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A screening test for more than 50 cancers at earlier stages would strike many as a godsend. Such a test would promise, prima facie, to save 160,000 lives annually from a premature death from cancer, reduce the intensity of medical treatment, and reduce social costs. In brief, this is what is promised by the Galleri test. We will delineate those claims in greater detail and critically assess them from medical, economic, and ethical perspectives. We conclude, with many others, that this test lacks clinical validity and clinical utility. In addition, annual public funding of $100 billion for this test would be socially unaffordable; the opportunity costs would be unacceptable for both ethical and economic reasons. Further, the least well off with respect to cancer care would be made worse off if this test were publicly funded for everyone over the age of fifty.
This article discusses the thin socio-legal conceptualisation of the rule of law in Hungary. Employing a culturalist perspective, it first shows how the rule of law had a thin foundation prior to the Second World War in this country. Then, the contribution demonstrates how, contrary to previous understandings, even in the most advanced stages of rule of law building in Hungary, in the early 1990s, the resulting concept had been thin mainly focusing on institutional guarantees and legal certainty. The remaining part of the contribution then critically discusses whether and to what extent it is possible to use backsliding to frame the ongoing legal changes in Hungary.
OBJECTIVES/GOALS: Cognitive dysfunction and/or depressionfollowing ischemic stroke results in loss of independence in daily functioning. The objective of this work is to assess neural correlates of post-stroke cognitive deficits and the effect of left frontal transcranial electrical stimulation on cognitive control and associated brain rhythms. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: We recorded midfrontal scalp EEG from 15 healthy and 13 participants with stroke while they performed a multi-source interference task (MSIT). The stroke cohort also performed additional MSIT sessions where they received active and sham transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) on the left prefrontal cortex (PFC). The EEG was pre-processed to get rid of eye movement and other channel noise artifacts and filtered to retain 0.5-55 Hz components. A Morlet wavelet was used to estimate power in theta (4-8 Hz), alpha (8-15 Hz) and gamma (35-50 Hz) frequency bands over a period of 2 seconds following MSIT image presentation. A generalized linear mixed effects model was used to find effect of group on behavior and EEG oscillations. A GLME was also used to find effects of active tDCS on behavior and EEG. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: We found Group (healthy v stroke) as a significant predictor of both response time (behavior) and conflict evoked theta power in the frontal channels (F1-Fz, F2-Fz). We also found that active tDCS significantly improved MSIT performance as compared to sham, after accounting for cognitive load. Active tDCS also induced low frequency oscillations in frontal EEG channels compared to sham. Preliminary results indicate that mid-frontal theta oscillations are a potential neural correlate of post-stroke cognitive deficit and tDCS of the left PFC might be a promising therapeutic intervention to ameliorate this. DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE: Current therapeutic approaches often do not alleviate post stroke executive dysfunction, hence a better understanding of the brain network changes underlying such deficit can elucidate neural correlates of post stroke cognitive deficit to inform the development of neuromodulation interventions.
Can Rawlsian public reason sufficiently justify public policies that regulate or restrain controversial medical and technological interventions in bioethics (and the broader social world), such as abortion, physician aid-in-dying, CRISPER-cas9 gene editing of embryos, surrogate mothers, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis of eight-cell embryos, and so on? The first part of this essay briefly explicates the central concepts that define Rawlsian political liberalism. The latter half of this essay then demonstrates how a commitment to Rawlsian public reason can ameliorate (not completely resolve) many of the policy disagreements related to bioethically controversial medical interventions today. The goal of public reason is to reduce the size of the disagreement by eliminating features of the disagreement that violate the norms of public reason. The norms of public reason are those norms that are politically necessary to preserve the liberal, pluralistic, democratic character of this society. What remains is reasonable disagreement to be addressed through normal democratic deliberative processes. Specific issues addressed from a public reason perspective include personal responsibility for excessive health costs, the utility of a metaphysical definition of death for organ transplantation, and the moral status of excess embryos generated through IVF and/or their use in medical research.
The Dobbs decision has precipitated renewed medical, political, and professional interest in the issue of abortion. Because this decision handed responsibility for regulation of abortion back to the states, and because the states are enacting or have enacted policies that tend to be very permissive or very restrictive, the result has been legal and professional confusion for physicians and their patients. Medical education cannot resolve either the legal or ethical issues regarding abortion. However, medical education must prepare future physicians for caring for patients seeking abortion-related services. Physicians must be prepared to interact appropriately (sensitively and with integrity) with patients or colleagues whose views on abortion differ significantly from their own. This essay describes our educational effort to achieve that objective. The motto that governed this exercise was “No Easy Answers.”
