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Extensively trained as a philosopher, Cicero was also a working politician with a keen awareness of the distance between pure intellectual endeavor and effective strategies of persuasion. This volume explores a series of interrelated problems in his works, from the use of emotion, self-correction, and even fiction in intellectual inquiry, to the motives of political agents and the morality of political arguments, to the means of justifying the use of force in international relations. It features close readings of works from all periods of Cicero's philosophical career, from the threshold of Rome's civil war to the year following the assassination of Julius Caesar. For a richer body of evidence, the volume also makes use of material from Cicero's personal letters and political speeches. Power and Persuasion in Cicero's Philosophy will be essential reading not only in Roman philosophy but also for the political and rhetorical culture of the Roman Republic.
I argue for an account of acting together that has a particular notion of joint commitment at its core. The account presented offers a compact explanation of four significant aspects of acting together as this is ordinarily understood: the parties have pertinent obligations to one another; each needs the concurrence of the rest with his or her untimely exit from the joint activity; an appropriate collective goal is sufficient to motivate the parties; and the parties may have personal goals contrary to the collective goal. I argue that the simplicity of the account coupled with its explanatory power argue for it in face of concerns that it takes us beyond the concepts we need to explain what it is for an individual to act alone. Indeed, there is reason to invoke joint commitment in many contexts other than acting together in which more than one person is involved. I conclude by noting that the joint commitment account of acting together plausibly accounts for the apparently transformative nature of doing things with others, citing its connection with a sense of togetherness, solidarity, and unity, as in the phrase ‘There is no I in team’.
I start by emphasizing two aspects of Michael Bratman's approach to shared agency and contrast it with my own in those respects. I conclude with some related remarks on the relation of morality and joint commitment.
Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a “we,” and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights. Here I outline my understanding of joint commitment and its normative impact.
The combinatorial theory of species, introduced by Joyal in 1980, provides a unified understanding of the use of generating functions for both labelled and unlabelled structures and as a tool for the specification and analysis of these structures. Of particular importance is their capacity to transform recursive definitions of tree-like structures into functional or differential equations, and vice versa. The goal of this book is to present the basic elements of the theory and to give a unified account of its developments and applications. It offers a modern introduction to the use of various generating functions, with applications to graphical enumeration, Polya theory and analysis of data structures in computer science, and to other areas such as special functions, functional equations, asymptotic analysis and differential equations. This book will be a valuable reference to graduate students and researchers in combinatorics, analysis, and theoretical computer science.
Philosophical epistemology is concerned with knowledge and related phenomena such as belief. In order to have a general label for such phenomena I shall refer to them as cognitive states. Differing accounts of a variety of cognitive states have been produced. For instance, according to one venerable – if debated – account of knowledge, it is justified true belief. Belief has been contrasted with acceptance, though the belief-acceptance contrast has been drawn in a variety of different ways.
It is certainly nothing new to point out that Pygmies, hunter-gatherers of the African equatorial rainforest, are known as a people who sing and dance—in other words, who “music“†—a lot. Their music, for the most part vocal polyphony, has been abundantly recorded and reproduced on 78-rpm records and on CDs. Many