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We put the bifocal stance theory (BST) into dialogue with the Confucian approach to ritual. The aim of the commentary is two-fold: To draw on BST to provide an explanatory framework for a Confucian approach to social learning and, while doing so, to show how Chinese (Confucian) philosophy can contribute to debates in cultural evolution.

This second edition of An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy presents a comprehensive introduction to key ideas and arguments in early Chinese philosophy. Written in clear, accessible language, it explores philosophical traditions including Confucianism, Daoism, Mohism, Legalism and Chinese Buddhism, and how they have shaped Chinese thought. Drawing on the key classical texts as well as up-to-date scholarship, the discussions range across ethics, metaphysics and epistemology, while also bringing out distinctive elements in Chinese philosophy that fall between the gaps in these disciplinary divisions, hence challenging some prevailing assumptions of Western philosophy. Topics include human nature, selfhood and agency; emotions and behaviour; the place of language in the world; knowledge and action; and social and political responsibility. This second edition incorporates new ideas and approaches from some recently excavated texts that change the landscape of Chinese intellectual history.

Summary

The debates during the Warring States period challenged the beliefs and practices of the status quo. Confucian doctrine upheld many aspects of traditional life yet raised questions about possibilities for self-directed accomplishments, especially for those involved in government. Daoism rejected many more facets of conventional life and practices but retained a vision of the good life for the common people. Legalist thought is singular in its rejection of fundamental humanitarian values. It rejected the importance of relationships, the institutional fostering of ethical awareness and behaviour and, perhaps most of all, the idea of a compassionate government that looked after the interests of the people. Herrlee Creel, a historian of Chinese thought, argued that Legalist philosophy was, “in considerable degree, a philosophy of counterrevolution” (1953: 135). Creel maintained that the Legalists rejected the increasingly popular view that government exists for the people, focusing instead on the ruler's maintenance of power.

The classification in the Shiji by Sima Tan, of Legalist philosophy as a “school” (fa jia: school of penal law), is misleading in a number of ways. First, there is no identifiable founder of Legalist thought, although Han Fei (c. 280–233 BCE) appears to be its most systematic proponent, on the basis of the text that bears his name. Yet the question of authorship of the Han Feizi is riddled with questions given the inconsistencies in the text. Second, not all thinkers who are considered Legalist actually discussed fa (penal law) as a fundamental theme. Third, it is not clear which ideas or themes best characterise the ideology of the Legalist thinkers. Those who articulated Legalist ideas or influenced Legalist philosophy in significant ways during the pre-Han period include Guan Zhong (d. 645 BCE), Shang Yang (d. 338 BCE), Shen Buhai (d. 337 BCE), Shen Dao (c. 350 BCE –275 BCE) and Han Fei.

The impression we get from reading the Legalist texts is that there was lively debate and scrupulous consideration of the idea of fa, which could mean “standard,” on a broader reading, as well as penal law, in some of its uses.

Summary

“Daoism” has been used to denote a range of quite different areas of focus, ideas and debates across different periods of time. The English term “Daoism” has been used to identify different groups, practices or doctrines that incorporate at some level the notion of dao (way, path). However, the criteria for inclusion are sometimes obscure and arbitrary. We briefly consider the varied meanings of the term “Daoism” before discussing some key themes in one of its basic texts, the Daodejing (also referred to as the Laozi, bearing the name of its alleged author). We consider the terms dao, de (potency), ziran (nature, spontaneity) and wuwei (unconditioned action) as well as some distinctive features of Daoist thought. We will also draw on some of these insights to consider their relevance to issues in contemporary philosophical debates.

In traditional scholarship, Daoism has often been juxtaposed against Confucianism, sometimes as if it was a negative reaction to the latter. Differences between the traditions and their ideas were first expressed during the pre-Han period, for example, in the Lüshi Chunqiu, where Confucius is said to have learnt from a “Lao Dan,” believed to be Laozi (Graham 1998: 28). In the Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian), Confucius, overawed by Laozi, describes him as a dragon (Shiji 63). Similar stories are found in the Zhuangzi and the Record of Rites (Li Ji) (Graham 1998: 25, 26). In the Zhuangzi, Confucius is sometimes caricatured as lacking in deeper, Daoist wisdom which embraces flexible and skilful responsiveness. As we cover the ideas associated with Daoism below, we need to be mindful that many of the ideas had developed and evolved through time in the hands of different thinkers, and at times were entangled with political motivations. For example, the hostility between Daoism and Confucianism may have been due in part to the way they were brought together by Han historiographers to justify their ideologies and secure their positions (Loewe 1999; Lloyd 2002: 126–47).

