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Law-making is not a straightforward process in international law. This chapter focuses on the various law-making processes and structures available for creating international law. It first considers the traditional sources of international law as set out in art 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice generally and the concept of hierarchy of norms and relative norms before considering each of the art 38(1) sources in turn. The chapter concludes by considering alternative sources of international law not covered by art 38(1): 'soft law' including that created by non-State actors, and the role of the UN in creating international law.
In the 2023 judgment of Nicaragua v. Colombia, the International Court of Justice ruled that, under customary international law, a State’s entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines is not permitted to extend within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State. In identifying this customary rule, the Court did not apply the two-element approach. The state practice relied upon by the Court to identify the general practice is not sufficiently widespread, representative, or consistent. The opinio juris is inferred from such state practice, which is not necessarily driven by a sense of legal obligation. The Court’s assertion of the customary rule constitutes, in effect, a rewriting of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, amounting to a legislative exercise.
This article examines the role of customary international law in regulating SRM by analysing competing interpretations of the customary law principle of prevention and their implications for SRM governance. Existing customary law limitations are largely overlooked in current policy and expert discussions around the future of SRM, which seemingly proceed on the basis that there are no universally applicable limitations for states to develop SRM technologies should they decide so. The paper contrasts this view and argues, from a positivist point of view, that the customary principle of prevention does pose certain limits for states even before SRM-caused transboundary environmental harm occurs. It distinguishes between a retrospective and future-oriented dimension of the prevention principle, and it depicts three scenarios for how the prevention obligation may limit the development and deployment of SRM technology depending on how States (and international legal advisors) conceptualise the temporal scope and normative content of the prevention principle. The article also examines the implications of the different configurations of the customary law obligation for an eventual SRM treaty.
This chapter observes instances in which the World Court has recognised that certain sources of international law may confer rights for individuals. It first identifies cases where the Court has interpreted relevant provisions of other international treaties, beyond the international human rights framework, as conferring rights on individual. In so doing, it analyses where the Court has applied ‘textualist’ and ‘intentionalist’ approaches to reach its conclusions. The chapter then notes where the Court has identified customary international law, the existence of which would confer rights to private persons in specific contexts. It notes that while there are ambiguities in the Court’s methods, this is characteristic of its approach to sources more broadly
This title examines the concept of normative pluralism in international human rights law, focusing on the coexistence and interaction of multiple legal systems and norms within the global human rights framework. It explores the treaty-based structure of human rights norms, including various international and regional human rights treaties, and discusses the role of customary international law, general principles of law, and jus cogens in shaping human rights obligations. The section also addresses the impact of nonconventional sources of human rights law, such as judicial decisions and soft law instruments, on the development and enforcement of human rights standards. By analyzing the complexities of normative pluralism, this title highlights the dynamic and evolving nature of international human rights law and the challenges in achieving coherence and consistency across different legal systems and cultures. It also emphasizes the importance of dialogue and cooperation among international, regional, and national actors in promoting and protecting human rights globally.
This chapter explores the role of customary norms, general principles of international law, and jus cogens in forming human rights law. It discusses the importance and challenges of integrating noncodified sources into the human rights framework. The chapter examines how customary international law and general principles of law contribute to the development and application of human rights norms. It also discusses the concept of jus cogens and its role in establishing fundamental human rights norms that cannot be derogated. The chapter highlights the challenges in identifying and applying noncodified sources of human rights law and the need for a comprehensive approach to integrate these sources into the human rights framework.
In the wake of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, international lawyers and policy advisors are considering the tools that are available to third States that wish to respond to the serious breach of international law and support Ukraine. Within this context, the question of third-party countermeasures is once again highly relevant. Though the topic was contentious during the drafting of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), doctrine on third-party countermeasures often argues that they are permissible under customary international law, even while acknowledging that opinio juris is lacking. Whereas it has been argued that this subjective requirement can be inferred, this article maintains that, given the ambiguity surrounding unilateral sanctions practice, it is necessary to demonstrate that States believe that they are legally permitted to adopt wrongful sanctions in response to a prior breach of an obligation erga omnes (partes). It is argued that the International Law Commission was right to not include third-party countermeasures in the final ARSIWA and that, while sanctions practice has seemingly flourished over the years, there has been little progress in conclusively establishing that third-party countermeasures are accepted as custom, as illustrated by the discussion on the confiscation of Russian State assets.
