There are many definitions of intelligence analysis, often using as a starting point the views of Sherman Kent, the founder of the profession of intelligence analysis in the United States, who wrote that that it can be an organization, a process, or a product. Others see intelligence analysis as solving puzzles. Grappling with conundrums is part of what analysts do, but just finding a solution is not the main goal. Still others emphasize that dealing with secret and tightly controlled information, such as from spies or satellites, is what is important about intelligence analysis. This may have been true during the Cold War but is much less so in the age of the Internet, when vast amounts of data that could be useful are readily available. Moreover, many people in business and law enforcement use analytic techniques effectively without recourse to secret sources or methods.

The perspective in Challenges in Intelligence Analysis: Lessons from 1300 BCE to the Present, therefore, is that what is unique and important about intelligence analysis is that it supports decision making. This is especially the case when the decision maker is dealing with difficult problems, high stakes, and intense pressure to get it right. Although having quality data, including possibly secret data, is important, analyses can be effective without any secret input. What is really crucial about intelligence analysis is how one thinks about the problem, including factors such as the identifying the main issues, evaluating the evidence, and laying out the options and risks.

The challenge for president woodrow wilson (1856–1924) as world War I came to an end was to promote American interests in a unique environment. The United States was playing a much more active role in the international scene than it had previously. Moreover, it found itself in a position of great military, economic, and political power, and its resources of manpower, equipment, and money were being applied on an unprecedented, global scale.

Wilson believed that the contribution that he and the United States could make to a peace settlement was to bring a perspective that was enlightened, rational, and progressive. Wilson's Fourteen Points made clear his vision of a settlement based on openness, freedom, justice, self-determination, disarmament, and a League of Nations to settle future disputes. Not everyone agreed with these goals, but the principles, along with American power, framed the debate.

In 1917, only a few months after the United States entered the war, Wilson set up a semi-official commission, known as the Inquiry, to gather information that would be useful for supporting him in the eventual peace negotiations. Financial support for the commission came from a presidential national security contingency fund provided by Congress. This was one of the earliest examples of bureaucratic analytic support for a senior decision maker.

Drawing on his extensive experience in academia, including obtaining a doctorate in history and political science, as well as serving as president of Princeton University, Wilson took a decidedly academic approach to the work of the Inquiry.

Unfortunately, despite all of the sacrifices made in the most destructive war in history, the end of World War II did not bring an era of peace. Instead there was a tense rivalry between the superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – and their allies. For nearly half a century, these two coalitions maneuvered against each other on a global basis. This competition was exacerbated by ideological differences, with the Western powers mainly capitalist, and the Eastern bloc communist.

To cope with this new and more threatening environment, the government of the United States, under the 1947 National Security Act, carried out a major reorganization. The 1947 legislation created a unified Department of Defense to coordinate the air force, army, and navy; and it established the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct espionage, covert action, and analysis. To manage the entire structure the president would have a new National Security Council.

The risks in this Cold War struggle for power were greater than ever before because of the existence of nuclear weapons. For the first time, the survival of whole countries, or even the entire planet, was threatened because of the technology of warheads and missiles.

There was also a significant intelligence component to the rivalry between the superpowers. Both sides developed huge and expensive intelligence organizations, including high-technology collection systems. There was also extensive deception and espionage.

The exact dates of sun tzu's life are not known with certainty, although they are traditionally believed to be around the fifth century BCE. Some scholars are not even sure that Sun Tzu was a single individual: They believe instead that the classic work, The Art of War, may be a compendium of the work of several authors. In any event, The Art of War is a summary of the Chinese perspective on some of the longstanding issues in intelligence analysis, including deception, surprise, uncertainty, indicators, calculation of risk, and anticipation of events.

As was the case in the West, the earliest Chinese works on intelligence analysis are preoccupied with military issues. Sun Tzu wrote before the unification of China and during a time when governments had to deal with shifting alliances and constant conflict. Rulers often faced the prospect of defeat and perhaps the extinction of a dynasty or even the state itself. As a result, a high value was assigned to guidance that could lead to success in war. Sun Tzu's views are expressed in a series of pungent aphorisms, sometimes embodying paradox, such as how to win a battle without fighting. The Art of War addresses a wide range of strategic and tactical issues, but gives special attention to intelligence.

Julius caesar (100–44 bce) is one of the most famous and successful military commanders in history, and there are many reasons for his triumphs. He is well known for his persistence, ruthlessness, and personal courage, as well as for the careful planning and organization of his military operations. Caesar was also famous for the close ties with his troops, upon whom he lavished praise, plunder, and promotions. One of the things that was most striking to both his fellow Romans and his enemies was the speed of his decision making and action. Not least of his skills was that he had an uncanny ability to size up a situation and come up with an appropriate response; he was, in fact, an excellent analyst.

