There are two views one can take on the timeliness of the idea of human rights. One is that it is an idea whose time has come. This view sees human rights as being a necessary counter to economic globalisation and asserts that, in the newly globalised world, ideas of global citizenship based on ideals of human rights are important in the same way as ideas of national citizenship rights became important with the emergence of the nation state. It suggests that the apparently increasing interest in a human rights discourse is a source of hope for a future based on collective understandings of shared human values rather than individual greed and consumption. Human rights can be the basis for a future of humanity that until now has seemed an impossible dream.

The other view of human rights is that it is an idea whose time has passed. This view sees human rights as a leftover remnant from the disappearing world of modernist certainty and Western imperialism. In the newly emerging postmodern world of relativism, multiple voices, fragmented realities and the ‘death of the meta-narrative’, there is no room for, and no point in, a universal discourse such as human rights. The idea of human rights is so tied up with the modernist project, and so Western in its construction, that to persist with it is both an irrelevance and a disservice to humanity rather than a positive contribution to the future.

The academic literature on human rights has been dominated by three disciplines: law, philosophy and political science. Although social workers have for a long time liked to talk about rights (Centre for Human Rights 1994; Tan & Envall 2000), especially welfare rights, rights-based practice and the rights of particular disadvantaged groups, a thorough analysis of human rights and their implications has not been prominent in the social work literature, and lawyers, political scientists and philosophers have dominated the discourse.

In terms of human rights practice – the theme of this book – the field has mostly been the province of lawyers, who are widely regarded as the main human rights professionals, though a social work literature on human rights has recently begun to emerge (Solas 2000; Reichert 2003, 2007). Most edited collections of articles on human rights, and journals dedicated to human rights, are written and edited by lawyers, and the law is commonly seen as the primary mechanism for the safeguarding of human rights and the prevention of human rights abuses (Beetham 1999; Douzinas 2000). The emphasis has been on legislation and on human rights treaties and conventions, and much of the literature is concerned with their analysis and implementation (Mahoney & Mahoney 1993). Many countries have human rights commissions, whose membership consists largely of people with legal training, and which operate in a legal or quasi-legal way, for example by hearing complaints and making judgments that have legal force.

One of the important characteristics of a profession is that it should have a code of ethics (Corey et al. 1998). Social workers have long considered ethics an indispensable aspect of their practice, and many national social work associations have codes of ethics to which their members are required to adhere. Social work is no different from many other professions in this, except that the importance it gives to values means that social workers are probably more immediately conscious of the ethical aspects of their practice than are some other professionals. Certainly, social workers spend a good deal of time talking about ethics, establishing and revising codes of ethics, and consciously dealing with ethical issues confronted in practice. The very nature of social work practice, dealing as it does with conflicting values and the making of difficult moral choices on behalf of society, means that ethical dilemmas will be part of the practice of every social worker (Clark 2000).

Codes of ethics are not only used to encourage ‘ethical’ behaviour on the part of social workers and to assist social workers who are confronted by difficult ethical dilemmas. They also perform a controlling function by seeking to prevent deliberately ‘unethical’ behaviour on the part of social workers. There is usually some form of sanction associated with the operation of a code of ethics: a mechanism for steps to be taken against unethical social workers, such as expulsion from the professional association, relinquishment of their right to practise, or a requirement to undertake further training (Gaha 1997). A code of ethics is therefore a significant part of the profession's formal mechanisms of control.

The discursive view of human rights, emphasised throughout this book, suggests that human rights must be understood as an ongoing and ever-changing discourse about what it means to be human and about what should comprise the rights of common global citizenship. If this is the case, it is most important to examine the nature of that global dialogue. Who is responsible for maintaining that discourse, who contributes, who does not, and whose voices are the most powerful in defining what is to count as ‘human rights’?

As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the consequences of global-isation has been localisation, and this has led to the identification of the global and the local as the sites of significant change and praxis. For this reason, the discussion in this chapter will be divided into a consideration of global and local dialogues around human rights.

The global discourse of human rights

While not wanting to underemphasise the disproportionate role that Western voices have had in framing the human rights discourse,it is also clear that this concern is now being vigorously addressed. Even a cursory glance at the human rights literature shows that the issue of cultural relativism and the Western domination of the discourse has received substantial attention and that a significant number of non-Western writers are now talking about human rights (Schmale 1993; Pereira 1997; Aziz 1999; Bauer & Bell 1999; Parekh 1999; Van Ness 1999; Nirmal 2000; Moussalli 2001; Dalacoura 2003).

