Liberal political theory and contemporary expositions of human rights focus largely on the individual. Some liberal theorists even deny that ethnic communities and other groups, as collective entities, can have moral rights at all. The outlook is narrow and unfortunate. It reflects a preoccupation with domestic politics and a model of domestic politics that neglects the common fact of heterogeneity. It ignores widespread practices and urgent problems, for in many countries groups identified by race, language, or religion make moral claims, and their claims are sometimes conceded. It ignores the common view that nations or “peoples” have a (moral) right of self-determination, and it even leaves the state itself without justification. If theory is to give adequate guidance, its focus must be broadened. The question of group rights needs to be explored, and interrelationships between the rights of individuals, of groups, and of the state need to be clarified.

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.

This paper focuses on the requirement of the U. N. Charter that members shall promote human rights “without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” It asks: (1) whether “without distinction” means “without any differentiation” or “without discrimination”; (2) whether the naming of race, sex, language, and religion means that “distinction” on other bases remains permissible, or whether what is ruled out is discrimination of any kind that affects human rights; and (3) whether the search for equality has not been internationalized, at least in principle, and what the implications of the internationalization may be. The inquiry can be classified as legal/philosophical.

The third question leads to an analysis of the “without distinction” clause of the Charter in terms of the principle of equality. Claims to nondiscrimination are negative claims to equality, and they have as their counterpart claims to affirmative action on behalf of equality—often for groups. The problem is that affirmative action promoting equality for groups entails differentiations among individuals that may be discriminatory. To resolve the dilemma, the test of reasonableness is endorsed—and the search for standards for judging it goes on—at both the domestic and international levels.

Most political scientists concern themselves in one way or another with values and interests. References to values are ubiquitous in the literature, and one need only cite such terms as interest groups, the public interest, the common interest, and the national interest to recall the frequent reference to interests.

The two words have already been discussed a great deal. Even so, there is considerable confusion about their meaning and about the interrelationships of their meaning. Rather than serve as effective tools for incisive analyses, they frequently lead into intellectual traps; and rather than serve as clear symbols for communication, they frequently lead to misunderstanding. These difficulties have been especially great in the field of foreign affairs, where so much has been made of the concept the national interest.

To the time of the writing of Taft's book, A Foreign Policy for Americans, his views on the problem of American security could be characterized as follows: (1) The paramount purpose of American policy is to preserve individual liberty in the United States. (2) Foreign aid programs, defense preparations, and above all war itself jeopardize liberty because of the regimentation and taxation they require. (3) Security measures should therefore be selected in terms of two potentially contradictory considerations: they must be adequate to prevent or win war, but they must not be so extensive as to undermine from within the liberty which they are designed to preserve. Until the writing of the book Taft sought to resolve this dilemma by minimizing foreign threats and consequently by minimizing the need for domestic activities which he thought would endanger liberty. Where he recognized the need for such activities, he was inclined to restrict expenditures, to select military means, and to delimit the geographic zone of defense so as to keep domestic danger to liberty at a minimum. His emphasis was more on domestic dangers than on foreign dangers. (4) Although favoring containment of the Soviet Union and Communism, and supporting the principle that a Soviet attack on western Europe would mean war with the United States, Taft preferred not to have formal European allies and not to rearm them collectively; above all, he opposed any advance commitments to engage in land warfare. Belief that the security of western Europe was vital to the security of the United States had, at least, not become an ingrained part of his thought. (5) He professed to adhere to the principle of collective security, but in practice he twice abandoned it—in relation to the Axis and in relation to Korea. After Korea, Taft looked upon the UN with disfavor. (6) Taft regularly insisted upon preserving Congressional prerogatives in the field of foreign affairs. He put serious reservations on bipartisanship, and he distrusted the Department of State.

Several significant, though subtle, changes in Taft's position are evident in his book. Nowhere are previous positions explicitly repudiated, yet there are modifications, omissions, and shifts of emphasis. The preservation of individual liberty in the United States is still the primary objective, but Taft has shifted somewhat away from preoccupation with domestic dangers to American liberty toward greater concern for foreign dangers. He no longer minimizes the Soviet Union as a military threat.