Throughout the various conferences addressing the law of the sea, states shaped and reshaped legal concepts relating to the oceans. They invented the ‘continental shelf’, ‘transit passage’, the ‘exclusive economic zone’, ‘archipelagic waters’ and the ‘seabed’. They reformulated the contiguous zone and fishing limits. And with a single stroke of a pen, they shrank the high seas by a third. Then, in 1994, just before the 1982 convention was about to enter into force, the UN General Assembly, prodded along by the United States, passed the ‘Implementation Agreement’, which amended the seabed regime set out within it. Now, over four decades after signature, new geopolitical forces will inevitably generate pressure for further changes to the law governing the sea.
States have the sovereign right to pursue their social and economic development, often involving urbanization, industrialization, infrastructure development, and tourism promotion. Regrettably, these endeavors frequently lead to destruction or damage to the authenticity and integrity of their cultural heritage. In light of this, one might wonder whether and to what extent, under customary international law, states’ right to development must be harmonized with the need to preserve their own cultural heritage for the benefit of future generations. The present contribution examines various elements of international practice, including treaty practice, resolutions of international organizations, national legislation, and states’ conduct in actual cases to determine the existence of a customary prohibition or clear limits on damaging cultural heritage for social and economic development. It also reflects more broadly on the international regime for protecting cultural heritage during peacetime and the ambiguous relationship between the World Heritage Convention and customary law.
In 2019, the United States indicted Turkiye Halk Bankasi (Halkbank), a Turkish state-owned bank, alleging a multiyear scheme to evade US sanctions against Iran by using fraudulent transactions to transfer the proceeds of oil and gas sales to Iran. This chapter evaluates the charges against Halkbank under both US domestic law and customary international law. After briefly reviewing the charges against Halkbank and the US district court’s analysis of the extraterritoriality questions, the chapter considers the application of the US presumption against extraterritoriality, concluding that all the charges except for the bank fraud charges survive this analysis. The conclusion with respect to customary international law, however, is quite different. Under customary international law, the United States lacks jurisdiction to prescribe when its only connection to the foreign defendant is the clearing of transactions through banks in the United States. Because the International Emergency Economic Powers Act authorizes sanctions on financial transactions only when the person or property is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, the sanctions regulations cannot lawfully be applied to Halkbank.
Whilst the United States ever more frequently imposes unilateral secondary sanctions, the debate on their lawfulness has only intensified. This chapter focuses specifically on the legality of imposing access restrictions, that is, denying third state sanctions evaders access to the United States and its commercial and financial markets. Until the late 2000s, it was widely held that access restrictions were a means of enforcing US prohibitions. The issue, therefore, was whether the United States had prescriptive jurisdiction to impose such prohibitions. If not, enforcement by way of access restrictions was unlawful. More recently, this has become contested. Some now argue that access restrictions are justified on uncontroversial jurisdictional grounds because they only regulate the behaviour of US persons on US territory. Others argue that access restrictions merely amount to a lawful withdrawal of privileges. In this chapter author’s view, these arguments are not convincing. Based on the relevant US legislation, the chapter shows why access restrictions are indeed enforcement tools. Since the underlying prohibitions cannot be justified under customary international law, such enforcement is unlawful. Furthermore, the international community has consistently condemned US secondary sanctions legislation, including access restrictions, as unlawful, leading to a customary international law prohibition.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the role of judicial dialogue between international courts in the interpretation of customary international human rights law. Judicial dialogue refers to international courts’ spontaneous practice of referencing other international courts’ decisions or international instruments that are outside the international court’s own judicial system. International courts engage in this practice in order to both identify rules of customary international human rights law and reach common interpretations on the meaning and scope of norms protecting human rights. Through the analysis of international courts’ case law, this chapter discusses the impact of judicial dialogue consisting in cross-references to legal norms and judicialdecisions on the interpretation of rules protecting human rights, especially when judges use case law from other courts in support of their interpretation.
Effectiveness and efficiency in judicial decision-making are the most important objectives of any court. While this concerns primarily the final decisions that are rendered, it is also relevant to the judicial process and the legal reasoning that a court or tribunal carries out to reach its decision, in order to ensure continuity and coherence. Traditional understandings of the international judiciary have seen the judges’ role as one where they discover and declare the law by applying it at face value to the legal issues that have arisen within the case, thereby achieving effectiveness through what is said to be direct and clear application of the law. This sits rather uneasily with the identification of customary international law (CIL), which is by its very nature unwritten and established by identifying evidence of state practice and opinio juris. The aim of this chapter is to examine instances of judicial activism in the decision-making of international courts and tribunals during the determination and application of CIL and how that allows for either judicial effectiveness or ambiguity.
