When listing the precepts of religion, Murtaḍā mentions three: divine unicity, divine justice and prophethood (nubuwwa). But he notes that although prophethood is a precept (aṣl) of religion, theologians (namely the Muʿtazilis) usually do not enumerate it among the five precepts because it is implicitly included in the precept of divine justice. This classification he finds objectionable, saying that by the same token the only precepts that should be explicitly mentioned are divine unicity and justice since the other three Muʿtazili precepts (the station between the two stations, the promise and the threat, and enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong) may also go under justice; this is not to mention the fact that for Imamis the list should also include the Imama. But despite this appreciation for prophethood, Murtaḍā's writings on it are considerably less extensive than his writings on the Imama. The reason is probably the relative lack of controversy surrounding prophethood, as much of the discussion on it involved Muslim theologians answering the objections of non-Muslim theologians. Since Murtaḍā's project is first and foremost directed at systematising and consolidating Imami Shiʿi teachings, it is natural that his investment in the question of prophethood is on a different level than his investment in the Imama. After all, most of what he would say agrees with the general contours of other theological schools; the real difference concerns aspects of their doctrine that could contradict Imami beliefs. However, prophets being also Imams according to Murtaḍā, the works on the Imama may also be considered works on prophethood. In this chapter, the focus is on the distinctive features of prophethood; the features in common with the Imama are addressed in the theoretical part of the chapter on the Imama. Some of these common points, however, are most elaborately argued as part of the prophethood doctrine due to considerations such as their Qurʾānic basis (as in the question of comparing prophets and Imams to angels) and their pertinence to prophethood in terms of the primary function of the office (as in one of the two arguments for infallibility). Such points are thus given more attention in this chapter despite not being related exclusively to prophethood.

The question of divine justice, studied in the previous chapter, involves attempts to understand God's work in a manner that fits with human morality – some theologians would say morality simpliciter. The general framework of moral theory, in addition to elements specific to divine agency such as assistance and corruption, serves as a prelude to the ultimate concern of theologians: the creatures’ destiny in their interaction with the Creator.

This chapter investigates how Murtaḍā's theology makes sense of religious experience. It first covers his definition of the human being and touches on the history of this sensitive debate in the Imami context, and then proceeds to his view on human agency inasmuch as it affects human responsibility before God. The next section analyses God's general act of creation in light of the considerations that govern moral theory, given that this act must be understood before the more specific question of human experience can be addressed. This discussion is followed by an examination of Murtaḍā's view on the relationship between humans and God in the form of moral obligation, covering the roots, duration and scope of moral obligation and how it materialises in real life.

These were controversial topics in Islamic theology. Like the debate on divine essence and attributes, the debate on human agency became a question of dogmatism and group identity. The origins of the controversy need not be foreign to the concerns of the Muslim community, although the avowed positions coincide neatly with the then available views of major religions and intellectual movements. Despite some attempts to propose less polarising solutions, the major fault line dividing believers in human agency, on the one hand, and those who ascribed human actions to God's work, on the other, was not overcome, as attested by the name calling practised by the two camps: the former would refer to their adversaries as ‘determinists’ (mujbira; mujabbira; jabriyya), whereas the latter would dub the former ‘deniers of God's decree’ (qadariyya) – although this term has a more complex history in that both groups tried to apply it polemically, but the latter group was more successful.

The significance of the controversy surrounding divine justice in the development of Islamic theology cannot be overestimated. It split the community of theologians into two rival camps, with the Muʿtazilis being the most outspoken representatives of the first and the Ashʿaris of the second. The paramount theological importance of the split is manifest in the fact that the groups of the first camp, including the Imamis and the Zaydis, although also agreeing with each other on other theological matters pertaining to divine essence and attributes, often styled themselves collectively as the ‘upholders of justice’ (ahl al-ʿadl, al-ʿadliyya), not without a hint of pride. The importance of the issue may also be gauged by the relatively abundant space that discussion of this precept occupies in their theological works; the claim that the study of all five precepts of Muʿtazili doctrine may be called ‘the sciences of justice’ (ʿulūm al-ʿadl); and the tendency to reduce these precepts to only unicity and justice, with the first including the discussion on divine attributes and the remaining precepts going under justice.

Both camps agreed that God is just, but they diverged over the definition of justice, which led to a debate over the definition of the morality of acts and their consequences. Thus, at the core of the discussion lie the respective moral theories adopted by the two camps. The first camp, that containing the Muʿtazilis, believed in rationally comprehensible moral values, postulating the existence of objectively good and vile acts whose nature is independent of their agent and which necessitate clearly defined consequences. The other camp defended the thesis that acts are good or vile only as a consequence of divine command; they are morally neutral in themselves. But despite the fact that this sharp polarisation was centred on the disputed status of objectivist morality, it is also important to note that vehement disputes were taking place within each of these main camps. This fact is attested by the relatively meagre attention that the Basran Muʿtazilis gave to traditionalists and Ashʿaris compared to the elaborateness of their arguments against the views of Baghdadi Muʿtazilis.