What exactly is a “wicked problem”? It is a social or economic problem that is so complex and so interconnected with other issues that it is extraordinarily difficult or impossible to resolve. This is because all proposed resolutions generate equally complex, equally wicked problems. In this essay, I argue that precision medicine, especially in the context of the U.S. healthcare system, generates numerous wicked problems related to distributive justice. Further, I argue that there are no easy solutions to these wicked problems. The need for trade-offs is inescapable. Rough justice is the best outcome we can hope for, and that outcome requires a commitment to processes of public reason that are fair and inclusive.
John Rawls has held up as a model of public reason the U.S. Supreme Court. I argue that the Dobbs Court is justifiably criticized for failing to respect public reason. First, the entire opinion is governed by an originalist ideological logic almost entirely incongruent with public reason in a liberal, pluralistic, democratic society. Second, Alito’s emphasis on “ordered liberty” seems completely at odds with the “disordered liberty” regarding abortion already evident among the states. Third, describing the embryo/fetus from conception until birth as an “unborn human being” begs the question of the legal status of the embryo/fetus, as if an obiter dictum settled the matter. Fourth, Alito accuses the Roe court of failing to exercise judicial restraint, although Alito argued to overturn Roe in its entirety. In brief, the Dobbs opinion is an illiberal, disingenuous, ideological swamp that swallows up public reason and the reproductive rights of women.
Robert K. Merton did not identify as a sociologist of culture and would have rejected this label as an attempt to pigeonhole his sociological style. When forced to adopt professional titles, he used to introduce himself to nonacademic audiences simply as a sociologist or, while addressing colleagues, resorting to the denominations of those American Sociological Association (ASA) and International Sociological Association (ISA) sections he belonged to: sociological theory and sociology of science. In his New York Times obituary (it is their policy to make the eulogy conform to the deceased person's thought, so that one might even take the commendation literally as a personal statement), it is handed down to posterity that Merton coined the concept of “theories of the middle range,” which refers to “undertakings that steered clear of grand speculative and abstract doctrines while also avoiding pedantic inquiries that were unlikely to yield significant results.” His contribution to the study of science is synthesized with the same brevity with which, according to Merton, scientists should provide information about themselves and their actions: “Merton gained his pioneering reputation as a sociologist of science, exploring how scientists behave and what it is that motivates, rewards, and intimidates them.”
Although RKM (Robert K. Merton loved abbreviations, even when it came to his own name) did not make “culture” the subject of his sociological research and did not consider it as the sole guiding principle of his investigations, his work nevertheless offers several insights worthy of consideration for those who have devoted themselves, in one way or another, to the sociology of culture. If some scholars in this subfield wanted to make RKM a “reference individual” (Merton 1968b, 357–359), they would easily turn to his publications that examine cultural productions empirically, but there are also other writings in which cultural characteristics are given an important place in the design of sociological research. Monographs that belong to the former category include Science, Technolog y and Society in Seventeenth Century England (Merton 1938a [1970)], Mass Persuasion (Merton 1946 [2004]), On the Shoulders of Giants (Merton 1965 [1985]), and The Travels and Adventures of Serendipity (Merton and Barber 2004), as well as countless of his essays (almost all his contributions on the different aspects of scientists’ activities, however, are collected in one volume: Merton 1979).
Can religious arguments provide a reasonable, justified basis for restrictive (coercive) public policies regarding numerous ethically and politically controversial medical interventions, such as research with human embryos, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, or using artificial wombs? With Rawls, we answer negatively. Liberally reasonable policies must address these controversial technologies on the basis of public reasons accessible to all, even if not fully agreeable by all. Further, public democratic deliberation requires participants to construct these policies as citizens who are agnostic with respect to the truth of all comprehensive doctrines, whether secular or religious. The goal of these deliberations is practical, namely, to identify reasonable policy options that reflect fair terms of cooperation in a liberal, pluralistic society. Further, religious advocates may participate in formal policymaking processes as reasonable liberal citizens. Finally, public reason evolves through the deliberative process and all the novel technological challenges medicine generates for bioethics and related public policies.