The uncertain character of customary international law (CIL) has been discussed time and time again among academics and practitioners. To most of them, the uncertain character of CIL entails a twofold defect: first, uncertainty is perceived with respect to the identification of the rule, since we may not know whether there is a valid legal rule; and second, uncertainty is perceived with respect to the content of the rule, since we may not know the precise meaning of the rule. Yet, what seems to be missing from the entire discussion is the mechanism by which CIL functions. Although a number of theories have been formulated, there are no persuasive answers that would explain when and how changes in CIL occur. In other words, the dynamics of CIL, as the driving force behind its evolution remain essentially unexplored. Providing answers to these questions requires an in-depth understanding not only of the structure of CIL but also of the processes that occur in and out of CIL during its operation as a social system. This chapter uses complexity science to describe the functioning of CIL and explore CIL’s construction as a social system.
The interpretation of unwritten norms is fraught with difficulty, as the boundaries between the existence of a norm and the determination of its content can become blurred. Interpreters may return to the evidence of the norm’s existence in order to determine its content or it may be that interpretation itself is part of the constitutive process of unwritten norms. This confusion is exacerbated by a lack of established methods and procedures for the interpretation of unwritten international law, which includes not only custom but also general principles of law. While it is commonplace to speak of custom and general principles under the umbrella of ‘general international law’, it is unclear whether questions of interpretation are to be approached in the same manner for both categories of norms or whether custom and general principles may assist in the interpretation of one another. The central objective of this chapter is to examine the interactions between these two categories of norms in the context of interpretation. More specifically, it considers whether general principles of law may play a role in the interpretation of customary rules.
This chapter explores how the interpretation of customary international law (CIL) can be shaped by the underlying premises and political values of a system. The argument it develops focuses on how investor–state arbitration has interpreted the CIL law rule establishing that the actions of state-owned enterprises will be attributed to the controlling state, as expressed in Article 8 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
In its case law the International Court of Justice has repeatedly suggested the idea that rules of customary international law (CIL) do not operate in a vacuum but, instead, are to be understood against the background of other rules of the international legal system. This observation, although somewhat unsurprising, shows that the sources of international law exist in close interconnection – something that is also visible if one looks at the rules of interpretation contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Accordingly, ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ must be taken into account, together with the context, when interpreting treaty provisions. The question addressed in this chapter is whether or not the same can be said of the interpretation of customary rules. In other words, if we look at the practice of international courts and tribunals, is it possible to reach the conclusion that CIL rules, too, must be interpreted with the cognizance of any relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties?
The process of identifying and interpreting norms of customary international law, while appearing to be primarily based on an inductive analysis of state practice and opinio juris, is sometimes a deductive exercise based on logic and reason. Logic permeates every decision in international law. Logic manifests itself inherently throughout the process and can be identified in all steps of reasoning in identifying, interpreting and applying customary international law. Logic, however, can constitute the application of either an inductive or deductive inference. This chapter focuses on situations in which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) applied a deductive approach, identifying or interpreting norms of customary international law without seeming to consult state practice and opinio juris. Specifically, it considers whether norms that can be reasonably inferred or deduced from existing rules, or that are simply logical for the operation of the international legal system, can be identified as norms of customary international law under a complementary, supplementary or distinctive interpretive approach.
This chapter addresses the chronological paradox of customary international law (CIL). The paradox is that for a new customary rule to be created states must believe that the law already obligates the behaviour specified in that rule (opinio juris). However, the behaviour in question can only be legally required once that rule has been created. As a result, creating a new customary rule would be impossible, or at the very least an incoherent process. This chapter challenges this conclusion. In addressing the chronological paradox, it provides a coherent interpretation of the creation of new customary rules. It argues that the sense of legal obligation (opinio juris) emerges from the general principle of good faith. Good faith leads to legal obligations, which compel a subgroup of states to engage in specific behaviour. Then, as a result of this subgroup’s repeated behaviour, a new customary rule emerges, obligating the entire community of states to act accordingly. To explain the shift from good faith to legal obligations and from legal obligations to customary rules, the chapter draws on interpretivism, social ontology and contemporary research on constitutive rules.
When faced with the inevitable task of interpreting customary international law (CIL), what should a court do and what should it consider? Should it engage in an ‘inductive’ process of sifting through available evidence of state practice and opinio juris or a deductive process designed to reason logically from principles embedded in the rule? Should the court invoke something like the rules of treaty interpretation with their focus on good faith, ordinary meaning, context, and object and purpose? International law doctrine falls short here. Figuring out how to interpret and apply custom requires a theory of custom, a focus on the normative stories we tell. This reveals that there is not just one story explaining why custom should be a source of law, but multiple stories. What we call ‘custom’ may represent or draw from at least three different sources of law: Negotiated Law, Legislated Law and Adjudicated Law. This chapter aims to show that the non-treaty rules derived from each draw on different sources of legitimacy, operate according to different logics, dictate different methods of interpretation, and favour different methods for resolving disputes.