In the first century BCE, the expanding Roman Empire controlled most of the northern coast of the Mediterranean. One of the few areas that was close to the Italian heartland of the empire but not yet conquered was Gaul, which is now France, Belgium, and parts of the Netherlands and Switzerland. Roman merchants did business in the region and knew something about it, but the Roman army had never conducted operations there. For Caesar, who was looking for ways to enhance both Roman power and his personal glory, Gaul was a tempting target. What could be gained, however, and could it be achieved at reasonable cost? A key issue was, therefore, how to conduct successful military operations on unfamiliar terrain.

In the midst of world war ii, when it was far from clear who would win the conflict, analysts in Britain faced the especially difficult problem of how to find and understand something they had never seen before and determine the level of danger it represented. The challenge was, in the face of German denial and deception, to assess new weapons and to do so in time to produce countermeasures. It would be easiest to develop countermeasures early on during the design phase of a new weapon, but during that phase the nature of the threat is hard to detect because most of the work is done in someone's head or in an office. There is a greater chance of understanding a new weapon during its testing phase, when prototypes are out in the open – but is this too late? When the new weapon is actually operational, it is difficult to develop countermeasures.

During World War II, Hitler from time to time in his speeches mentioned new weapons that Germany was developing, but he gave no details. British and American intelligence analysts were aware that Germany was working on a number of projects, such as the atomic bomb and jet aircraft, that could be a serious threat. Could there be something else?

Starting in late 1942 operatives working on the European continent for the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) reported that the Germans were building a new long-range weapon, often referred to as a “rocket” (Rakete in German).

In january 2003, there was public panic in southern china in response to the rapid spread of a serious respiratory disease. People in large numbers were buying both modern medicines and traditional herbal cures, but nothing seemed to work. Local health officials came up with a diagnosis of what they termed “atypical pneumonia,” even though the disease did not respond to antibiotics that would normally have been effective against pneumonia. Provincial and national governments released little information beyond claiming that there had been only a handful of deaths and that the situation was under control, so the outside world had little sense of what was happening. In the months that followed, approximately 5,300 people in China became infected, 349 of whom died.

Over the winter, the situation continued to worsen, and by late February the disease had spread to Hong Kong. Officials there were already dealing with an outbreak of avian influenza and were worried that the new disease might be influenza. Symptoms, or indicators, of what they feared might be a new wave of influenza included fever, dry cough, and body aches, which were typical of several diseases such as pneumonia and influenza. The new ailment, however, was more serious, acted more quickly, and spread more rapidly. Hong Kong is, of course, a major transportation hub, and travelers passing through the city spread the disease to elsewhere in China, as well as to Canada, Singapore, and Vietnam.

Coca cola is, of course, one of the largest and best known companies in the world. In the 1980s, however, it was losing market share to Pepsi, its traditional rival. Pepsi was conducting an extensive and successful advertising campaign, trying to attract and lock in young consumers by making Pepsi look hip and stylish.

To respond, Coca Cola executives decided to change its taste; Pepsi was sweeter, so perhaps what Coke needed was a sweeter version. The company had already introduced Diet Coke and Cherry Coke, and concluded that it could safely tinker with the basic recipe of its premier product.

Coca Cola did some market research into customer attitudes, but the approach continued to focus on the issue of taste. For example, its researchers conducted taste tests, and many consumers said that, in fact, they preferred New Coke to the original. There was some inconsistent data, however, with focus groups indicating that there would be some anger at the change in product. In addition, surveys did not have the same results. In any case, executives did not make it clear to consumers that New Coke was to be a replacement for the original.

Neither the researchers nor the executives realized that taste was not the main issue. Instead, many consumers' strong attachment to Coke was based on emotion; they saw it as an icon of Americana.

Another early front in the cold war was in southeast asia. in the late 1940s, insurgents in the British colony of Malaya hoped to follow in the footsteps of the successful communist takeover in China in 1949. Based on the Chinese model, the Malayan communists portrayed themselves as the main voice for independence and social justice, and they planned to use guerrilla tactics to drive out the British. Starting in the summer of 1948, the communist insurgents began attacking the main economic resources in Malaya – rubber plantations and tin mines – to increase the financial burden for London of holding the colony.

From the beginning of the insurgency, the British faced the difficulties of fighting a war in a complex environment far from their main sources of support. Some 80 percent of the Malayan Peninsula was covered by jungle, and British settlers, soldiers, policemen, and officials were few in number. In addition, there was a varied ethnic makeup of Malays, Chinese, and Indians, with uncertainty about their loyalties.

On the other hand, the British had some potential advantages. For example, Malaya had only a narrow land border, which could be relatively easily controlled. The only other alternative for potential external help for the insurgents was to come by sea, a route which the British could dominate. In addition, as time passed, the Korean War brought greater demand for Malayan rubber and tin, greatly increasing the financial resources available to the government.

