This chapter argues that Hobbes’s appreciation of Galileo’s principles of motion occurred in stages by focusing on a principle that Hobbes introduces in Leviathan 2.1 to explain the imagination: “when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same, namely, (that nothing can change itself) is not so easily assented to.” Although there is evidence that Hobbes became aware of the importance of this principle in early criticisms of Thomas White and in early notes for De corpore, he did not incorporate it into his account of the imagination in Elements of Law (1640). However, in later works, such as the English and Latin versions of Leviathan and De corpore, conceiving of unhindered motion as continuing eternally provided Hobbes with the ability to explain more aspects of human cognition related to the imagination. Furthermore, thinking of the passion "curiosity" as an infinite endeavor enabled Hobbes to explain why human scientific endeavors can persist even in the face of failure or apparent uselessness.

I argue that through his account of the meaning of, and need for, solidarity, Rorty offers a non-juridical vision of liberal community built upon a political ethos of hope. This political ethos of hope is necessary to combat the threat posed by pathological individualism to contemporary liberal democratic societies. This ethos is characterised by attention to the cruelty that we inadvertently cause to others through the exercise of our private freedoms. It involves an explicit commitment to curiosity and an implicit demand for humility in our interactions with our fellows. These values have radical and far-reaching implications for Rorty’s account of political conversation – how we approach our dialogues with others, and the language that we use therein – in his idealised liberal community. I contrast these implications with deliberative democratic norms and put distance between Rorty’s view of political conversation and J. S. Mill’s account of free expression in a liberal society and the accounts of epistemic injustice offered by Fricker and Medina. I attempt a nuanced interpretation of Rorty’s understanding of the relevance of identity to politics.

Exploration involves gathering and assimilating information. Exploratory motivation and play are linked. Curiosity is associated with novelty seeking. Links are described with boredom. The orienting reflex is a form of exploratory behaviour. Exploratory behaviour involves whole-body movement. High levels of fear are antagonist to exploratory behaviour. The link with latent learning and cognitive maps is described. Problems with the application of drive theory to exploratory behaviour are discussed. The link to competence is discussed. Exploration acts in a hierarchical mode of control, involving incentive salience attribution. The chapter discusses the neuroscience of exploration (e.g. the hippocampus). Motivation of exploration involves the pathway from the VTA to the NAcc, which is excited by novelty. An amplification of exploratory motivation is seen in sensation seeking. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the developmental factors that underlie exploratory motivation. A focus is upon the role of environmental complexity in individual differences.

Creativity and innovation involve moving beyond conventional solutions, preconceptions, disciplinary boundaries, and assumptions about materials. They rely on a style of thinking termed open-minded engagement: playful, nimble, and cognitively flexible, and receptive to and embracing of new ideas, values, beliefs, lifestyles, and cultures, but in a critical and bounded way. This chapter surveys philosophical and empirical literature to explore how such thinking is engaged and developed through the arts. It suggests that if you can embrace and accept that you may not quite know what could happen, pause on projecting your preconceptions, be open to what the artwork is saying to you on its own terms, you will surely engage more fully, come to understand more about the artworks and artist themselves, and deepen your own capacity for continued openness.

This chapter explores practical strategies for sparking students’ interest and curiosity in statistics as lectures and classes commence, and for sustaining their engagement throughout the learning journey. It focuses on the benefits of capturing attention at the outset, encouraging open discussions, and creating a supportive environment where students feel confident to ask questions and seek help. By setting the scene for active participation and fostering a sense of curiosity, the chapter demonstrates how inclusive and student-centred teaching can transform statistics into a subject that feels relevant, accessible, and even enjoyable. Student perspectives highlight what truly makes a difference in their learning experience.

Many young artists try their hand at a variety of creative forms. Even those who know their passion early on may still dabble a bit in related domains, often fueled by the need to explore different artforms and endless curiosity. Many artists might use insights or skills learned in one domain throughout their career, even if they ultimately do not keep creating in that area. Some artists whose stories are told in this chapter kept shifting areas into college and young adulthood. Most stayed within the arts, but some found their way to the arts from other areas from sports to science. Other times, artists will work across multiple domains for their whole career.

