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Abnormalities during a smooth pursuit eye movement task (SPEM) are common in schizophrenic patients and their relatives. This study assessed various components of SPEM performance in first-degree unaffected relatives of schizophrenic patients. One hundred individuals with schizophrenia, 137 unaffected first-degree relatives, and 69 normal controls completed a 16.7°/s SPEM task. Smooth pursuit gain, catch-up saccades (CUS), large anticipatory saccades, and leading saccades (LS) were identified. Groups were compared with parametric and admixture analyses. Schizophrenic patients performed more poorly than unaffected relatives and normals on gain, CUS, and LS. Unaffected relatives were more frequently impaired than normals only on gain and LS. Relatives of childhood-onset and adult-onset probands had similar impairments. Gain and frequency of leading saccades may be genetic endophenotypes in childhood-onset and adult-onset schizophrenia.
Scholars of Middle Eastern studies in the last decade often were preoccupied with two major problems. First, the democratization that has spread over most of the globe seems to have missed the Middle East. Second, there appears to be a growing gap between international relations and comparative politics theory, on the one hand, and Middle East studies, on the other. In seeking to explain why, some point to the highly politicized scholarship that can still be found in Middle East studies. Others argue that the theorists simply have not tried hard enough to fit the special nature of the Middle East into their theoretical models, or that Middle Eastern scholars have not tried hard enough to deal with theory. Two of the three books under review, by Hansen and Heydemann, do a great deal to narrow the gap between theory and reality in the Middle East. The book by Niblock is an example of the kind of highly politicized scholarship that is still found too often in Middle Eastern studies.
In an outgrowth of his doctoral dissertation, Talal Nizameddin, now a lecturer at HaigazianUniversity in Beirut, discusses the evolution of Russian foreign policy toward the Middle Eastunder Boris Yeltsin from the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 until 1997. Thebook, based in part on extensive interviews in Moscow, seeks to show how Russian policyevolved from what the author describes as the “radical pro-West” view of ForeignMinister Andrei Kozyrev in the early 1990s to the more nationalist view of Yevgeny Primakov inthe mid- to late 1990s. In general, Nizameddin succeeds in his task, although his failure toevaluate critically some of the comments given to him by his interviewees in Moscow, such asVitaly Naumkin, and the clearly anti-United States and anti-Israel perspective with which thebook is written detract from the value of the study.
This book is a most welcome addition to the literature on Russian–Israeli relations. Although Yaacov Ro⊃i, in his study Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel 1947–1954 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), covered the 1947–53 period thoroughly, and although there is an extensive body of literature on Russian policy toward Israel (and the rest of the Middle East) after the 1967 war, a gap has existed for many years in the scholarly coverage of Russian–Israeli relations from the death of Stalin in March 1953 until the June 1967 Six Day War. Yosef Govrin, a retired Israeli Foreign Office official who specialized in relations with the USSR, has gone a long way toward filling this gap. Having the advantage of access to the Israeli archives and internal political debates, Govrin presents a balanced picture of the Soviet–Israeli relationship, pointing out where, in his opinion, both Israel and the USSR made mistakes in developing their ties. He also goes into great detail on the question of Soviet Jewry (more than half of the book), noting how Israel's efforts to get the Soviet government to allow Jews to emigrate to Israel was a serious complicating factor in the relationship, although the primary cause for the USSR's breaking of diplomatic relations with Israel in June 1967 (Govrin was first secretary of the Israeli embassy in Moscow at the time) stemmed from Moscow's backing of the radical Ba⊃athist regime in Syria, which helped precipitate the 1967 war.
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Syria in the Andropov era (November 1982–February 1984) provides a fascinating case study of the limits of a superpower's influence on a client state, particularly when that client becomes the only lever of influence a superpower has in a region deemed of great importance by the superpower's leadership. In order to analyze the Soviet–Syrian relationship, however, it is first necessary to deal with the goals of both the Soviet Union and Syria, and to determine to what degree the assistance each can offer the other is critical to the accomplishment of each country's goals.
As far as the question of Soviet goals in the Middle East is concerned, there are two major schools of thought. While both agree that the Soviet Union wants to be considered as a major factor in Middle Eastern affairs, if only because of the USSR's propinquity to the region, they differ on the ultimate Soviet goal in the Middle East. One school of thought sees Soviet Middle Eastern policy as primarily defensive in nature; that is, directed toward preventing the region from being used as a base for military attack or political subversion against the USSR. The other school of thought sees Soviet policy as primarily offensive in nature, aimed at the limitation and ultimate exclusion of Western influence from the region and its replacement by Soviet influence.