In this paper, I argue for the following points. First, all of us have a presumptive moral obligation to be organ donors if we are in the relevant medical circumstances at the time of death. Second, family members should not have the right to interfere with the fulfillment of that obligation. Third, the ethical basis for that obligation is reciprocity. If we want a sufficient number of organs available for transplantation, then all must be willing donors. Fourth, that likelihood is diminished if individuals are entirely free to refuse to be organ donors but still would demand to be organ recipients. Fifth, although individuals would be ethically obligated to be organ donors, we still need to permit them to refuse to be organ donors. Sixth, to encourage individuals to stay within the organ donation system, we should have as a just and ethically justified policy denying individuals an organ transplant in the relevant medical circumstances if they have chosen to exit the organ donation system. Individuals would not be permitted to be organ recipients if they were unwilling to be organ donors. This is what it means to be part of what Rawls in Political liberalism (15-22) would refer to as a “fair system of social cooperation.” We refer to this as the “reciprocity requirement.”
In the following interview, philosophers Leonard Fleck and Arthur Ward discuss the latter’s recent experience of being a nondirected kidney donor. The interview took place in the Center for Bioethics and Social Justice at Michigan State University.
Identification of treatment-specific predictors of drug therapies for bipolar disorder (BD) is important because only about half of individuals respond to any specific medication. However, medication response in pediatric BD is variable and not well predicted by clinical characteristics.
Methods
A total of 121 youth with early course BD (acute manic/mixed episode) were prospectively recruited and randomized to 6 weeks of double-blind treatment with quetiapine (n = 71) or lithium (n = 50). Participants completed structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) at baseline before treatment and 1 week after treatment initiation, and brain morphometric features were extracted for each individual based on MRI scans. Positive antimanic treatment response at week 6 was defined as an over 50% reduction of Young Mania Rating Scale scores from baseline. Two-stage deep learning prediction model was established to distinguish responders and non-responders based on different feature sets.
Results
Pre-treatment morphometry and morphometric changes occurring during the first week can both independently predict treatment outcome of quetiapine and lithium with balanced accuracy over 75% (all p < 0.05). Combining brain morphometry at baseline and week 1 allows prediction with the highest balanced accuracy (quetiapine: 83.2% and lithium: 83.5%). Predictions in the quetiapine and lithium group were found to be driven by different morphometric patterns.
Conclusions
These findings demonstrate that pre-treatment morphometric measures and acute brain morphometric changes can serve as medication response predictors in pediatric BD. Brain morphometric features may provide promising biomarkers for developing biologically-informed treatment outcome prediction and patient stratification tools for BD treatment development.
Brazil’s President Bolsonaro has received significant global political and scholarly attention as a threat to liberal democratic values in the context of the rise of far-right bad populism in the world. When it comes to the country’s judiciary, since taking office in 2019, the Brazilian president has turned his political weapons against important legal institutions in the country, such as the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) and the Supreme Court.1 This chapter, however, rather than focus on his administration’s rhetoric or governmental actions, investigates the role played by legal elites in four politically significant cases, some of which even predate his rise to power.
This Article summarizes the features of modern non-democratic legal systems and draws the relevant conclusions. Some of these systemic issues have long-term consequences. The Article illustrates the defining effects of the historical traditions with concrete examples based on empirical researches. Judicial independence as part of the rule of law is not only institutional guarantees but cultural, mental dispositions too. This Article shows how non-democratic legal heritage led to backsliding democracy in post-communist Hungary. However relative autonomy of judges could emerge during the last three decades of the communist rule, skills and habits of professional self-defense could not stabilize.
Quantitative plant biology is an interdisciplinary field that builds on a long history of biomathematics and biophysics. Today, thanks to high spatiotemporal resolution tools and computational modelling, it sets a new standard in plant science. Acquired data, whether molecular, geometric or mechanical, are quantified, statistically assessed and integrated at multiple scales and across fields. They feed testable predictions that, in turn, guide further experimental tests. Quantitative features such as variability, noise, robustness, delays or feedback loops are included to account for the inner dynamics of plants and their interactions with the environment. Here, we present the main features of this ongoing revolution, through new questions around signalling networks, tissue topology, shape plasticity, biomechanics, bioenergetics, ecology and engineering. In the end, quantitative plant biology allows us to question and better understand our interactions with plants. In turn, this field opens the door to transdisciplinary projects with the society, notably through citizen science.