The Philosophy and Practice of the Daojia

This section outlines Daoism, understood as the philosophy and practice of the Daojia (Daoist-group), with sections on Huang-Lao Daoism and Lao-Zhuang, or “philosophical Daoism” to follow.

Summary

During the fourth century B.C. it began to occur to the Chinese that words move in a world of their own, a region connected only in the most casual and precarious way with the world of reality … Now there were particular reasons, connected with the history and character not only of the Chinese language, but also of the script, which made this rift between language and actuality not merely a subject of detached philosophic enquiry … but a burning question of the day.

(Waley, The Way, 1958: 59–60)

Arthur Waley calls this phenomenon “The Language Crisis.” His description suggests it was as though a wave of consciousness had spread among the thinkers in China. The early thinkers questioned the nature of language and its connection with the world. Putting aside the concern about the accuracy of Waley's account of this phenomenon, we note that he rightly points out that there is a peculiarity in the Chinese language that complicates issues of language–world correspondence. It was important to many of the early thinkers to consider how each Chinese character (or name, ming) picked out entities or phenomena, or aspects of the world. The thinkers were also perplexed by the question of how, when two characters were combined to form a compound name, it was possible systematically to pick out the correct referents of the compound names. For example, what do “狗” (gou, dog) and “小” (xiao, small) pick out, and what does “小狗” (xiaogou) pick out? Were there regularities or patterns to these changes? Both the Confucian theory of correcting names (zhengming) and the Mohist preoccupation with standards (fa) involved some thought about how correct application of names might help to establish norms and thus bring order to society. In contrast, thinkers associated with the Daodejing advocated caution about the conventionality of language and its potentially manipulative power. The debates about names extended over a range of philosophical areas that we may think of as being loosely aligned with metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of language. The discussions of the Mingjia (Disputers concerned with names) and the Later Mohist thinkers were not fully appreciated by thinkers of the Warring States period and long after.

Summary

Over the last two decades, interest in Chinese philosophy has grown significantly among Anglophone scholars, students and interested lay public: more excellent translations of original texts have been produced; scholarly journals highlighting the field established; successful international conferences organised; and monographs and anthologies published. The field has broadened in its engagement across disciplinary boundaries, in studies that bring together philosophical perspectives with historical, archaeological, religious or anthropological approaches. Just as important, dialogue across Western and Chinese philosophical traditions is burgeoning, fuelled in part by the conviction that Chinese philosophy can make significant and insightful contributions to contemporary debates.

An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy examines major philosophical concepts, themes and texts in early Chinese philosophy, paying special attention to the period between the fifth and the second centuries BCE, the earliest time from which we have a substantial collection of texts expressing a plethora of views. We may think of this period as one where we begin to see the origins of Chinese philosophy. The extant texts from this period incorporate key elements of philosophy: presentation of and reflection on worldviews, unmasking of assumptions, argumentation and justification of ideas and debates on values and ideals. The primary aim of this book is to introduce a representative overview of key philosophical ideas and debates proposed by thinkers of the time and which continue to be relevant today. Some attempt is made to compare the features of Chinese philosophy with parallel aspects of Western philosophy. However, the aim of such comparisons is to elucidate the characteristics of Chinese philosophy rather than to present and account for differences in the two fields.

This book is introductory in a few ways. First, it covers representative ideas, themes and debates so that these fundamental aspects of Chinese philosophy may inform further investigations into more complex and lesser-known areas. Second, it seeks to capture the spirit of the classical Chinese texts, but it cannot replace close reading of these texts. Good translations are available of many texts and recommendations are included in the list of suggested readings at the end of each chapter. If it is not possible to read more complete translations of the texts, readers should at least obtain a reliable compendium of primary sources such as William Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom's Sources of Chinese Tradition (vol. 1: 1999).

