Almost 50 years have passed since Sartori introduced to the world one of the most famous innovations in the history of political science: a new party systems typology. Despite many criticisms and refinements since then, Sartori's typology still constitutes, as stated by Peter Mair in 1990, “the most effective and exhaustive framework within which to contrast the properties of different party systems”. In the current research note, and taking into consideration that previous typologies have not yet been that successful, we propose a new classification of party systems – which not only embeds the notion of polarization into the typology, but also allows us to populate the “polarized pluralist” type beyond Sartori’s “centre-based” (Italian) model – in Asia, a continent almost completely ignored by Sartori in his seminal work. Using an original dataset that includes the most important characteristics of party systems in the region and building on Sartori's original conceptualization, we examine to what extent party systems in Asian democracies, both contemporary (Bhutan, East Timor, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Taiwan) and historical (Bangladesh 1991–2006, Kyrgyzstan 2010–2020, Myanmar 2015–2020 and Thailand 1992–2013), have changed. Our discussion of a new party system typology is particularly relevant and important to Asia, as its many new democracies still need to shift from plurality electoral rules adopted during the early post-independence periods to more mature, power-dispersing political institutions that accommodate their rich ethnic and religious diversity, as it happened in Europe after the World Wars.

Political scientists have long been concerned that a popularly elected presidency may destabilize competitive party systems. We develop and test a new theory holding that the impact is more immediate and severe than previously assumed. Coexisting legislative and presidential coalitions first and foremost impede the evolution of predictable party interactions at the executive level, which is the domain of the cabinet. This quality has become accessible for comparative research thanks to the concept of party system closure. Using a new dataset for all European democracies since 1848, we show that presidential elections undermine party system closure in two ways: (1) by confounding patterns of government formation (notably under powerful presidencies) and (2) by disturbing electoral/legislative politics, which in turn affect executive politics. The former, direct effect emerges as dominant from a series of panel analyses and case illustrations. These findings have important implications for current problems of constitutional design and institutional reform.

Parties and party systems are treated as separate phenomena in theory, but not in research practice. This is most clearly so in the literature on the institutionalization of party politics, where the party level and the systemic levels are often analyzed through combined fuzzy indices. We 1) propose separate indicators for measuring institutionalization at the party and at the party system level, 2) demonstrate their different dynamics in twentieth and twenty-first century European countries, and 3) investigate the direction of causality. Using a dataset that covers more than 700 elections, 800 parties, and 1,400 instances of government formation in 60 different historical party systems across 45 European countries, we find that party-level institutionalization tends to precede systemic institutionalization. The opposite pattern occurs only in a few countries.

An institutionalized party system is often regarded as a precondition for a well-functioning democracy. Recent recesses in democracy and, in particular, in the liberal dimension of democracy in relatively established party systems, however, warrant a fresh look into how party system institutionalization shapes liberal democracy. We use a dataset that covers 58 European party systems over more than a century to assess how party system institutionalization in the governmental arena – closure – is related to more robust liberal democracy. Our results show that stable coalition combinations are conducive to higher levels of liberalism, while infrequent government changes and the exclusion of new parties from the governmental arena have a detrimental role.

The rise in support for anti-political-establishment parties (APEp), especially since the beginning of the 2008 Great Recession, has put democracy in peril. Some scholars have warned us about the negative implications the recent rise of APEp might have for the development of democracy in Western Europe. For that reason, it is important we begin to understand what generates APEp’s electoral success. Drawing on a new comparative dataset that examines all Western European democracies from 1849 until 2017, the current article attempts to provide an explanation. In particular, our analyses examine three alternative explanations put forward by the literature: economic, institutional, and sociological. Our results show that it is not economic performance but both institutional and sociological change which together can help to understand the current wave of support for APEp.

Introduction – Explaining party bans, political and legal contexts – Banned parties and banning states in Europe, the political context – Nature of banned parties – Nature of banning states – Tolerant and intolerant democracies, the legal context – Evolving rationales for party bans and procedures for proscription – Contemporary rationales for banning parties – Anti-democratic ideology – Non-democratic internal organisation – Party names – Party orientation to violence – Protecting the present order – Evolving rationales for party bans – Weimar and legitimacy paradigms – Conclusions, directions for future research

Adopting Ionescu's qualitative approach to political science, and building on Sartori's definition of party system, this article examines the degree to which European (both East and West) party systems have developed since the collapse of communism in 1990 in all three major areas of partisan competition: parliamentary, governmental and electoral. In this context, this article constitutes, paraphrasing Sartori (1969), an attempt to go ‘from political sociology to the sociology of politics and back’. The main conclusion is that, although two decades have passed, East European party politics continues to be generally characterized by instability and unpredictability at all levels.