What does Heidegger mean by “curiosity” and why does he characterize it as a kind of epistemic vice, when most contemporary accounts view it as a virtue? Being and Time disparagingly notes that curiosity “concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known” (BT 217/172); the curious person busies herself with “entertaining ‘incidentals’” (BT 358/310). Building on previous work – wherein I argue that virtues are best understood as tendencies to cope well with existential obstacles to flourishing (McMullin 2019) – I show that curiosity as Heidegger frames it is an epistemically vicious misunderstanding of self and world arising in large part from our tendencies toward impatience, arrogance, and fear. Because Heidegger’s account of curiosity in Being and Time is not well-developed, we will look at nearby texts to get a better understanding of this sometimes-overlooked concept in Heidegger’s corpus.

TOT states have a subjective phenomenology to them that is worthy of investigation in and of itself. Although examining the mechanisms of word-retrieval failure is an important part of fully understanding TOT experiences, the mechanisms of word-retrieval failure are not the complete picture. For one thing, not all instances of word-retrieval failure result in a TOT state. For another, TOT states are an inherently subjective phenomenon with a potentially unique set of phenomenological qualities that distinguish them from other metacognitive states of awareness and experiences. Understanding the subjective phenomenology of TOTs could help to elucidate important facets of metacognition as well as human consciousness more broadly.

The chapter lays out the motivation for this particular study on discovery through reference to the cross-disciplinary nature of this inquiry and its potential for deepening our understanding of how new knowledge is generated beyond a focus on single or allied disciplines. Classical studies on discovery are acknowledged, and their contributions to the subject are described in appreciation. However, what happens when discovery is pursued across disciplines from the social, natural, and biomedical sciences?

The main focus of this chapter is on another class of actions (in addition to the habits discussed in Chapter 2) that don’t result from decision-making processes. So in that sense they aren’t intentional and don’t fit the standard belief-desire model. These are actions that are directly caused by affective states (emotions, desires, and so on). Some of these actions are merely expressive, whereas others give the appearance of being instrumental, and are generally (but mistakenly) interpreted as goal-directed. But the chapter begins with a review of some basic findings from affective science and neuroscience. This is to set up the discussion in this and later chapters.

The inclination to withdraw himself from the public as far as possible is regarded as one of Virgil’s most salient characteristics: this at least is the impression given by the few testimonia and numerous anecdotes of his life. The guiding principle of Virgil’s life as a poet of the res publica Romana could be described as an ‘art of disappearing’, which becomes evident in different ways. By means of this Virgil sometimes succeeds in withdrawing himself spatially even from Augustus, the mightiest designer of space, and in establishing certain limits to his ‘topotactic’ power. To present the ‘withdrawing technique’ practised by Virgil, this chapter draws on information gathered from biographical texts on Virgil as well as on relevant passages of Virgil’s work, naturally without ignoring the documentary fragility of the texts considered. Nevertheless there are conspicuous correspondences between the texts about Virgil and the poetological messages within his literary works, which give an impression at least of his effective seclusion. His reception by his contemporaries and immediate successors proves his greatest success in this respect.

We propose that the processes underlying insight problem solving in humans depend on two distinctly different forms of curiosity: Curiosity1 (which is associated with a habit-based, goal-centered, reinforcement learning processing system), and Curiosity2 (which depends on the discursive, default mode, medial-temporal-lobe based processing system). The former kind of curiosity is goal directed and increases with approach to the rewarding answer. The latter is exploratory and goal averse: “twiddling.” The possibility of insight, we suggest, depends upon the individual initiating a deliberate system switch upon apprehension of an impasse. Problem solving involves engaging in a habitual mode of responding and motivation by Curiosity1. With insight problems, however, this normal mode fails to lead to a solution, and impasse results. Acknowledgment of the impasse may trigger a strategic switch to a different kind of curiosity and information processing system: the discursive, default mode Curiosity2 system, wherein the solution that was previously unavailable may be found. This view is consistent with traditional stages posited to be involved in insight problem solving. However, several paradigms used to study creativity or investigate 'Aha!' reactions do not fit easily with this view of insight. Using this perspective, we evaluate the evidence for insight in nonhuman animals.

What makes us durable in alone time is a combination of background, personality, mindset, approach, and mental tools. It may come as no surprise that adaptable, confident, and optimistic people are better at alone time, because those traits are important for resilience in any context. But we are also learning that those who are able to stop and introspect, who are generally curious and self-reliant, flourish when they’re alone. Perhaps more importantly, how we perceive solitude can make or break that time. Being able to see value or meaning in it, even when we must be alone, is critical. Feeling that we have interesting and challenging activities in that space also makes it more enjoyable.