Summary

The Yijing (The Book of Changes) incorporates sections that date from around the ninth century BCE. The older layer of the text, known as the “Basic Text” (Ben Jing), has traditionally been associated with divination. This older layer comprises:

Summary

The primary themes and argumentative strategies in Zhuangzi's (c. 399 BCE–c.295 BCE) philosophy bear some resemblance to those in the Daodejing. The Zhuangzi bears the name of its alleged author but, like the Daodejing, its sections were most probably composed by different authors, and the extant text contains writings collected over a period of time. Although some of its subject matter overlaps with that in the Daodejing, its style is quite different. It is inquisitive, being playful and critical at the same time, using many examples from the natural world – monkeys, fish, cicadas, frogs and summer insects, to name a few – to illustrate its questions. Because it often leaves its questions unresolved, it seems as if it is inviting readers to come to their own conclusions. Some of these characteristics of the text are reflected in its chapter titles, for example, chapter 1 is entitled “Going Rambling without a Destination” (“Xiaoyao You”) and chapter 4, “Worldly Business among Men” (“Renjian Shi”) (trans. Graham, Chuang-Tzu, 2001). Yet in spite of the seemingly light-hearted way in which the text brings up questions, the reader is always aware that it treats its questions with utmost seriousness.

The Zhuangzi dates from between the fourth to the second centuries BCE, and debate persists concerning when particular sections might have been written and by whom (Graham 2003a: 58). Traditionally, the two texts, the Daodejing and Zhuangzi, had been grouped as belonging to one tradition, the Lao-Zhuang tradition. There was also some consensus that the Daodejing was composed earlier than the Zhuangzi, and, as they stand in that relation, that the Daodejing is a less sophisticated text while the Zhuangzi represents a mature, developed Daoism. For example, Wing-tsit Chan notes:

The Dao in Laozi is still wordly, whereas in Zhuangzi it becomes transcendental. While Laozi emphasizes the difference between glory and disgrace, strength and weakness, and so forth, and advocates the tender values, Zhuangzi identifies them all. Laozi aims at reform, but Zhuangzi prefers to “Travel beyond the mundane world” … It is not wrong, after all, to link Laozi and Zhuangzi together, although it must be borne in mind that [Zhuangzi] certainly carried Daoism to new heights.

(Chan, Source Book, 1963a: 178; annotations by author)

Summary

Troubled by the unrest of the Spring and Autumn period, Confucius (Kongzi) (551–479 BCE) proposed the ethical reform of society. His proposal involved the elimination of the power-mongering and exploitative behaviours of those in power. The process was to be initiated by exemplary court officials, men of broad education and committed to beneficent government.

As the instigator of these ideas, Confucius is recognised as belonging to a group known as the Ru (Literati). The Ru were learned men who sought to share and realise their insights on the ethical administration of government. However, the nature of the connection between the Ru and the Confucians depicted in the Analects – the Conversations – is quite unclear (Zufferey 2014).

Ruist education consisted in the cultivation of an ethically and ritually disciplined life. As some Ru extended the rigours of ceremonial court ritual to the social and domestic arenas, Confucians have sometimes been thought of as traditionalists. It is interesting that in the Analects (7:1), Confucius is noted to have said that he is a transmitter, not a creator. Did he see himself primarily as a proponent of a traditional way?

Reading the Analects

Textual matters

The key text for Confucius’ ideas is The Analects of Confucius (Lunyu). The text comprises conversations Confucius was meant to have had with his followers. The extant text provides an unreliable picture of Confucius as it was compiled during the Western Han (206 BCE–9 CE), at least two and a half centuries after Confucius’ death. More recently, two unearthed versions of the text, believed to pre-date the received version, have received some scholarly attention. In spite of the evidence that suggests multiple versions of the Analects were in circulation around the Western Han period, some scholars have attempted to date the received text's sections. How might the text be read? The 499 short passages in the Analects are not systematically organised and repetitions and inconsistencies are common. Because the extant text is composite, it is not surprising to find that a term or concept may have several different meanings in its conversations. The reader will not find clearly articulated doctrines or justified points of view, even though it is sometimes possible to construct a plausible account of the rationale for the conversations and some key themes.

