Abstract: This chapter examines how advertising posters for cinematographic shows with tricked or dynamic seats presented in theatres explicitly reflect, by their rhetoric, an ideal immersive spectatorial experience. Using advertising materials from 1959 for the film The Tingler and the Percepto gimmick, and from 2010s by the D-Box company, the author studies how the tricked or dynamic seat is sold to the public as a promise to better immerse themselves in the world of a film through the sense of touch. The article also considers how the spectatorial postures conveyed by the advertisements depict immersion quite similarly from one era to another.

Keywords: gimmick, advertisement, spectatorship, exhibition

The seat, as it always is in direct contact with the spectator when they watch a film, is central to the reception apparatus of cinematographic works. Indeed, it is rather rare that we experience films standing up or lying down. However, this piece of furniture is generally considered secondary to cinema's apparatus, since it does not appear to participate in the expressive codes of cinema, unlike the format or ratio of the image or the spatialization of sound, for example. Thus, except when it comes to choosing an optimal seat in the theatre in order to see the screen, to hear the sound effects all around, and not to be invaded by the proximity of neighbours, and except in cases where it might be broken or uncomfortable, the seat—like the film theatre itself nowadays—is usually forgotten during the film's screening. Moreover, this particular piece of the cinematographic apparatus has so far received very little attention from scholars. Among the few publications devoted to this subject is Jocelyn Szczepaniak-Gillece's article, “Revisiting the Apparatus: The Theatre Chair and Cinematic Spectatorship” (2016), in which the author studies texts written by architects who designed film theatres and analyzes the way they considered this piece of furniture. Among others, she quotes Ansel M. Moore, an architect who described his vision of the ideal seat in a 1939 Boxoffice Magazine article:

• ◦ This case study illustrates the difficulties a cartel can face in getting out of a price war and identifies some of the obstacles to doing so related to market circumstances. It does so by closely examining a price war that upset collusion in Québec City in 2000.

• ◦ The episode started when an independent retailer chose to defect from the collusive agreement by lowering its price so as to increase sales volume and benefit from a price-support clause it had with an upstream supplier. This act triggered a price war that caused margins to go from five cents per liter to nearly zero and which lasted almost a full year.

• ◦ Using daily station-level price data, the case study shows the price war lasted so long because it was very costly for any firm to take the lead to return to collusive prices. The root of the problem was the high price elasticity of firm demand. Raising price by only two cents per liter above neighboring prices could result in a 36 percent loss of volume. Thus, a firm raising the price to get out of the price war would experience a significant drop in sales as it waited for other firms to match its increase. This deterrent to raising price was compounded by one of the leading firms having a low-price guarantee which tied its price to the lowest price in the market.

The relative freedom and political stability of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain produced an intellectual milieu amenable to advances in the natural sciences and philosophy. The major theme of British psychological thought was empirical, emphasizing knowledge acquired through sensation. The mechanism of this acquisition process was association. Founded by Hobbes but fully articulated by Locke, British empiricism retained the necessity of the mind construct while underlining the importance of sensations. Berkeley, Hume, and Hartley evolved skeptical positions concerning the reality of matter and mind that could have left the British movement in the same sterile position as French sensationalism. In addition, James Mill, although he was somewhat salvaged by the utilitarian influence, reduced associations to mental compounding. However, the Scottish common sense writers succeeded in restoring empiricism to a more flexible and open-ended position that recognized complex and integrative psychological phenomena. Thus, the later empiricism of John Stuart Mill, while adhering to scientific inductive methods, adopted a broadly based model of psychology that viewed mental operations and physiological processes as complementary and necessary dimensions of psychological inquiry. By the nineteenth century British philosophy was providing strong support for the study of psychology.

