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This chapter encompasses psychological thought during the “early modern” period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, known as the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment respectively. These developments partially laid the foundation for Psychology. However, early modern scholars were not interested in psychological questions as currently understood. Rather, their beliefs that mind was not material and humans were more than physical objects challenge current psychological assumptions. Furthermore, early modern scholars encountered a rather different cultural context than ours. Accordingly, some historiographical cautions are in order:
Although the terms and concepts that early modern scholars used might appear the same as those in today’s Psychology, their meaning has changed profoundly over centuries.
Few early modern scholars conducted scientific inquiry about psychological phenomena. Rather, late eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century physiologists investigated human biological phenomena with psychological implications (see Chapter 4).
Often contradictory historical accounts exist for those early modern scholars who described psychological phenomena philosophically.
Given these cautions, the aims of this chapter are to describe:
Early modern natural philosophers’ conceptions of psychological phenomena.
The continuities and discontinuities between Psychology’s philosophical heritage and current psychological ideas.
The varieties of psychological discourse during the early modern period.
Three themes that summarize this discourse: compatibility of scientific with theistic thought, objectivity–subjectivity of observation, and a self-contained vs. a relational self.
The Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment
When modern science and psychological thought began to emerge during the early modern period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Western culture was in a state of transition. Major societal changes were occurring, including the emergence of mercantile capitalism; expansion and consolidation of political power; colonization of the New World; European journeys to East Asia; violent conflicts over religion; and the use of the magnetic compass, gunpowder, and the printing press, all invented earlier by the Chinese. These developments aided the growth of science and technology, which in turn aided colonial and commercial expansion (R. Porter & Teich, 1992).
In the modern revival of interest in Ovid's exilic poetry, the Tristia have long received the most attention, although his last elegies, the Epistulae ex Ponto, reward the reader no less and are arguably more appealing – works in which his inventiveness flourishes no less than before, and in which his imaginative self-fashioning is as ingenious and engaging, though now in a minor key, as it always was from the time of his Amores. Their comparative neglect resulted partly from a dearth of commentaries. Whereas Luck's commentary on the Tristia (1967, 1977) long made that collection more accessible, the reader of the Epistulae ex Ponto had until recently little beyond Keene (1887) in English and Scholte (1933) in Latin on book 1, both difficult to obtain. Now, however, Ovid's readers can look forward to the completion of M. Helzle's German commentary on all four books, of which the first volume, on books 1–2, appeared in 2003; his commentary on selected elegies of book 4 (1989) is in English. On book 2 we have Pérez Vega (1985) in Spanish and Galasso (1995) in Italian. In 2005 appeared J. F. Gaertner's commentary in English on book 1, a valuable work, whose vast scale perhaps diminishes its accessibility to some readers. I am greatly indebted to these predecessors, especially Helzle and Gaertner, in the writing of the present commentary, which, consistent with the aims of this series, is meant to assist students as well as interest scholars.
I began this work in idyllic circumstances as Blegen Fellow in the Department of Classics at Vassar College. I am deeply grateful for support also from the University Research Committee of my own institution, Emory University, and from Emory's Fox Center for Humanistic Inquiry, which provided a year's leave, enabling me to complete the project. It is a pleasure to thank my colleagues at Emory for their encouragement and support. My greatest debt is to my editor, Professor E. J. Kenney, who promptly scrutinized each portion of the commentary as it was written, offering invaluable advice, recommending improvements, and rescuing me from many errors. His vast learning in Latin literature and especially in Ovid, generously shared with so many over many decades, remains a source of inspiration and encouragement for all who pursue these studies.
In Chapter 1 we discussed diverse meanings of “history,” “psychology,” and “science,” and we explained our critical-historical orientation to the history and philosophy of psychology. Now we can begin the first stage of our historical journey and consider how psychological questions were addressed in ancient, medieval, and Renaissance thought. New scholarship in these areas has generated controversy and new insights especially regarding interpretations of ancient thought (Rossetti, 2004). By addressing this research we clear up some long-standing misinterpretations, however, for the most part we present conventional ideas on the history of philosophy relevant to psychological inquiry.
We start with the ancient Greek philosophers: abstract descriptions of nature introduced by the presocratics, the Socratic method of inquiry, the psychological views of Plato, along with a differing orientation espoused by the Sophists. Then we discuss the psychological ideas of Aristotle. Next we consider developments in science and philosophical psychology during the Roman Empire. We discuss the practical views of therapeutic philosophies and religious reinterpretations of Plato in late antiquity important to medieval ways of thinking. Concerning the Middle Ages, we describe the influential ideas of Augustine and Aquinas on psychological subjects. Regarding the Renaissance, we note the cultural, scientific, and philosophical developments from which a modern scientific and a more intensely psychological focus began to emerge in the seventeenth century. That stage of our journey continues in Chapter 3.
In this closing chapter we synthesize our account of Psychology’s history and philosophy by presenting multiple critical frameworks for appreciating the past, present, and anticipated future of the discipline. The central theme is that many individuals and groups have described Psychology throughout its history as a problematic science due to its disputed concepts, methodology, and practices, yet they also proposed alternative approaches. We trace these critiques back to Immanuel Kant, Auguste Comte, and nineteenth-century German scholars Friedrich Lange and Rudolf Willy (1855–1918).
Turning to the twentieth century, we review developments in physics, biology, and fuzzy logic, which have implications for Psychology’s scientific and epistemological foundations. Then we describe critiques by social philosophers, Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas, known as critical theorists, and discuss modern critical approaches in Psychology, including the work of Klaus Holzkamp and current critical psychology.
