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Human imagination is a complex system that allows us to form images or concepts in the mind that are not present to the senses. Research on imagination has been heavily influenced by the idea that humans store two distinct types of long-term memory: episodic and semantic memory. This theoretical distinction is particularly important in the context of aging, where older adults show reduced episodic memory compared to semantic memory (Levine et al., 2002). However, recent work has shown that these two memories are not as distinct as once thought (Renoult et al., 2019; Irish & Vatansever, 2020), suggesting a need to either refine the relationship between these concepts, or the concepts themselves.
Here, we apply a broader framework for imagination to the autobiographical memories of older adults. Introduced by Andrews-Hanna & Grilli (2021), memory and future thoughts can be understood as the outcome of the collaboration between two representational forms of imagination: the mind’s mind and the mind’s eye. The mind’s mind is described as a high-level, abstract form of imagination accompanied by a verbal representational form, and the mind’s eye is described as a contextually-specific, image-based form of imagination. In the present study, we examine whether this broader framework for understanding imaginative thought can a) explain some of the established age-related changes in episodic and semantic memory, and b) extend beyond existing research to offer new ways to conceptualize autobiographical memory in aging.
Participants and Methods:
In this study, we introduce a novel scoring protocol distinguishing mind’s eye from mind’s mind forms of imagination and apply this protocol to the autobiographical memories of eighty-two cognitively normal older adults. Participants were instructed to retrieve unique autobiographical events, and to focus on describing event-specific details. All data were scored both with our new scoring protocol as well as the Autobiographical Interview scoring protocol from Levine et al. (2002).
Results:
Our novel scoring protocol demonstrated high inter-rater reliability across two raters for both mind’s mind (0.95) and mind’s eye (0.96) details. First, we show that the proportion of mind’s mind and mind’s eye details on average are significantly different, with an increased proportion of mind’s eye details. Second, we find that both mind’s eye detail production and mind’s mind detail production is significantly reduced with age, whereas only internal details decline across age when scored with the Autobiographical Interview scoring procedure.
Conclusions:
The new scoring protocol suggests that both mind’s mind and mind’s eye details undergo change with age, a finding that shares similarities and differences with results from the Autobiographical Interview scoring technique. Taken together, our results hint at a more elaborate set of detail types forming autobiographical memories that change with age, with implications for understanding episodic and semantic memory.
Network theory is necessary for the realization of cognitive representations and resulting empirical observations of social groups. We propose that the triadic primitives denoting individual roles are multilayer, with positive and negative relations feeding into cost–benefit calculations. Through this, we advance a computational theory that generalizes to different scales and to contexts where conflict is not present.
The experience of “meaning in life” (MiL) is a major aspect of life satisfaction and psychological well-being. To assess this highly individual construct, idiographic measures with open-response formats have been developed. However, it can be challenging to categorize these individual experiences for interindividual comparisons. Our study aimed to derive MiL categories from individual listings and develop an integrative MiL model.
Method:
University students were asked to rate 58 MiL providing aspects recently found in a nationwide study using the Schedule for Meaning in Life Evaluation (SMiLE), an MiL instrument allowing for open responses. Pearson's correlations and factor analyses were used to test the unidimensionality of subsequently derived higher-order MiL categories. Multidimensional scaling, cluster analysis, and factor analysis were performed to further analyze a latent MiL structure.
Results:
A total of 340 students participated in the study. Some 11 unidimensional categories consisting of 34 meaning-providing aspects were summarized into a circumplex model with four MiL domains: leisure/health, work/finances, culture/spirituality, and relationships (family, partnership, social relations).
Significance of results:
This model seems to incorporate a major portion of individual respondent-generated MiL listings. It may be useful for future idiographic MiL studies to help organize individual experiences of MiL and allow for higher-level interindividual comparisons. Further studies including different samples are necessary to confirm this model or derive other MiL domains, for example, in palliative care patients or patients who are confronted with a loss of meaning.
The results of Nawrotzki (1962), Feigin (1979) and Puri (1982) show that the class of all point processes (on the real line) with the order statistic property consists of all mixed Poisson processes up to a time-scale transformation, and of all mixed sample processes. The present note characterizes those order statistic point processes that are mixed Poisson processes and mixed sample processes simultaneously.
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