Summary

Buddhism was first introduced into China during the Han dynasty, around the first century CE. However, it was only after the downfall of the Han, when China was once again divided by ethnic and territorial wars and Confucianism lost its footing as the state-endorsed ideology, that Buddhist ideas were given serious consideration. Over the third and fourth centuries CE, during the Wei dynasty (220–65) and then the Jin (265–420), Buddhist religious and philosophical notions were put through intensive scrutiny, and those who sought to promote this “foreign” ideology primarily articulated its ideas in the language of existing terms and ideas in Chinese thought, especially those aligned with Daoism. Buddhist thought in China was significantly shaped by the ideas of the Xuanxue (mysterious learning) thinkers, who were known collectively by this title as they were preoccupied with the profound, mysterious dao (Chan 2009: 303). It was not until the fifth century that Chinese Buddhism began to establish its ideas in its own terms. In the course of this process, doctrinal differences were articulated, resulting in the development of different strands of Chinese Buddhism. From then, Chinese Buddhist doctrine stood apart from Indian Buddhism, while also establishing itself as a Chinese tradition, distinctive from Confucianism and Daoism.

Given the extended period of development of Chinese Buddhism and its eventual division and definition into different strands, the discussion in this chapter will focus on key points of philosophical interest. It is important first to understand the fundamental tenets of Indian Buddhist thought; the sketch here presents brief details of its elements that are relevant to our understanding of Chinese Buddhism. The second section explores the early stages of the introduction of Buddhism into China up until around the fourth century. The discussion here also highlights elements of the indigenous philosophies of China, especially Xuanxue thought, that shaped Chinese Buddhist thought. Third, there will be an overview of the main strands of Chinese Buddhist doctrine, a few of which began to establish distinctive views from around the fifth century. The discussion will centre on developments across the two or three centuries from the fifth century. The final section of this chapter considers some distinctive features of Chinese Buddhist philosophy in light of its engagement with Chinese thought and its contributions to Chinese intellectual history.

Summary

Mohist thought is named after its alleged founder, Mozi (c. 480 BCE–c. 390 BCE). Some vignettes of Mozi's life have been constructed on the belief that he was anti-Confucian. For example, Mozi was said to have interacted with a group of Ruist scholar-officials who were preoccupied with the study of texts, ceremonial ritual and the cultivation of a privileged lifestyle. According to this account, Mozi reacted to these aspects of Ruist doctrine and is said to have praised Confucius but rejected the other Ruists he met (see Schwartz 1985: 133, 138–9). None of these accounts can be treated with certainty, however, so our picture of Mozi is primarily constructed from what he is supposed to have said in the Mozi. Consideration of these interpretive issues raises the important methodological question of whether we read the Mozi as “a master with disciples and opponents bringing about a text” or as “a text describing (and thereby creating) a master, disciples, and opponents” (Defoort and Standaert 2013: 4).

Textual matters

At the heart of Mohist philosophy is the text, the Mozi. The fifty-three-chapter extant text is a version of a seventy-one-chapter text compiled by Liu Xiang (76–6 BCE) during the Han dynasty. The chapters may be divided into a number of sections:

• 1–7 (opening chapters)

• 8–37 (core chapters, articulating the ten doctrines)

• 40–5 (canons or dialectical chapters)

• 46–50 and 38, 39 (dialogues or “Mohist Analects”)

• 51–71 (military chapters)

The extant text presents a reasonably coherent picture of early Mohist philosophy with a number of distinctive themes, which will be covered in this chapter. Sections were written over time and it is not clear that groups of Mohists identified in other works were actually associated with the text. It is also possible that different sections of the text were in circulation at different times and in different areas. The Zhuangzi identifies three factions of Mohists (Zhuangzi, chapter 4), the Han Fei Zi also identifies three factions (Han Fei Zi, chapter 50) although only one of the groups overlaps in the two lists. Because the language in the Mozi can be repetitious and ponderous, it has been suggested that the Mohists – some of whom were craftsmen and technicians – were of lower social status than the authors of texts such as the Analects (see Hansen 1992: 95–8).

Summary

Confucius’ vision for rectifying society was idealistic: good government begins with the moral self-cultivation of able leaders. At times, the Analects acknowledges that the chances of such rectification were low (Analects 7:26; 9:13). Nevertheless, its theme of self-cultivation (xiushen) has had far-reaching effects in Chinese society and culture. The belief that education begets moral wisdom was articulated in the Chinese Civil Service Examination system for recruiting officials. The system, which had its beginnings during the Sui dynasty (581–618) and which thrived during the Qing (1644–1911), employed men who performed well in examinations based largely on Confucian texts. It was believed that scholars of the classical texts would also be ethically adept practitioners of good government (Elman 2009).