In the many schools of thought that defined Imami Shiʿism throughout its history of development and transformation, the question of the Imama represented a doctrinally solid distinction that, in addition to other legal points and social arrangements, placed the Imami community apart from other groups. But the Imama debate is primarily a response to historical circumstances, with theology being used to justify, interpret and filter recorded accounts.

The interaction between historical narrative and religious dicta has long been noted by scholars of Islamic history. Whether one decides to read early reports as unverifiable products of the sectarian milieu or as containing a kernel of historical fact, these reports seem to have become a matter of consensus by the time they were included in the classical works of Islamic historiography. Disagreement was more about certain elements within them or about their interpretation; for a parabolic reading of the material proved useful for both Shiʿi and Sunni narratives. Therefore, it can be said that these classical works are similar in their formal and teleological framework: they are both ‘sectarian’ and ‘non-sectarian’ inasmuch as readers are willing to exploit their latent potential to promote a particular agenda. This complexity underlies the assumption that ‘multiple orthodoxies’ are represented in Islamic historiography.

The intense historical component in the Imama theological debate reflects the above observation. Nevertheless, it also allows us to consider the various theological structures, superimposed on the body of acceptable reports, as a prism that analyses the historiographical material into as many colours as the theologian needs in order to present his narrative. This chapter and the following one, therefore, do not seek to add a ‘dome’ of historical thought besides others (ḥadīth, adab, ḥikma and siyāsa); rather, they attempt to demonstrate how the handling of material originating from various domes can prove a much more efficient strategy in the hands of theologians who are unwilling to break with the supernarratives set down in the plethora of acceptable reports.

Historical setting

The arrival of the Shiʿi Būyids in Baghdad in 945 represented a historic turning point for the Imami community; for although the new dynasty may have been originally of another Shiʿi affiliation, the Būyids of Baghdad favoured the Imamis over other Shiʿis. The ʿAbbāsid caliphate had been weakened by mercenaries and had lost the iron grip under which Imamis had lived, but their participation in authority was limited to a few notable families whose members held bureaucratic offices. The death of the Eleventh Imam, Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī, in 874 had left Imamis for the first time without a present Imam, generating a major crisis that compelled the community to devise new forms of management to sustain itself. The effects of this crisis, later known as the ‘Minor Occultation’ (al-ghayba al-ṣughrā) and taken to have ended in 941, were still very much in evidence when the Būyids arrived. Their advent and the ensuing improvement in the Imamis’ political position alleviated the strain that the Imamis were experiencing. The Būyids were to maintain control of Baghdad for a long century, to be replaced by the Saljuqs only in 1055.

The Būyid age was marked by tolerance and constituted a heyday of intellectual activity. Termed both ‘the Shiʿi century’ and ‘the renaissance of Islam’, the period witnessed some of the greatest masters of philosophy, theology, language and literature of medieval Islam; these were the days of Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), Qāḍī al-Quḍāt ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Ibn Jinnī (d. 1001), al-Tawḥīdī (d. 1023) and al-Mutanabbī (d. 965), to name but a few. Probably owing to both their sectarian status as members of a minority and their non-Arab origins, the Būyids showed exceptional acceptance of religious and cultural diversity. Accordingly, debates on various matters, including doctrinal questions, were often held at the monarch's court and in his presence. Many members of the ruling elite were men of learning, especially the viziers, some of whom, such as Ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. 970) and al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād (d. 995), were among the great belletrists of Islam.

To understand the conceptual framework of classical Muslim theologians, we must be mindful of both God and the world. Although God, in His self-sufficiency, does not depend on this world, the latter is the necessary point of departure for our knowledge of Him, be it of His existence or His other attributes. But to perfect our knowledge of the whole religious experience, a return to the world is needed once the reasoning about God has been completed; this reasoning allows us to understand how He manages the affairs of this world, of paramount importance among them the salvation of the human being.

With this consideration in mind, this chapter examines the major premises of Murtaḍā's theological system. It opens with a brief inventory to take stock of his terms, definitions and argumentative methods. This is followed by a discussion of the proof for the existence of God, inseparable from subsequently learning of His attributes and acts. These were topics of heated debate in Islamic history, and the very involvement in such discussions brought the wrath of traditionalists upon theologians, regardless of their affiliation. But even among theologians themselves, much ink was spilt on merciless accusations; a label no less grave than that of polytheism always loomed over the discussion of the relationship between divine essence and attributes, given the danger of accepting real multiplicity in the divine; talk of God's corporeality was closely associated with the slander of anthropomorphism, whereas that of His speech led to the famous inquisition (miḥna) instituted by the caliph al-Maʾmūn.

In these discussions Murtaḍā comes very close to the teachings of the Basran Muʿtazili school, to the point of endorsing most of its positions. This agreement is occasioned by the fact that these debates do not involve concepts that contradict staple Imami doctrines – in contrast to discussions of divine justice (in connection with which the Basran Muʿtazili understanding of intercession can pose a real problem), the Imama (on which both the historical/political and theological aspects of the common Muʿtazili position are incompatible with Imami doctrine) and prophethood (regarding which the Muʿtazili view of religious law may dispense with the necessity of the Imama).