The Romans adaptation of Greek philosophy was illustrated by the Stoics and Epicureans. The Stoics held that humanity is determined by the fates of nature, while the Epicureans believed that happiness came from seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Plato was revived by Plotinus and dominated Roman philosophy during the early years of Christianity. Both the missionary zeal of early Christians and the tranquility of Roman administration rapidly spread Christianity. The teachings of Jesus were bolstered by defenders, who gave Christianity form and content. St. Augustine successfully reinterpreted Platonic thought within Christian theology, and the consequent influence on psychology continued well beyond. With the fall of the Western empire, intellectual life came to a virtual halt, and only the monastic movement preserved remnants of Greek and Roman civilization. The papacy assumed a leading role in spiritual direction and civil administration. The power shift to the East saw the Byzantine Empire assume a distinctive Greek character. The rise of Islam threatened the survival of Christianity in the Middle East and in North Africa. But, at the same time, much of the Greek heritage of scholarship was preserved and extended in the great academic centers of medieval Islam.

German science and culture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries benefited from the enlightened patronage of the Prussian King Frederick the Great. Moreover, the universities of Germany prospered and became centers of excellence in the West, especially in science. Advances in psychology by German philosophers focused primarily on mental activity. Discarding the environmental determinacy of British empiricism, Leibniz defended the active agency of the mind in molding sensory data to provide experience. The active principle of his monadology lent itself to a dynamic view of harmony between independent physical and psychic processes. The rationalism of Wolff was fully elaborated by Kant, who described pure reason as the formation of perceptions innately through time and space, and asserted an elaborate structure of the mind in terms of categories that order the environment. From these formulations, German psychology received a variety of models suggested by Herbart, Beneke, and Lotze. Collectively, the German tradition is diverse but united by the belief in the activity of the mind and its control of environmental influences.

The ascendancy of French political power supported literary success and scientific achievement. Investigators such as Lagrange, Laplace, and Lavoisier gave mathematical and empirical support to modern chemistry, physics, and biology. In parallel, philosophical discourses on psychology led to a reinterpretation of Descartes’ formulation to focus on sensation. Condillac, Bonnet, and La Mettrie argued for the equation of mental operations and sensory input, with the result that they reduced psychology to sensation. Helvétius and Cabanis attempted to back off from such extremism by asserting the mediating role of a central ego, although both remained committed to sensory physiology. Biran and Comte recognized the consequences of reducing psychology to mere sensory physiology, but each worked out separate solutions. Biran rejected sensationalism as inadequate, suggesting an individual psychology based on consciousness and the will. In contrast Comte ultimately accepted sensationalism and dismissed psychology. For him, the individual person should properly be studied by physiology; the individual behaving in a group is the province of sociology. Comte, however, advocated a spirit of objective observation that was eventually useful to psychology. Thus, the successors to Descartes in France left psychology in a somewhat tenuous position, removed from recognition as a formal discipline.

Functional psychology was less a system than an attitude that valued the utility of psychological inquiry. Assuming a philosophical underpinning from the pragmatism of William James and Charles Sanders Peirce, functional psychology fit well into the pioneering spirit of America. From its beginning, functional psychology had a clear emphasis on applying psychology to individual and social improvement, as was evident from the works of Münsterberg, McDougall, and Hall. The tradition of British natural science and evolutionary theory was integrated into psychology in the views on adaptation championed by the Chicago functionalists, such as Dewey, Angell, and Carr. Mental testing and the study of human capacity constituted important areas of investigation among the Columbia functionalists, represented by Cattell, Thorndike, and Woodworth. Although its reaction to structural psychology kept functional psychology from developing a systematic alternative model of psychological inquiry, this phase of American psychology resulted in two critical benefits. First, functionalism firmly entrenched the new science of psychology in America and imposed on it a particular American orientation toward applied psychology. Second, functional psychology provided a necessary transition from the restricted context of structural psychology to more viable models of psychology, permitting the science to progress.