In 1932, with memories of his 1927 solo flight across the atlantic Ocean still fresh, Charles Lindbergh was one of the best known and most highly respected people in the world. His wife, Anne, was the daughter of a partner in the J. P. Morgan bank who had also served as ambassador to Mexico. At approximately 7:00 p.m., on the evening of Tuesday, March 1, 1932, the Lindberghs put their 20-month-old son, Charles, to bed in his upstairs room at their country estate near Hopewell, New Jersey. Construction was not quite completed on the house, and usually the family only stayed there on weekends. Because Charles had had a cold, however, they had stayed longer. Also in the house that evening were three servants: a butler, a cook, and a nursemaid. At approximately 10:00 p.m., the nursemaid checked on the baby and found the crib empty. One of the bedroom windows was open, and there was a small, white envelope on the sill. A quick search inside and outside the house turned up no sign of the child. The local police responded quickly to a call, and a further search revealed a custom-made collapsible ladder and a chisel in the yard.

One of the early casualties in the investigation was the crime scene. The first detectives to arrive did not take accurate measurements or make plaster casts of footprints and tire tracks that they found. In addition, as more police, reporters, and sightseers arrived, these prints and tracks were obliterated.

Under england's queen elizabeth i (1533–1603) tensions with Spain, which had once been an ally, increased over religion, trade, and other issues. From the mid-1580s there was an undeclared naval war in European waters, as well as in Spain's colonies throughout the world. To resolve the rivalry, King Philip II of Spain (1527–98) decided to build a great fleet (Armada) for an invasion of England.

The method of the attack was fairly well known: It would be carried out by large wooden sailing ships. Since the beginning of the sixteenth century there had been such ships, carrying sizable numbers of cannons and troops anywhere on earth where there was water and wind, which was approximately 70 percent of the planet's surface. This capability to send men and equipment in considerable numbers over vast distances was unprecedented. For the English government, the key questions were to determine (1) what Philip would choose as the target and (2) when an attack an attack might come. The information on which to base planning to resist the Armada came in two separate channels: the experience of the English navy and the country's espionage network.

Spain had a global empire, with territory in Europe, the Americas, and the Philippines. The English navy, which was then an emerging organization, learned about Spain's galleons through direct contact in battles around the world, starting in the 1560s. Mariners, such as John Hawkins (1532–95) and Francis Drake (1540–96), found that Spanish ships were powerful, but also slow and awkward.

Analysis is as much about questions as it is about answers. it is about understanding various ways to think about a problem and realizing that not every analytic method applies to every problem. The effective analyst has a collection of approaches, techniques, and tools, along with the willingness and patience to apply them. These analytic methods have been accumulated over time and from many different sources.

Uncertainty

To deal with uncertainty, analysts seek to provide context, a sense of the bigger picture. A useful first step in understanding context is problem restatement, also known as bounding the problem, which involves making sure that all relevant and important aspects of the issue are taken into account. Virtually every issue has various aspects, such as economic, social, political, and legal; therefore, analysts need to take the various perspectives into account. Analysts also provide context by looking for abstract linkages such as patterns, relationships, and trends. Understanding such linkages involves asking such questions as whether developments are new, accelerated, or having more impact.

A specific tool for providing context is the chronology, or the listing of events in the order in which they happened. This order may well be different from the order in which reports about the events were received; thus it promotes clarity about where individual events fit into the overall pattern. Briefly summarizing the various events, to fit them into a chronology, also helps analysts to focus on the key elements and the relative value of reports.

Many of the same analytic frameworks and procedures used in national security (e.g., hypotheses, trends, relationships, and indicators) are also useful in law enforcement. In fact, some widely used analytic techniques, such as network analysis, were pioneered in law enforcement. There are also some similarities in collection based on multiple kinds of sources. Both national security and law enforcement use imagery (surveillance photos and video in police work), reports from human sources (witness statements, confidential informants), and communications intercepts (telephone taps), for example.

There are also significant differences, however. Instead of trying to anticipate and plan for developments, law enforcement generally does not act until after a crime has taken place. Given the high stakes and the pressure of time, military and political leaders often have to make decisions before the facts are clear. The judicial system can take more time, and has higher standards of proof: for a case, “preponderance of evidence” in civil cases and “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal ones. Court procedures, such as maintaining a clear and unadulterated chain of custody for evidence, are much more stringent than the way “evidence” is handled in the national security agencies. The consumers of intelligence are also different in law enforcement. They often include local political and police officials who need to carefully apportion scarce resources to pursue investigations and prosecutions that will succeed and have an impact. Consumers can also include operators, who use analysis to target key suspects for arrest.