The concept of human rights represents one of the most powerful ideas in contemporary discourse. In a world of economic globalisation, where individualism and becoming rich are seen as the most important things in life, and where at the same time the formerly secure moral positions for judging our actions seem to be reverting to a postmodern relativism, the idea of human rights provides an alternative moral reference point for those who would seek to reaffirm the values of humanity.

This book is written in the belief that human rights are important, and that they are particularly important for those in the human service professions in general and for social workers in particular. By framing social work specifically as a human rights profession, we can look at many of the issues and dilemmas that face it in a new light. Further, human rights can provide social workers with a moral basis for their practice, both at the level of day-to-day work with ‘clients’ and in community development, policy advocacy and activism. This book seeks to articulate what it means to say that social work is a human rights profession, and to consider the implications of such a perspective for the practice of social work. However, it does not provide a simple ‘how-to-do-it’ framework for human rights-based social work. Human rights do not provide simple answers; rather they pose questions – often complex and difficult questions – for the practitioner. It is in wrestling with these questions that human rights-based social work can be enacted.

As was indicated in Chapter 2, one of the major criticisms of conventional human rights discourse, largely confined to civil and political rights, has been that it has concentrated on the protection of human rights and the prevention of human rights abuse only in the public sphere (Clapham 1993; Bröhmer 1997; Ratner & Abrams 1997). The very idea of ‘civil and political’ rights implies that rights are about the capacity to engage freely in the structures and processes of civil society and the body politic.

The fact remains, however, that for many people it is not in the public or ‘civil and political’ domain where human rights are threatened or denied and where it is necessary for human rights to be promoted and protected. It is in the private or domestic sphere that, arguably, the greater human rights violations occur and where there is most need for social work practice to seek to redress abuses. A number of groups can be identified to whom such human rights practice most particularly applies. In discussing these particular groups in this chapter, several important issues about human rights and human rights practice will emerge and will be considered. The chapter will therefore not only consider the human rights of vulnerable groups but will also use these considerations to identify a number of important theoretical and practical issues that apply to any examination of human rights and social work practice.

Human rights is a powerful ideal. It is readily endorsed by people from many different cultural and ideological backgrounds and it is used rhetorically in support of a large number of different and sometimes conflicting causes. Because of its strong appeal and its rhetorical power, it is often used loosely and can have different meanings in different contexts, although those who use the idea so readily seldom stop to ponder its various meanings and its contradictions. This combination of its strong appeal and its contradictions makes the idea of human rights worth closer consideration, especially for social workers and those in other human service professions.

This book is concerned with what a human rights perspective means for social workers (Centre for Human Rights 1994). Framing social work as a human rights profession has certain consequences for the way in which social work is conceptualised and practised. In many instances, such a perspective reinforces and validates the traditional understandings and practices of social work, while in other cases it challenges some of the assumptions of the social work profession. The position of this book is that a human rights perspective can strengthen social work and that it provides a strong basis for an assertive practice that seeks to realise the social justice goals of social workers, in whatever setting. Human rights, however, are also contested and problematic. To develop a human rights basis for social work requires that the idea of human rights, and the problems and criticisms associated with it, be carefully and critically examined. In this and following chapters some of the issues and problems associated with human rights will be discussed, and the implications of these discussions for social work will be highlighted.

The previous chapter dealt with ways to realise and protect human rights through social work practice. This chapter, by contrast, focuses on social work practice itself – it is the processes, rather than the outcomes, of social work practice that are of concern here. If social work is a human rights profession and aims to meet human rights through its practice, it is essential that the profession itself operate in such a way that its own practices observe human rights principles and do not violate the human rights of others.

As in the previous chapter, many of the principles identified here have already emerged from previous discussion, for example in Chapter 7, concerning ethics and human rights, though that chapter did not undertake an examination of social work practice per se from a human rights perspective. The important principle throughout this chapter is that we respect other people's human rights by allowing them maximum self-determination and control over the situation in which they find themselves. This principle can be applied to the practice of social work. While social workers have always been committed to the principle of client self-determination, this has often applied to the life of the client rather than to the practice of social work itself and to the way social work practice is constructed by social workers. To be consistent with a human rights perspective, however, the principle must also be applied to all those with whom a social worker interacts: clients, community members, colleagues, managers, supervisors, students and other professionals.

