Viscount Victor Spencer was representative of the British social elites deeply entrenched in business at the beginning of the twentieth century. He was amongst the 41 per cent of CEOs who were peers of the realm. Like most of these peers, he did not have a background in the business world or industry. This chapter details why these aristocratic amateurs initially dominated corporate leadership roles but rapidly declined in number as social and political changes reduced the importance of the aristocracy and the economic environment was transformed by the technological and business innovations of the second industrial revolution. They were replaced by professional managers like Thomas Sutherland of the shipping company P&O, founder CEOs such as Thomas Lipton, and family CEOs such as Archibald Coats of the textile business J & P Coats. These CEOs developed extensive business experience as insiders within their companies, which allowed them to innovate the strategy and structure of their companies. Despite their decline, the gentleman amateurs performed no worse than these players.

Across the twentieth century, CEOs became more powerful, and their decisions had a sizeable effect on their company’s performance and the British economy. Some CEOs harnessed technological and organisational innovations which allowed companies to grow and become more efficient, resulting in improvements in national productivity. In contrast, the insularity and lack of dynamism of some CEOs played a significant role in Britain’s economic stagnation. History shows that who gets to the top matters. Based on this, the chapter goes on to argue that those involved in selecting and preparing CEOs need to develop pathways to the top that identify individuals with interpersonal characteristics, values, and vision focused on the long-term stewardship of companies. They need to improve diversity to ensure that a range of cognitive abilities and insights get to the top. Across the century, various corporate governance mechanisms have been used to address the principal–agent problem at the heart of the corporation. The chapter closes by arguing that corporate governance needs to be strengthened through legislation to align CEOs to the long-term interests of company stakeholders.

By the 1970s, Britain’s economic malaise had become chronic. This chapter shows how a group of business outsiders sought to cure the malaise by unleashing market forces. These buccaneers, including Jim Slater, Jimmy Goldsmith, James Hanson, and Gordon White perfected the art of the hostile takeover to shake up poor-quality incumbent management. They believed they were liberating assets and improving the performance of management by focusing their attention on shareholder value. This resulted in high-profile and acrimonious takeover battles. Their critics named them corporate raiders, and incumbents such as Denys Henderson of ICI fought back through accusations of asset stripping and sweating. Although few tangible elements of the buccaneers’ empires survived their fall in the 1990s, they had a profound impact on business strategy, the role of the CEO, and the British economy. They empowered CEOs, their demands for improved corporate leadership were followed, and a growing number of CEOs were sacked for poor performance. Their business model influenced the growing financialisation of companies and Margaret Thatcher’s economic reforms.

Family and founder CEOs had their heyday in the interwar period. They faced a highly volatile economic and geopolitical environment. The chapter shows how they responded to these challenges. CEOs such as Alfred Mond led his family company to become the chemicals giant ICI, and William Lever founded and grew consumer goods company Lever Bros. Skin in the game and roots in social groups outside the mainstream of British society gave many of the families and founders a set of values and a deep commitment to grow their companies. Through investment and innovation, they achieved scale and scope. Their success took some to the heart of government, where they reshaped competition policy. The chapter then goes on to show that families and founders were particularly challenged by succession issues. John Ellerman, the most successful entrepreneur of the era, found his son had little interest in his business empire. The succession trap led to the collapse of many family companies. Others survived by handing power to professional managers such as D’Arcy Cooper, who transformed Lever Bros. Families and founders declined in importance, but through their stewardship corporate giants were built.

In the 1990s, privatisations, globalisation, and the ICT revolution opened up the British economy. This chapter examines how CEOs took advantage of these opportunities. Privatisation of national industries meant CEOs such as George Jefferson of BT now led some of Britain’s largest companies. Jefferson and his successors ensured their pay increased significantly. The average pay of CEOs rose rapidly, becoming a fixture of media debates, making the likes of Cedric Brown of British Gas a cause célébre. British CEOs finally underwent a managerial revolution in terms of education levels and training, but did increased pay correspond with improved corporate performance? In banking, pay rose for the likes of Fred Goodwin of RBS, and James Crosby and Andy Hornby of HBOS. But these CEOs all played leading roles in the collapse of their banks in 2008. The chapter shows how the Cadbury Report sought to rein in CEO excesses, but with limited effect. Governance problems were exacerbated as CEOs got younger and their tenures shorter, further incentivising short-term thinking. Women finally entered the role of CEO with Marjorie Scardino of Pearson and Cynthia Carroll at Anglo American.

This chapter sets out the debates that have grown up around CEOs, highlighting three major reasons why they warrant serious study: their importance to the companies they lead, their wider economic and political power, and what their careers tell us about social mobility. To address these debates the book explores three questions: Who were the CEOs and how did they get into the role? What did they do? Did they matter for their companies and Britain’s economy and society? To answer these questions, a unique database of the CEOs of the top 100 most valuable UK public companies between 1900 and 2009 has been assembled. This consists of 475 companies and 1,397 CEOs. For each CEO a career biography is created. To analyse the data, we draw on Upper Echelons Theory and Agency Theory, alongside historical scholarship to understand the environments in which they operated. The chapter then sets out the five analytical threads that are developed throughout the book. The chapter closes by discussing how the nomenclature around top corporate officers evolved from ‘chairman’ to ‘managing director’ to ‘chief executive officer’.

After World War II, Britain’s CEOs faced major economic challenges. International competition increased, and Harold Wilson called for a managerial revolution to exploit the white heat of new technology. This chapter examines whether this revolution occurred. Engineers, including Leonard Lord and George Harriman of the British Motor Corporation, and accountants, like John Davis of Rank and Leslie Lazell of Beechams, made up an increasing proportion of top CEOs. These trends increased social diversity with over 70 per cent of CEOs rising through merit rather than social position or family. Yet, British CEOs had significantly less formal education and specialist management training than their competitors. In 1950, 36 per cent of British CEOs had an undergraduate degree. The equivalent figures were 75, 75, and 95 per cent in the United States, Germany, and France. Although training in accountancy and engineering brought a focus on optimisation and efficiency, it lacked more holistic approaches to management, resulting in bureaucratic organisations and siloed thinking. The managerial revolution failed, innovation and productivity suffered, and economic malaise set in.

Securities token offerings, cryptocurrencies, and crypto-related assets are new categories of assets. Relatively little pension money has been invested in cryptocurrency and crypto-related assets, but that amount is growing. This chapter evaluates whether those assets are suitable investments for pension plans and pension participants.