The cold war was waged not only in the third world and on missile production lines, but also in quieter ways. During the waning months of 1985, American spies in the USSR were being arrested at an alarming rate, and by the following spring almost a dozen – virtually the entire roster of human sources operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the Soviet Union – had been killed. Most were quickly executed; in some cases their fate was never determined. As time passed, a number of technical operations being conducted against the Soviets were also exposed. Obviously, something was terribly wrong.

In 1986, the CIA and FBI launched separate counterintelligence investigations to try to determine what had happened, so that corrective measures could be taken. The CIA's approach was to look at the records of the blown cases to see if there were common elements that might provide leads. Initially the hypotheses were: (1) that the problem was sloppy tradecraft by the Soviet agents; (2) revelations from the numerous spies arrested in 1985 (which had become known as “the year of the spy”); or (3) that U.S. secure communications with Moscow had been compromised.

It soon became clear that none of these hypotheses was a plausible explanation. That all of the American spies had made operational mistakes at the same time was unlikely.

As far back as there have been organized societies and records of their activities, there have been wars. To achieve victory in those conflicts, military commanders realized that it was to their advantage to have accurate information about factors such as the lay of the land, the strength and location of enemy forces, and the opposing commander's capabilities and intentions.

Looking back from the perspective of the age of the Internet and trying to understand the analytic challenges centuries ago, it is worthwhile to think for a few moments about how different things were.

Records are not always complete or accurate when looking back at the distant past. It is clear, however, that the power, range, and mobility of weapons were quite restricted. The introduction of gunpowder increased capabilities, but muskets and cannons still had limited range. Moreover, armies and fleets could move only at the speed at which a man could march or a ship sail. Providing sufficient supplies also limited the size, duration, and scope of operations.

Information – the lifeblood of intelligence – could move a bit faster than armies or fleets, at the speed of a galloping horse, although this speed was difficult to maintain over extremely long distances.

In the ancient world, the effort to obtain accurate and useful information before making a decision revealed what would turn out to be timeless problems such as how to assess risk, what constitutes reliable evidence, how to uncover and deal with deception, and how to avoid getting caught by surprise.

In recent years there has been much discussion of success and failure in intelligence and many proposals for reform. Much of the focus has been on reorganizations, such as establishing the position of Director of National Intelligence to improve coordination among the various intelligence agencies and creating the Department of Homeland Security, or more advanced technology, such as data mining.

Relatively little attention, however, has been devoted to how to improve analytic thinking in intelligence, especially by examining the historical record to see which analytic approaches have worked – or not worked. To fill this gap, Challenges in Intelligence Analysis: Lessons from 1300 BCE to the Present offers examples from the last three millennia. These examples have been drawn from around the world and a variety of disciplines, including national security, law enforcement, and business. The goal is to identify some common approaches and principles; it is hoped that a fact-based understanding of the past will help in generating realistic expectations for the future.

Some people ask – rightly – if there is such a thing as a “lesson of history.” Of course, each situation in the past, as well as each new set of circumstances in the future, is unique and different. Details of what we learn from one situation may not be applicable to other situations, especially in a large number of cases. That said, there are similar problems over time, such as fast-moving situations, tightly held decisions made by adversaries, implications of new technologies, and skilled deception.

Technological developments in the first third of the twentieth century brought an entirely new military capability: the long-range strategic bomber that could deliver a large payload over hundreds of miles. Advocates of strategic bombing claimed that this capability had the potential to defeat an enemy without the traditional need to destroy forces in the field. Now commanders could hope to achieve a strategic goal of striking at the enemy's capacity to wage war, such as industrial production, transportation links, and the population. After the fall of France in the spring of 1940, strategic bombing was the only way Britain could hope to inflict damage on Germany, until a cross-Channel invasion could be organized.

During World War II, the main problem for Allied bombers was one of efficiency, or how to have the most impact on the German war effort with the fewest bombs. The solution was to target a limited number of facilities based on their importance to the German war economy and their vulnerability. Analysis was done in two steps: Suitable targets were identified, then results of the bombing were evaluated to determine if further strikes were necessary. Intelligence analysis could play a crucial role in this process, but British and American targeters came up with quite different ways to go about it.

The Royal Air Force's (RAF) doctrine for strategic bombing concentrated on massive, nighttime attacks on large targets, mainly cities.

According to the biblical account in the book of numbers, after leaving Egypt and then spending many years of tribulation in the Sinai desert, the Israelites approached the land of Canaan (modern Israel and parts of the surrounding countries), which had been promised to them by God. Before undertaking the dangerous and important task of launching an invasion, there were certain things that Moses, the commander, wanted to know. Following divine instructions, he sent the leaders of the twelve Israelite tribes on a mission to clandestinely collect information about what lay ahead. According to the King James version of the Bible, Moses' guidance to the spies was:

The twelve spies spent forty days in Canaan looking for indicators of the strengths and vulnerabilities of those who occupied the land they wanted.