We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This book explains why conflicts in Africa are sometimes ethnic and sometimes religious, and why a conflict might change from ethnic to religious even as the opponents remain fixed. Conflicts in the region are often viewed as either 'tribal' or 'Muslim-Christian', seemingly rooted in deep-seated ethnic or religious hatreds. Yet, as this book explains, those labels emerge as a function of political mobilization. It argues that ethnicity and religion inspire distinct passions among individuals, and that political leaders exploit those passions to achieve their own strategic goals when the institutions of the state break down. To support this argument, the book relies on a novel experiment conducted in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana to demonstrate that individual preferences change in ethnic and religious contexts. It then uses case illustrations from Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Sudan to highlight the strategic choices of leaders that ultimately shape the frames of conflict.
The first chapter establishes the importance of distinguishing between ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa. It begins by first defining key concepts and positioning the study alongside other perspectives on ethnic and religious conflict, in particular the constructivist and instrumentalist accounts that focus primarily on coalition size, as well as accounts from the study of religion and politics that focus on the structural characteristics of specific groups (such as Islam). The chapter then provides an overview of the argument, outlining the land-based nature of ethnicity and the rule-based nature of religion. Those individual-level priorities are exploited by instrumental elites in the course of conflict. I also outline the methodological approach of the book; I describe the value of a mixed methods study and I stress the importance of complementary analytical strategies that together bolster the inferences that one can draw from the research. Finally, the chapter considers potential objections to the argument, using that opportunity to highlight the unique contributions of the book.
Chapter 3 presents findings from an experiment that helps to distinguish between ethnic and religious preferences at the individual level. The experimental treatments evoked either the ethno-linguistic or the religious identity of over 1,300 respondents in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, using radio reports created solely for the purpose of this study. The data suggests that individuals in ethnic contexts favor a candidate who prioritizes local development, they prefer to live in a wealthy community in greater numbers than their counterparts, and they are more willing to engage in corruption if it means a material advantage for their family. Otherwise identical individuals placed in a religious context favor moral probity and behavioral rules without regard for geographically local advantages: they prefer a candidate that fights moral decay, they are relatively more likely to prefer living in a community with strong moral values, and they are less likely to accept corruption. I link these findings to the land-based nature of ethnic groups and the rule-based nature of religion in the region. The chapter also provides novel evidence to elucidate the mechanism behind those findings.
Chapter 7 applies the argument to the case of Sudan’s two protracted civil wars. The first is considered an ethno-racial war; the conflict frame focused on northern Arabs and Southern black Africans. The second, beginning in 1983 after an 11-year respite and continuing until a peace agreement was signed in 2005, is labeled a religious conflict: the northern government sought to impose Islamic Shari’a Law throughout the country, leading to religious actors, targets, rhetoric, and reporting. Importantly, the supporting coalitions on each side never changed, only the labels with which they fought did. After taking readers through the histories of ethnicity and religion in the country to demonstrate the social importance of both, the chapter presents each conflict, the tensions that underpinned them, and the identity frames that emerged. The chapter adds further support to a story of mobilizational differences: land-related matters created a perception of ethnic differences during the first war, while lifestyle-related policies and international support contributed to a religious frame during the second war.
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter; it highlights the claim that success in conflict depends on mobilizing followers to act collectively in support of their leaders’ extra-institutional interests. Because the case studies presented earlier in the book all follow a similar pattern of within-case variation from an ethnic to a religious frame, the conclusions addresses two cases with different identity frames: the Rwandan genocide and the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria. In Rwanda, the genocide began as and remained an ethnic nightmare, largely as a function of disputes over land control. In Nigeria, Boko Haram has consistently presented its aim as a moral revolution rather than an attempt to control territory. As a result, despite having the option to exploit ethnic differences, the frame of Boko Haram’s activities has remained consistently religious. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of the argument for other parts of the world and how it helps to refine our understanding of the important but often vague concept of ethnic politics.
Chapter 8 presents the last of three case studies, on Nigeria’s Biafran War of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Like the other case illustrations, the frame of the Biafran War shifted from ethnicity to religion. The chapter again begins by tracing the histories of ethnicity and religion, demonstrating that the two identity types overlap in a north-south pattern and are both of critical social importance. I then show that the incentives of elites in the breakaway republic of Biafra centered largely around control of oil concessions and providing a safe haven for residents expelled from the North. As a result, the first stages of the war came to be seen in ethnic, Hausa-Fulani versus Igbo terms. However, as the prospects for Biafran success quickly dimmed, the incentives of Biafran leaders changed, and religion became more important. The chapter argues that the change in identity frames was a function of the mobilzational differences in ethnicity and religion: playing the ethnic card mobilized concerns for oil and land, but when the war effort deteriorated, Biafran leaders instead sought international support through religion.