencius believed that humans had a natural tendency to feel compassion even though some acted maliciously and selfishly; these latter behaviours resulted from a negligence to nurture the original compassionate heart-mind (xin). Xunzi held that individuals were not naturally predisposed to ethical conduct; it was only through the establishment of standards for human conduct, initiated by the ruler, that these problems could be addressed. In spite of their differences, both viewed morally-inspired government as the key to their respective approaches to establish a humane society. Their debates on human nature and its cultivation engaged with a range of views held by other thinkers. These discussions and ensuing tensions shaped conceptions of morality, government and society in China for years to come.

This book covers major philosophical traditions in early Chinese philosophy, focusing especially on its foundational period, prior to 200 BCE. It discusses on concepts, themes, reasoning and argumentative methods in Chinese philosophy, introducing readers to fundamental ideas in the different traditions, debates among thinkers, cross-influences between traditions, as well as interpretive theories about these ideas, including views expressed in contemporary scholarship. The chapters are organised partly on the basis of thematic coherence and continuity and loosely according to chronological order. A Chronology is provided at the outset, placing key thinkers in relation to one another. This list is selective and brief, situating only those thinkers and periods that are discussed in the book. The at-a-glance table should help the reader locate thinkers in their historical context in relation to other thinkers. Dates are also included in the text in places where they are integral to the specific point being made.

In a number of chapters, a section discussing textual matters is included. These cover, for example, details of different versions of texts, connections between text and thinker, or the dating of texts, where relevant. Some of this material is quite technical, though readers should find the information helpful in understanding how Chinese intellectual history shapes our grasp of Chinese philosophy.

For the sake of consistency, within citations, English transliterations of Chinese concepts, and names of thinkers and texts, have been modified to the standard Pinyin system. However, the names of modern and contemporary scholars (e.g. Fung, Yu-lan) have been retained so as not to confuse bibliographic data. A short list of Suggestions for Further Reading, of primary and secondary sources, is provided at the end of each chapter. A more extended Bibliography is included at the end of the book. Two separate lists, Primary Texts (listed alphabetically by title) and Secondary Sources (listed alphabetically by author), provide more extensive reading suggestions. References to primary texts follow this format: Graham, Chuang-Tzu, 2001; and secondary sources are listed in this way: Fingarette, 1983. The Glossary at the end of the book is set out in three sections, comprising texts and sections of texts, names and proper nouns and concepts and themes. The lists are alphabetically arranged in Pinyin transliteration, and, where possible, an English translation is provided.

PREPOSITIONS

Prepositions are words such as to, for, into, without, from etc. They give us information about the role that the nouns and pronouns they stand with play in a given sentence: I give this book to you (indirect object). The book lies on the table (place where). He cut the cake with a knife (instrument). In English, prepositions are numerous and frequently employed, and always stand in front of the noun or pronoun (hence the name pre-position).

Sanskrit, on the other hand, is an inflected language that can draw on case endings to mark the role that a noun plays in a sentence. Thus it only has a small number of prepositions in regular use. These, furthermore, stand behind the noun that they belong to, not in front of it (thus, properly speaking, they are post-positions). The most frequently used prepositions are:

PREVERBS

Related, but far more frequent in Sanskrit, is the use of preverbs, which are added to the front of a verb:

Some of these, such as प्रति, can function both as prepositions and as preverbs, and may then vary in meaning (as a preposition, प्रति expresses the idea of ‘towards’; as a preverb, it can mean ‘towards’, but also ‘back to’). A list of the preverbs employed on a regular basis is given in the Vocabulary section below.

Verbs that employ a preverb are called compound verbs. A few aspects of their use need to be pointed out.

This chapter gives a detailed introduction to the main types of Sanskrit compound – hence its length. No memorisation of new forms is required, however, and simply reading through this material and using it for future reference should be sufficient.

