Approximate parity in power capabilities between states creates uncertainty of victory if war were to occur. Whether, therefore, decisional uncertainty inhibits war between states or makes a breaking of the peace likely, is a central question in the host of ‘balance of power’ theories of interstate conflict. Some argue one way; others a different way; and some appear to argue one way, then the other. For along time each found support in armchair reflection—common sense bolstered with diplomatic anecdotes from ancient and modern state systems. Arguments could be made to command diverse historical examples because they rested upon the common assumption that calculations of power, security and conflicts of interest are essentially the same in any system of sovereign states. Anarchy, if you will, orders anachronisms. Now, however, each side can find support in quantitative evidence from far more systematic empirical analyses. The latter analyses are intended to bring some order and discipline to contrary insights by replacing anecdote with data.