The third force movement, grounded in the principles of existential philosophy, focuses on the individual in quest of identity, values, and authenticity. The nineteenth century writings of such figures as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dilthey formed the background for the view of the person as alone and dehumanized. The twentieth century works of Sartre, Camus, and Jaspers offered further expression to the basic state of anxiety and absurdity. The personalism of Emmanuel Mounier and Karol Wojtyła reintroduced the person within psychology. The methodological writings of Husserl and Heidegger contributed to the development of phenomenology as a means of investigating the holistic character of human experience. The combined existential–phenomenological psychology was an application of a new orientation in clinical settings, by such psychologists as Merleau-Ponty and Binswanger. In America, the humanistic viewpoints of Allport, Bühler, Maslow, May, and Rogers agreed generally with the European movement, and a center of existential-phenomenological psychology emerged at Duquesne University. Although it did not generate a comprehensive alternative to behaviorist formulations, the third force movement has exerted an impact on clinical applications, especially in therapeutic efforts.

The breadth of psychology’s history underscores the importance of learning about the present from the past, and psychology’s past is certainly fascinating. Several approaches to the study of intellectual history, particularly for psychology, are presented, as are some of the major recurring themes that are addressed in the book. Finally, the study of the history of psychology as an area of specialization within the discipline focuses on the resources available for serious pursuit.

Two parallel trends prepared scholars for the investigation of the mind–body relationship so that a model of psychological inquiry could evolve. The first trend was methodological, characterized by the triumph of empiricism. Scientific innovations by Francis Bacon and Newton were firmly based on careful observations and quantification of observables. Using inductive methods, moving from observed particulars to cautious generalization, empiricism stood in contrast to the deductive methods of the Scholastic philosophers. The second trend occurred in the attempt to develop conceptions on the nature of humanity and was more a philosophical enterprise. Spinoza taught that mind and body are manifestations of the same unity of the person. Human activity, although unique because of humanity’s higher intellectual powers, is determined by the laws of nature. Descartes stated that the first principle of life is self-awareness of the idea, and all else that we know proceeds from self-reflection. His dualism of the interaction between mind and body distinguishes psychology from physiology. Descartes’ views were developed in the French and British philosophical traditions; Spinoza influenced the German efforts to develop a model of psychology.

Psychology’s past in Eastern civilizations were an inherent part of the religious and moral philosophies. In an overview of those non-Western traditions in psychology, points of interaction between East and West occurred in Persia, which served as a crossroad between India and the Arab world. Ancient Indian culture followed the traditions of Buddhism and Hinduism. The writings of the Vedas, especially the Upanishads, provided the foundation for Hindu philosophy. In China, imported Buddhism taught that self-denial and proper thinking were necessary to achieve well-being. However, the older philosophical movement of Confucianism offered a stronger basis for Chinese intellectual progress. Both Buddhism and Confucianism were exported to Japan, where they were transposed into Japanese philosophies to support nationalistic aspirations. Two Middle Eastern cultures, Egyptian and Hebrew, are important as predecessors for the ancient Greeks whose philosophical formulations would provide the foundations for the emergence of psychology. Egyptian achievements in art and architecture left us a legacy, especially expressed in astronomy and medicine. The Jewish foundation of monotheism and law, along with an understanding of the person as a unity of spirit and matter, interfaced with the Greek culture that was to dominate the Mediterranean world.

The intellectual excitement of nineteenth-century Germany was reflected by the Romantic and Existential movements, although both had international aspects as well. Both movements were to some extent reactions against the dominant idealism of rationalism, coming primarily from Kant’s views on the active mind, constructing reality. Fichte, von Schelling, and Hegel explored the implication of Kant’s philosophy, with Hegel coming to dominate the age. Romanticism found its roots in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and exerted tremendous influence in art, literature as well as philosophy, particularly in the first half of the nineteenth century. Recognizing the complexities of human experience, particularly in the dimensions of emotions, passions and desires, romanticism explored those aspects not readily explained by rational, intellectual processes. Existentialism was a direct reaction against rationalism and found initial expression in the nineteenth century by Kierkegaard, in Theology, and Dilthey, in psychology. Further, the Kantian notions of the strivings of the will and the unconscious were explored more fully by Schopenhauer and von Hartmann.