This chapter examines the link between rights and responsibilities, duties and obligations. If people are assumed to have rights, these can be seen as implying certain corresponding obligations, on the part of both the state and individuals, to ensure that those rights are protected and realised. These need to be examined in some detail, as they have significant implications for a social work practice that assumes a human rights perspective. We will first examine the idea of the responsibilities of the state, or of some other civic body, which result from the acknowledgment and affirmation of human rights.

The erosion of the state

It is clear that human rights impose some obligation on the state to ensure that those rights are respected, protected and realised. However, before examining how this can be achieved, and its implications for social work, we need to examine the problematic role of the state in contemporary society. The ‘crisis in the state’ is a recurring theme in the social policy literature, and there is a substantial literature on the more specific ‘crisis in the welfare state’, which is particularly significant, since it is the welfare state that has been seen as having the primary responsibility for ensuring the meeting of many economic, social and cultural human rights (Bryson 1992; Burrows & Loader 1994; Saunders 1994; Goodin et al. 1999; Mishra 1999; Rodger 2000).

Thus far, there has been little discussion about how we construct, define or accept human rights. What rights should actually count as human rights for social work practice? Do we simply accept the Universal Declaration, do we add to it, do we subtract from it, or do we reformulate it? On reading the Universal Declaration (see Appendix I), one is struck by how many of the rights contained in it are violated daily for millions of people. This applies not only to developing nations or nations with a ‘human rights record’ that is seen as ‘poor’. It also applies to the so-called ‘developed’ world, where the rights outlined in the Universal Declaration are certainly not all adequately met for the whole population. What country, for example, can clearly demonstrate the full realisation of the right to equality before the law, the right to work and to free choice of work, higher education equally accessible to all on the basis of ability alone, and other rights?

There are also many other statements of human rights – international treaties and conventions, regional declarations and national constitutions and bills of rights – that can be useful for social workers. Social workers cannot work as human rights workers without a clear idea of what the human rights are on which their practice should be based, and so there is a need to refer to, or construct, some formulation of what human rights are to count.

This chapter is about the relationship between needs and rights, and what that means for social work practice. Social workers can be regarded as professional need-definers. They are constantly in the process of identifying, and then trying to meet, human needs, as described back in 1945 by Charlotte Towle (Towle 1965). Scarcely a day would pass in any social worker's life when the word ‘need’ is not used on dozens of occasions. Social workers do ‘needs assessments’, talk about the needs of individuals, of families, of client groups (e.g. the aged), of communities, of agencies, of service delivery systems (e.g. the health care system) and of the whole society (e.g. the need for a better income security system). Social workers talk about ‘unmet need’, ‘needing more resources’, ‘doing a needs survey’, ‘needing more social workers’ and ‘needing supervision’. ‘Need’ is one of the most commonly used words in the social work vocabulary, and it is significant that more often than not it is used, in the words of Noel and Rita Timms, ‘in the absence of any deep sense of puzzlement about the concept’ (Timms & Timms 1977: 141).

Need, however, is a complex issue and requires a good deal more examination than is common in the social work literature. This book seeks to frame social work as a human rights profession rather than a human needs profession. Instead of seeing social work practice as about the assessment and meeting of human needs, we can see it as about the defining, realising and guaranteeing of human rights. To understand the difference, it is necessary to look in more detail at the relationship between needs and rights in the context of social work practice, so that the implications of an idea of rights-based practice can become clearer.

The issue of cultural relativism has been a major one for theorists of human rights. Arguments about cultural difference represent perhaps the strongest criticisms of the idea of human rights, and for many they are the most difficult to deal with (Brown 1998, 1999). This is especially true for social workers from Western traditions, who are generally aware of the role of the West in colonising other world-views and who wish to value cultural diversity. This results in Western social workers (among many others) feeling somewhat guilty about supporting something called ‘human rights’ and being particularly susceptible to the criticisms of human rights as a Western concept and therefore somehow not to be trusted. The aim of this chapter is to explore this difficult area, with a view to developing an approach to human rights that overcomes these dilemmas.

While it is true that the Western cultural tradition has been the origin of many oppressive and colonising practices, including some aspects of conventional social work practice, the feelings of guilt about all things Western, so commonly expressed by people like social workers, represents an inappropriate and unhelpful reaction. While there are many things that can be criticised about mainstream Western culture, there are other aspects of Western culture which, from a human rights perspective, one would want to defend. And exactly the same can be said of other cultural traditions; glorifying another culture and assuming that it should be beyond criticism is as naïve and misleading as it is to criticise everything about Western culture as oppressive.