GENERAL

A compound noun is a noun that consists of more than one stem. English examples include words such as toothpaste (consisting of tooth and paste), underworld, ruby-red, tree house or chewing gum. (Compounds in English are often not written as one word, but hyphenated or written as two separate words, while Sanskrit compounds are always written as one word. In what follows, some Sanskrit compounds will also be broken up by hyphens, yet that is solely to help you understand their structure.)

Compound nouns (or ‘compounds’) in Sanskrit basically function like compounds in English. Yet there is a crucial difference: in English, compounds usually refer to something more specific than just the sum of their parts. A blackboard, for example, is not just any board that is black, but a specific kind of flat surface on which to write with chalk. Sanskrit compounds, on the other hand, are often made up on the spot: a kind person can simply be called a kindperson, प्रिय-जन- (made up of प्रिय- ‘dear’ and जन- ‘person’); a message from Rāma may simply be a Rāma-message, राम-वचन- (राम- ‘Rāma’, वचन- ‘word; message’); and so on. As a result, compounds are very frequent in Sanskrit.

This chapter will describe the main types of Sanskrit compound. These ‘types’ are distinguished on the basis of the relation that the compound parts (or ‘members’) have to one another. Compare, for example, the English compounds blackbird and toothbrush: a blackbird is thus called because it is black; but a toothbrush is not a brush that is a tooth. Rather, it is a brush that is intended for one's teeth. The ‘types’ we distinguish go back to categories established by the ancient Indian grammarians. While they named several types by using an actual compound of that type (toothbrush would be a tatpuruṣa compound; see below), Western scholars use more descriptive/analytical terminology (a tatpuruṣa is called a ‘dependent determinative’). Both sets of terminology are commonly used and will thus be given and explained here.

Practice Handouts: Practise Your Devānagarī Handwriting

Photocopy the next few pages before filling them in so that you can use them more than once.

IMPERFECT

Athematic imperfect forms employ the augment and the same endings as thematic verbs in the imperfect; yet note that the 1st SG and 3rd PL include an -a-:

Like athematic present forms, athematic imperfects display the strong root in the singular and the weak root everywhere else; compare the imperfect paradigm of √हु ‘to sacrifice’ (and note the appearance of the guṇa stem before a vowel in the 1st Sg):

Sandhi

In verbs whose stem ends in a consonant (which is possible in all classes that do not add a suffix, i.e. II, III and VII), the 2nd and 3rd SG may be difficult to recognise or tell apart: consonant clusters at the end of Sanskrit words are simplified by dropping all consonants but one (just as happens in the NOM SG of consonant stems –› Chapter 15), and, as a consequence, both forms may be identical: see √हन् II ‘to kill’ below or the 2nd and 3rd SG IMPF of √रुध् VII ‘to obstruct’, अरुणत् (from *aruṇadh-s and *aruṇadh-t). The 2nd and 3rd SG IMPF of √द्विष् ‘to hate’ is अद्वेट्. Instead of memorising a list of forms here, it is best to remember that athematic imperfect forms whose ending is difficult to recognise are probably 2nd or 3rd SG.

POTENTIAL

Athematic verbs do not have the potential marker -e- that we know from thematic verbs. Instead, the suffix -yā- is added to the weak stem, giving -yām, -yāḥ etc.; but note that the 3rd PL ending is -yuḥ.

(Cf. the Reference Grammar (Appendix III) for a list of full imperfect and potential paradigms.)

NOTEWORTHY PARADIGMS

Among athematic verbs, there are a number of forms that are irregular or difficult to recognise. The following introduces the most common among them. Look over the paradigms and the brief notes above each. Depending on what you find easier, study the paradigms or the notes.

√अस् (Class II) ‘to be’

The regular weak form of the root √अस् is s-, giving e.g. 1st SG अस्मि, but 1st DU स्वः, 1st PL स्मः and 3rd PL सन्ति. This weak s- is also found throughout the potential, giving us स्याम्, स्याः, etc.