Much of the beef produced and sold in the United States before World War II was from grass- or limited grain-fed cattle. However, development of the modern large-scale cattle feeding industry in the 1950s and 1960s greatly increased supplies of grain-fed beef and, by the early 1970s, many American consumers found only USDA Choice beef from heavy, grain-fed cattle in supermarkets. Consumers soon became conditioned to the flavor, juiciness, and tenderness of high quality, well-marbled beef. Proponents of forage or limited grain finishing systems found little support at any marketing level.

Nutrigenomics is the study of how constituents of the diet interact with genes, and their products, to alter phenotype and, conversely, how genes and their products metabolise these constituents into nutrients, antinutrients, and bioactive compounds. Results from molecular and genetic epidemiological studies indicate that dietary unbalance can alter gene–nutrient interactions in ways that increase the risk of developing chronic disease. The interplay of human genetic variation and environmental factors will make identifying causative genes and nutrients a formidable, but not intractable, challenge. We provide specific recommendations for how to best meet this challenge and discuss the need for new methodologies and the use of comprehensive analyses of nutrient–genotype interactions involving large and diverse populations. The objective of the present paper is to stimulate discourse and collaboration among nutrigenomic researchers and stakeholders, a process that will lead to an increase in global health and wellness by reducing health disparities in developed and developing countries.

Having argued in Part One against extensive judicial or regulatory interference with private personnel credentialing in the health care field, this Article now shifts its focus to emphasize the anticompetitive hazards inherent in credentialing as practiced by professional interests. Competitor-sponsored credentialing is shown to be a vital part of a larger cartel strategy to curb competition by standardizing personnel and services and controlling the flow of information to health care consumers. Instead of altering the conclusions reached in Part One, however, Part Two sets forth a new and hitherto unexplored agenda for antitrust enforcement, one that the authors believe will increase the quantity and quality of information available to consumers and offer a fairer competitive environment to individuals and groups disadvantaged by the denial of desirable credentials. The specific targets singled out for antitrust scrutiny are (1) the practice of "grandfathering," by which new candidates for credentials are required to meet tougher requirements than were met by existing credential holders; (2) agreements to standardize educational programs if they go beyond setting and applying accrediting standards and impair the freedom of institutions to decide independently whether to offer unaccredited training; (3) agreements by which independent certifying or accrediting bodies limit the nature or scope of competition among themselves; and (4) mergers and joint ventures in credentialing and accrediting. The legal theory supporting antitrust attacks in the latter two categories is strengthened by the apparently original insight that commercial information and opinion are themselves articles of commerce such that agreements and combinations restricting their nature and output can be characterized as restraints of trade. Among the many self-regulatory institutions in the health care field whose operation or sponsorship is called into question by the analysis herein are the leading medical specialty boards, the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, various accrediting and certifying bodies in the allied health occupations, and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.

This Article explores the antitrust and other implications of private credentialing and accrediting programs in the health care industry. Although such programs are usually sponsored by powerful competitor groups, they serve the procompetitive purpose of providing useful information and authoritative advice to independent decision makers. Part One examines the risk that credentialing will sometimes be unfair to competitors and deceive consumers. Its survey of common-law, antitrust, and regulatory interventions to correct such unfairness and deception seeks to determine the degree of oversight to which credentialing and similar activities have been and should be subjected. In recommending that judicial or regulatory scrutiny should be limited to discovering whether standards and practices have a rational relation to a procompetitive purpose, the Article argues that greater intrusion into credentialing schemes would be inconsistent with market theory and first amendment values and would discourage line-drawing efforts that stimulate competition and facilitate consumer choice. By emphasizing throughout that personnel certification and institutional accreditation embody ideology and opinion as well as factual information, Part One sets the stage for the argument in Part Two that antitrust law can and should be used to contest the dominance of a single ideology of health care and to facilitate the development of alternative sources of consumer information. The Article’s overall thesis is that, whereas the quality of advice given to the public about health care personnel and similar matters should not be closely regulated, neither should the supply of competing information and opinion be artificially curtailed.