The Confucians were optimistic, yet to some extent pragmatic, in their assessment of human moral capacities and how these could be shaped to produce more fruitful outcomes for society. Self-cultivation played a central role in the Confucian hope for a better, more ethically focused society. Both Mencius (c. 385 BCE–c. 312 BCE) and Xunzi (c. 310 BCE–c. 219 BCE) reflected on the resources available to humanity for its cultivation. They discussed the human capacity to be moral and the fabric or infrastructure of society that supported its development. They drew different conclusions, however. Mencius believed that humans had a natural tendency to feel compassion even though some acted maliciously and selfishly; these latter behaviours resulted from a negligence to nurture the original compassionate heart-mind (xin). Xunzi held that individuals were not naturally predisposed to ethical conduct; it was only through the establishment of standards for human conduct, initiated by the ruler, that these problems could be addressed. In spite of their differences, both viewed morally-inspired government as the key to their respective approaches to establish a humane society. Their debates on human nature and its cultivation engaged with a range of views held by other thinkers. These discussions and ensuing tensions shaped conceptions of morality, government and society in China for years to come.

Summary

This book covers major philosophical traditions in early Chinese philosophy, focusing especially on its foundational period, prior to 200 BCE. It discusses on concepts, themes, reasoning and argumentative methods in Chinese philosophy, introducing readers to fundamental ideas in the different traditions, debates among thinkers, cross-influences between traditions, as well as interpretive theories about these ideas, including views expressed in contemporary scholarship. The chapters are organised partly on the basis of thematic coherence and continuity and loosely according to chronological order. A Chronology is provided at the outset, placing key thinkers in relation to one another. This list is selective and brief, situating only those thinkers and periods that are discussed in the book. The at-a-glance table should help the reader locate thinkers in their historical context in relation to other thinkers. Dates are also included in the text in places where they are integral to the specific point being made.

In a number of chapters, a section discussing textual matters is included. These cover, for example, details of different versions of texts, connections between text and thinker, or the dating of texts, where relevant. Some of this material is quite technical, though readers should find the information helpful in understanding how Chinese intellectual history shapes our grasp of Chinese philosophy.

For the sake of consistency, within citations, English transliterations of Chinese concepts, and names of thinkers and texts, have been modified to the standard Pinyin system. However, the names of modern and contemporary scholars (e.g. Fung, Yu-lan) have been retained so as not to confuse bibliographic data. A short list of Suggestions for Further Reading, of primary and secondary sources, is provided at the end of each chapter. A more extended Bibliography is included at the end of the book. Two separate lists, Primary Texts (listed alphabetically by title) and Secondary Sources (listed alphabetically by author), provide more extensive reading suggestions. References to primary texts follow this format: Graham, Chuang-Tzu, 2001; and secondary sources are listed in this way: Fingarette, 1983. The Glossary at the end of the book is set out in three sections, comprising texts and sections of texts, names and proper nouns and concepts and themes. The lists are alphabetically arranged in Pinyin transliteration, and, where possible, an English translation is provided.

For a while now, there has been much conceptual discussion about the respective natures of knowledge-that and knowledge-how, along with the intellectualist idea that knowledge-how is really a kind of knowledge-that. Gilbert Ryle put in place most of the terms that have so far been distinctive of that debate, when he argued for knowledge-how's conceptual distinctness from knowledge-that. But maybe those terms should be supplemented, expanding the debate. In that spirit, the conceptual option of practicalism has recently entered the fray. Practicalism conceives anew the nature of knowledge-that, as being a kind of knowledge-how. In this paper we enlarge upon this conceptual suggestion. We draw from an ancient Chinese text, the Analects of Confucius, explaining how it lends some support to practicalism.

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Confucius and the varifocal stance

An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy

7 - Legalist Philosophy

Summary

Chronology

Glossary

5 - Daoism and the Daodejing

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Contents

6 - The Mingjia and the Later Mohists

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1 - Chinese Philosophy

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9 - The Yijing and Its Place in Chinese Philosophy

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8 - The Zhuangzi

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Index

Frontmatter

2 - Confucius and the Analects

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10 - Chinese Buddhism

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4 - Early Mohist Philosophy

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3 - Human Nature and Cultivation in Confucian Philosophy: Mencius and Xunzi

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Bibliography

Preface

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Practising to Know: Practicalism and Confucian Philosophy

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An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy

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