Economists and psychologists have long argued the origin of wealth influences individual behavior. In a previous study (Cherry et al., 2005), we found the origin of endowment did not significantly affect behavior in linear public good games with summation contribution technology. In such games, however, both Nash behavior (everybody gives nothing) and social optimal behavior (everybody gives the entire endowment) call for symmetric levels of contributions. Results from this new study indicate that the origin of wealth might matter in more asymmetric situations, such as in a best-shot public good game with heterogeneous groups.

We examine repetition as an institution that affects coordination failure in a game with and without pre-play communication. We use probit regression with random effects to test hypotheses regarding the frequency and form of coordination failure in the presence of repeated play versus one-shot games. Our results indicate that repetition without pre-play communication results in a lower frequency of coordination failure relative to one-shot game outcomes. This result is reversed when pre-play communication is allowed. Our evidence also suggests that repeated play coordination failures tend to be suboptimal Nash equilibria, whereas one-shot game coordination failures are disequilibria regardless of the presence of pre-play communication.

We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50%; (2) senders’ messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers’ trust of messages increased.

The social cost of greenhouse gases is important in many regulatory impact analyses. However, calculations of the social cost of greenhouse gases are highly complex and periodically revisited. We offer seven recommendations to improve current estimates. These include recommendations to use both country-level and global measures of the social cost of greenhouse gases, to use country-specific values for monetizing climate damages, to represent uncertainties by reporting distributions instead of using only central values, and to conduct a temporal distributional analysis that shows the magnitudes of climate damages across generations. We also provide recommendations for the discount rates that should be used when estimating the social cost of greenhouse gases, and the appropriate discount rates for regulatory impact analyses that include the social cost of greenhouse gases.

We examine the net benefits of social distancing to slow the spread of COVID-19 in USA. Social distancing saves lives but imposes large costs on society due to reduced economic activity. We use epidemiological and economic forecasting to perform a rapid benefit–cost analysis of controlling the COVID-19 outbreak. Assuming that social distancing measures can substantially reduce contacts among individuals, we find net benefits of about $5.2 trillion in our benchmark case. We examine the magnitude of the critical parameters that might imply negative net benefits, including the value of statistical life and the discount rate. A key unknown factor is the speed of economic recovery with and without social distancing measures in place. A series of robustness checks also highlight the key role of the value of mortality risk reductions and discounting in the analysis and point to a need for effective economic stimulus when the outbreak has passed.

Widespread testing is key to controlling the spread of COVID-19. But should we worry about self-selection bias in the testing? The recent literature on willful ignorance says we should – people often avoid health information. In the context of COVID-19, such willful ignorance can bias testing data. Furthermore, willful ignorance often arises when selfish wants conflict with social benefits, which might be particularly likely for potential ‘super-spreaders’ – people with many social interactions – given people who test positive are urged to self-isolate for two weeks. We design a survey in which participants (n = 897) choose whether to take a costless COVID-19 test. We find that 70% would take a test. Surprisingly, the people most likely to widely spread COVID-19 – the extraverts, others who meet more people in their daily lives and younger people – are the most willing to take a test. People's ability to financially or emotionally sustain self-isolation does not matter to their decision. We conclude that people are selfless in their decision to test for COVID-19. Our results are encouraging – they imply that COVOD-19 testing may succeed in targeting those who generate the largest social benefits from self-isolation if infected, which strengthens the case for widespread testing.

We examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations – subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.

This paper reviews recent work examining two topics of economic research vital for invasive species policy—integration and valuation. Integration requires bioeconomic models that blend invasive biology with economic circumstances and the feedback loops between the two systems. Valuation requires nonmarket valuation associated with human and environmental damages posed by invasive species. We argue for a second-level of integration in invasive species economics—valuation based on integration models. Policy prescriptions based on integration models need valuation work; valuation surveys need integration models—the two are complements. Valuation could be enhanced with integration in mind; integration could be made better with valuation in mind. An example from blending the two research areas is presented and its merits demonstrated.

We illustrate the experimental method by examining bidding behavior for controversial goods, i.e., goods in which bidders have positive and negative values. Our results suggest that bidding behavior differs across auction type. Bidders with positive induced values bid sincerely in a WTP auction. Bidders bid conservatively, however, in the WTA auction, foregoing profitable opportunities. Informing bidders of their optimal strategy serves to attenuate bidding discrepancies but does not eliminate them. Treating the WTP and WTA auctions as equivalent given positive and negative values could lead one to overstate the costs relative to the benefits of the controversial good.

Experimental markets can be a useful tool to guide and evaluate environmental policy. This paper reviews four experiments to illustrate. Two institutional experiments are considered—Coasian bargaining with positive transaction costs, and a gaming experiment of dynamic choice in a conflict. Two valuation experiments are also discussed—the impact of sequential reduction mechanisms on the value of risk, and experimental auction markets to elicit the value of safer food.

In our opinion, the challenges of ongoing measurement, the ever-moving behavioral baseline, and strategic self-ignorance return us full-circle to a sensible point made by Peter Bohm–Benefit-Cost Analysis for environmental goods should use an interval method.

Herein we explore the economic value of delaying inevitable environmental damage due to aquatic invasive species, which is a problem especially relevant to tropic and subtropical regions. We developed an analytical framework and tested it using a stated preference survey. The results suggest that delaying the impacts can be valuable. Other tests reveal characteristics of the willingness-to-pay estimates that are consistent with economic theory.

Environmental and consumer groups have called for mandatory labeling ofgenetically engineered (GE) food products in the United States, stating thatconsumers have the “right to know.” Herein, we use a nonhypothetical fieldexperiment to examine the willingness to pay for GE-labeled products, usingthe only second-generation GE product currently on the U.S. market—GEcigarettes. Our results suggest consumers pay less for GE-labeled cigaretteswhen marketing information is absent. But, when presented with marketinginformation on the attributes of the cigarette, we find no evidence thatconsumers pay less for GE-labeled cigarettes.

Many poor countries remain trapped in a cycle of poverty and environmental degradation. Understanding how people react to existing and proposed solutions most likely can be improved using the methods of experimental economics. Experiments provide researchers a method to test theory, look for patterns of behavior, testbed economic institutions and incentives, and to educate people. Herein we explore how experimental economics has been used and could be used to help guide decision making to increase prosperity without overexploiting the resource base and environmental assets needed for basic survival.

We develop a bioeconomic model to gain insight into the challenges of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) as applied to protect endangered species given wildlife-livestock disease risks and habitat fragmentation. We show how greater connectivity of habitat creates an endogenous trade-off. More connectedness both (i) ups the chance that populations of endangered species will grow more rapidly, while (ii) simultaneously increasing the likelihood diseases will spread more quickly. We examine subsidies for habitat connectedness, livestock vaccination, and reduced movement of infected livestock. We find the cost-effective policy is to first subsidize habitat connectivity rather than vaccinations – this serves to increase habitat contiguousness. Once habitat is sufficiently connected, disease risks increase to a level to make disease-related subsidies worthwhile. Highly connected habitat requires nearly all the government budget be devoted to disease prevention and control. The result of the conservation payments is significantly increased wildlife abundance, increased livestock health and abundance, and increased development opportunities.