This manifesto argues that education should incorporate philosophical exploration to help young people address existential questions and find meaning and purpose in their lives. The manifesto suggests that to understand the meaning of one’s life, one must consider personal existence and consciousness and the reality beyond the here and now. It proposes that education should provide a neutral forum for discussing these big questions, without bias towards any particular belief system, and incorporating both scientific and spiritual perspectives. By engaging in such philosophical discourse, young people can develop a clearer sense of self and purpose, fostering resilience, mental well-being and a commitment to values and moral behaviour. This can support them to survive and thrive through the opportunities and challenges of the future.

Like their forerunners, post-Hellenistic doctors also grappled with the unclear boundaries between healthy versus pathologic sleep, and consciousness-unconsciousness. Furthermore, they incorporated new diseases and redefined others - like lethargy - that were specifically associated with this process. Celsus considered sleep as all-or-nothing phenomenon, without recognising different depths. Regarding mental capacities, he subsumed most of them in his idea of mens/animus. Aretaeus, on the other hand did conceive different depths of sleep, and his eclectic method enabled him to find alternative pathophysiological explanations to characterise several of its main features. Similarly, although his organization of mental capacities varied according to what he was explaining, the opposition gnômê-aisthêsis was important in his idea of mind.

Some Hippocratic doctors regarded sleep as a healthy process, and some as a pathological one; some of them struggled to distinguish between hallucinations and nightmares, and some between deep dreamless sleep and total loss of consciousness. This chapter explores how different treatises from the Hippocratic corpus navigated these ambiguities, how they explained different depth of sleep (i.e. different levels of consciousness), and how such understanding relates to their views on mental capacities (which they subsumed in concepts such as phronesis, sunesis, gnômê, and nous).

Ch. 6 New developments in science and philosophy can led to a new natural theology based on induction and probability. Natural theology today requires insights from the sciences, analytic philosophy, and hermeneutics.

This introductory chapter presents and contextualises the main sources under study, and addresses the problems of a definition of consciousness. Given the vagueness of the notion, a working definition is proposed, which is based on cognitive model that uses three prototypical clinical presentations of impaired consciousness: delirium, sleep and fainting.

This chapter presents sleep within a system of opposing tensions (consciousness-unconsciousness, health-disease), and in the midst of extra biological debates, particularly anthropological and sociological. Such tensions and debates illuminate how understanding sleep can be useful to apprehend ancient doctors’ ideas about the mental capacities that are compromised in impaired consciousness.

In face of the difficulty of establishing clear biological boundaries between sleep and the other forms of impaired consciousness, the sociological and anthropological analyses can provide hints as to where those limits were set in real life. The terminological analysis suggested a common feature that persisted throughout the different authors and periods: different levels of consciousness (from drowsy to hyperactive, and from delirium to koma) where always related to the impairment of mental capacities, regardless of the way in which each medical writer grouped or understood them.

Galen conceived sleep and wakefulness as a continuum that depended on the mixture of qualities within the ruling part of the puschê (the hêgemonikon) located in the brain. Naturally, in his system whenever pathological sleep occurred the doctor needed to determine if the brain was affected directly or by sympathy (from another organ), and the precise imbalance of qualities that needed to be counteracted by their opposites. His idea of mind was very accurately and hierarchically structured: it resided in the logical part of the soul, located in the brain, and several diseases with impaired consciousness compromised its normal functioning.

If the history of human rights shows anything, it shows that claim-making has no predetermined agents, and this volume nods to the rights of the non-human in a chapter by Jim Davies, who analyzes what might be at stake in the recognition of artificial intelligence not just as an instrumental tool, but a rights-bearing claimant in its own right. Indeed, Davies pursues this possibility through an analogy with the rise of entitlements of non-human nature, especially non-human animals.

The cognitive approach sees behaviour as resulting from the operation of internal mental processes. Our visual systems did not evolve to present us with a true description of the world; rather, they evolved to give us a useful description of the world that supports our actions upon it. We can see this in perceptual constancies in which a changing world is stabilized by the actions of our visual system, resulting in visual illusions. Although problems such as under-age drinking are often thought of as problems of logic (such as the abstract Wason task), they are perhaps better thought of as problems of duties and obligation and play a role in detecting freeriders to better enable cooperation. Statistical misconceptions such as the gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy may arise from our sensitivity to the patchiness of the world that we inhabit.

This chapter introduces the hard problem of sensory phenomenal consciousness and the three-part solution, the MOUDD theory, developed in the book.

James’s modernism is based directly on the psychology he founded, and specifically on his recognition that the self is malleable (or “plastic”), aggregate, distributed, and capable of mental reform. Yet James’s outspoken critique of US imperialism and the lynching of African Americans reflected his understanding of the dangerous potential of conversion – namely, that revolutions in belief carry a measure of uncertainty and risk, not just to individual believers but to the very fabric of democratic thought. Jamesean conversion therefore dramatizes the processes by which consent is staged from within and from without. The self enacts the drama in the form of an internal dialogue in which one imagines one’s “self” inhabiting a particular temporo-spatial location, as if fulfilling the role of a protagonist in a work of fiction. Against that background, Henry James’s What Maisie Knew and Harold Frederic’s The Damnation of Theron Ware dramatize the processes through which individuals become plastically transformed under the manipulations of powerful “pattern-setters” of public opinion. By fracturing and fragmenting imperial forms of selfhood, these psychological Bildungsromane inaugurate a reform modernism that registers dissent from the imperial sway of groups, demonstrating the strenuous effort required by individuals to transform oppressive systems from within.

Chapter 4 draws on both existing research and semi-structured interviews with people with visible differences to explain what we know about the human experience – both psychological and social – of having a disfigurement. For instance, are particular types of disfigurement more vulnerable to discrimination than others? Are certain life contexts impacted more acutely? Are coping mechanisms commonly used? It considers the link between physical appearance and perceived personality traits. And it challenges common assumptions – like the idea that more severe disfigurements are always worse to live with (an erroneous assumption which lives on undaunted in the law). Despite methodological difficulties in researching such a dynamic and underexplored area, this chapter identifies significant disadvantages in looking different. With this in mind, this chapter probes how people with lived experience of visible difference understand their experiences and relate them to the law. Exploring the legal consciousness of this group of people provides a partial insight into the low numbers of claims brought under the relevant part of equality law. It interrogates the gulf between what the law says on paper and how it works in real life, revealing tensions and mixed messages which undermine law’s potential for effectiveness.