Erdelyi grants “repression” emotional and cognitive qualities that can modulate consciousness and probably overlap with what is typically attributed to “attention.” Such a broad appellation of repression explains virtually all behavior and lacks specificity. Repression and attention elucidate behavior in different clinical, cognitive, and cultural contexts. Refining these influences, we identify a few lacunae in Erdelyi's account.

Arbib offers a comprehensive, elegant formulation of brain/language evolution; with significant implications for social as well as biological sciences. Important psychological antecedents and later correlates are presupposed; their conceptual enrichment through protosign and protospeech is abbreviated in favor of practical communication. What culture “is” and whether protosign and protospeech involve a protoculture are not considered. Arbib also avoids dealing with the question of evolution of mind, consciousness, and self.

Fully interpreted, Lewis's dynamic systems modeling of emotion encompasses psychological-adaptation thinking and individual and group differences in normal and abnormal behavior. It weakens the categorical perspective in evolutionary psychology and the clinical sciences; and suggests continuity between “normal” or “abnormal” behavior in whatever way this is self and culturally constituted, although culture/linguistic factors and selfhood are neglected. Application of a dynamic systems model could improve formulation of clinical problems.

In the case of religion, explanations based on emotion should be privileged over those based on “cold” cognition. The origins of religious beliefs are as critical to understanding religion as are the group phenomena which sustain them. In addition, religion's relationship to the growth of knowledge is neglected by the target authors. The balance between the costs and benefits of religion will vary depending upon the phase of an individual society's cultural evolution.