Next we review more recent critiques of mainstream Psychology from feminist and postmodern perspectives. Then we trace the inclination to critique Psychology to advocates of postcolonial perspectives who assert that psychologists have tended to ignore the discipline’s cultural embeddedness and who propose respect for culturally diverse psychologies. We conclude our review of critiques with a philosophical analysis of the ontology, epistemology, and ethics of Psychology.
After the Scientific Revolution natural science came to overshadow religious knowledge about nature and human nature. Many natural philosophers became disenchanted with divine and mysterious explanations. They regarded nature as mechanistic, manipulable for human ends, even conquerable. Emergent empirical methods and quantification techniques enhanced scientists’ confidence about their work.
Societally, economically privileged Western nations became increasingly rationalized and bureaucratic. Efficient administration of industry, commerce, and government depended on applications of systematic knowledge; consequently, social management of individuals escalated. In addition, cultivating individual experience became culturally desirable.
This scientific and societal context was early psychologists’ legacy. Their new science blended the study of individuals with practical applications for managing them. To legitimize Psychology, natural-science psychologists adopted the methodology of the natural sciences. They assumed that rigorous application of empirical methods and precise and reliable measurement would reveal socially useful truths.
Empirical methods, then, typically supported by quantification, have been the basis for natural-science psychologists’ claims to scientific knowledge. However, it seems that, rather than being purely objective and universal, these claims depend on modes of conducting research and writing about it that have a social history. In short, societal and scientific contexts guided Psychology’s research traditions.
While a field of study that is “applied” aims to have a practical purpose, a “profession” is generally understood as an occupation practised not only for societal gain but also as a source of personal livelihood. The first and oldest professions recognized were theology, medicine, and law. In the nineteenth century, other learned studies were accepted as professions, such as architecture and engineering. In the twentieth century, professionalization of labour became more pervasive, and accounting, teaching, and nursing as well as Psychology developed professional associations. Professionals were an expanding class of people given the authority to govern and shape the conduct of others (Miller & Rose, 1994). Applied psychology was the first occupational group to emerge entirely from academia (Napoli, 1981).
In this chapter we consider the historical development of applied and professional psychology as it emerged in response to problems of war, education, business, medicine, mental disturbance, crime, sports, community, and environmental concerns as well as the ethical codes and standards of professional conduct developed for clinical and counselling psychology.
In this chapter we begin a journey through the vast and varied terrain of the history of psychological topics by attempting to clarify what the terms “psychology,” “history,” “science,” and “philosophy” mean. We discuss some central ideas underlying a critical history and philosophy of psychological topics. Then we place the work of scientists in context and describe social realities that influence scientists’ attempts to be objective and unbiased. As such, we propose a view of science as socially embedded.
Because the discipline and professions of Psychology as practised currently are indebted to both ancient and modern philosophy, we examine domains of philosophy that seem most relevant to Psychology. Our view is that a philosophical outlook on psychological issues strengthens systematic critical inquiry. By “critical” we mean an approach that not only examines what psychologists are doing, but also why they are doing what they are doing. This approach includes an analysis of the implicit assumptions as well as the contexts in which psychological thinking and practice are embedded.
In this chapter we address the major changes that natural-science Psychology underwent after World War II. First we describe cultural and scientific developments that affected the discipline. Then we note the ways in which Psychology took shape internationally but in diverse forms. Next we describe developments in basic processes, developmental psychology, interpersonal processes, and psychologists’ relationship to the social order. We conclude by discussing thematic issues that link Psychology’s disparate domains.
Throughout this chapter we refer to four domains of natural-science Psychology:
Behavioural neuroscience focuses on animal models of basic psychological processes of sensation, perception, learning, cognition, emotion, and motivation. Behavioural neuroscience encompasses the subdisciplines of biological and comparative psychology, which previously were known as biopsychology or physiological psychology.
Cognitive neuroscience focuses on the same basic psychological processes in humans. Cognitive neuroscience encompasses cognitive psychology and overlaps with neuroscience and philosophy.
Developmental psychology focuses on animal and human development and links biological and cognitive domains with interpersonal processes.
Interpersonal psychology encompasses the subdisciplines of cultural, gender, personality, and social psychology.
Another domain of current natural-science Psychology is applied and professional psychology, which we describe in Chapter 8.
The aims of this chapter are to describe:
Cultural conditions and scientific developments, including the status of women, which were the context for Psychology’s development after World War II.
The discipline’s growth internationally in relation to globalized US Psychology.
The principal schools of thought after World War II: operant behaviourism, biological organization of behaviour, and cognitivism.
Developments in psychological neuroscience, neurogenetics, and evolutionary psychology.
The expansion of developmental psychology since World War II.
Developments in personality and social psychology and the psychological issues they have in common.
Psychologists’ relationship to the social order, including responses to racism and sexism.
Central themes that summarize Psychology’s development after World War II: neuroscience of the evolutionary brain and consciousness, self and identity in context, disciplinary fragmentation, and alliance with the status quo.
In this textbook on the history and philosophy of Psychology our intention is to provide a comprehensive but accessible account with international content suitable for a one-term or two-term, advanced undergraduate course in which the instructor aims to foster critical thinking about the discipline’s intellectual and social development. Below we describe our intellectual approach, text structure and chapter content, and the educational intent and pedagogical features of our text.
The distinctive characteristics of the text are as follows:
Integrates the history and philosophy of Psychology.
Distinguishes between natural-science and human-science Psychologies.
Relies on current scholarship in the history and philosophy of Psychology.
Takes an international and contextualized approach to psychological ideas.
Includes applied and professional psychology, current developments in the discipline, and Psychology’s research traditions.
Fosters students’ critical thinking about the history and philosophy of Psychology.
Facilitates instructors employing a different order of presenting the twelve chapters, because they are relatively self-contained, yet thematically linked.