This chapter clarifies the substantive scope and core content of the right to science as enshrined in Art. 15 ICESCR. By employing a reverse-engineering methodology grounded in the core obligations identified by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General Comment No. 25, the chapter systematically derives the core rights of the right to science. The analysis identifies four distinct yet interrelated substantive rights: the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications (Art. 15(1)(b) ICESCR; the right to the conservation, development and diffusion of science (Art. 15(2) ICESCR); freedom of science (Art. 15(3) ICESCR); the right to international scientific ollaboration (Art. 15(4) ICESCR) and the right to equality and non-discrimination in science. Each dimension incorporates essential, immediately enforceable core rights, which constitute the non-derogable nucleus of the right to science, thereby making them inherently justiciable irrespective of resource limitations. The findings contribute to bridging gaps between theoretical frameworks and practical adjudication, enhancing the protection and realisation of the right to science.

This Introduction sets out the book’s central aim, and it also provides an overview of the main arguments with summaries of subsequent chapters. The starting point for this book is that there is a need to test a common assumption about the widespread use of techniques and procedures used to prevent the birth of a disabled child: that in a modern liberal state this practice is mainly or solely a matter of individual choice, and that the state itself is neutral. Further, it might be assumed that this neutral stance would allow the modern liberal state to maintain its stated commitment to equality, and that it provides a shield against any charge of eugenics. The Introduction begins to explain how this common assumption will be tested, by reference to interpretations of a neutral state intention. It also emphasises the book’s original contribution: while there is already extensive literature on the ethics of selecting against disability, this book is distinctively centred on an analysis of the state’s position.

This Conclusion sums up the main arguments in the book, addresses some final questions, and suggests some future directions of travel. In particular, it returns to the eugenics question, and examines whether current practices in modern liberal states might be in line with a type of eugenics that does not involve state coercion, but that rather involves manipulation, and chiefly the manipulation of women. It also emphasises how an analysis of individual choice should be a secondary concern in our approach to the ethics of selecting against disability, and that the position of the state should be our starting point. The last part of the chapter offers additional reflections on the topic of starting points, and on the importance of thinking further about the nature of pregnancy.

Islam addresses social issues extensively because it acknowledges that individuals are profoundly influenced by their societies. Individuals and societies are interdependent, requiring mutual cooperation due to differing abilities, shared goals and collective challenges. Islam emphasizes community building by deepening innate human desires for social interaction, giving them philosophical significance, sanctifying them as religious obligations and setting ethical guidelines to strengthen community bonds.

Islam views society as composed of individuals engaged in exchange and reciprocity, driven by natural human disparities and collective aspirations. It sanctifies these interactions by considering communal responsibilities as spiritual duties, reflected in concepts such as piety, trust and cooperation. Islamic teachings underscore equality among people, highlighting differences only in specialized talents, which facilitate mutual service and cohesion.

Islam consecrates relationships through cultural, faith-based, ethical and jurisprudential dimensions, promoting familial respect, neighborly duties and social justice through practices like prayer, fasting, almsgiving (zakat) and pilgrimage (hajj). These rituals reinforce social solidarity and mutual responsibility. Islam also addresses societal development dynamically, encouraging continuous interaction with both divine revelation (Qur’an) and the universe, fostering adaptive and evolving communities aligned with spiritual and moral values.

In this chapter, I examine attempts to respond to the scenario of unmitigated capitalism, where the rich continue to get richer. This second possibility focuses on how greater economic equality might be created. I discuss four approaches. First, I explore how taxation can be used to redistribute wealth. Next, I introduce the emerging idea of “degrowth” – the purposeful shrinking of some parts of the economy to protect the environment. Third, I examine communism as a means of pursuing economic equality. Finally, I outline socialism as a fourth path toward building more equal societies. I identify and articulate the strengths and limitations of each approach. These reflections lay the foundation for the third and final possibility.

Māori comprise 17.4 per cent of the total population of Aotearoa New Zealand. They are a relatively young population, with a median age of 25.5 years for males and 27.6 years for females, compared to the national median age of 37.0 years for males and 39.1 years for females. Contemporary Māori, like their pre-colonised counterparts, are diverse in their identity, with many having connections to iwi (tribal nations) or hapū (constellations of whānau, or extended family networks). Today, rather than being defined solely by iwi and hapū differences, Māori are also diverse regarding their histories of colonisation, their levels of disconnection from te ao Māori (Māori world) and their contemporary social experiences. Disconnection from te ao Māori means not all Māori know their whakapapa (genealogical) connections.

This chapter begins by introducing remuneration – as a term encompassing both compensation corresponding to the work an international official performs and benefits addressing their personal circumstances – as integral to the treaty-based obligation upon international organizations to secure staff possessing the highest standards of efficiency and technical competence, with due regard to recruitment on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Second, the legal principles of remuneration are identified, namely: (1) Compensation must secure staff of the highest standard; and (2) Pay must be equal for equivalent work. Third, two attendant legal duties of remuneration are considered, namely: (1) Benefits must ensure geographic diversity; and (2) Remuneration revision methodology must be objective. Fourth, the practice of tax reimbursement is examined. Fifth, and in conclusion, this employment law of remuneration at international organizations is restated.

The early 2000s saw not only the War on Terror but also the radical transformation of the shape and character of the RAChD. In 2000, the Department’s regular chaplains were male, Christian and part of an organisation that remained confessionally divided. However, and in the space of a decade, its two branches were merged in a process of Convergence; a new (if rather hazy) model of ‘all souls’ ministry was embraced; its base of sending Churches was broadened to embrace Pentecostalism; female chaplains were commissioned; and a new category of tri-service Civilian Chaplains to the Military (representing the Sikh, Hindu, Islamic, Buddhist and Jewish faiths) had been created and incorporated. However, and though buoyed by ecumenical currents and driven by the principles of the McGill Report, this transition was not pain free. Convergence was widely resisted in Catholic circles, while the impetus behind the creation of the Civilian Chaplains to the Military was provided by an unrelenting governmental equality, diversity and inclusion agenda. Nevertheless, these changes were remarkable, accomplished as they were against a background of severe operational demands and organisational strain.

This chapter deals with the subjects of international law. The meaning of international legal personality is noted. The primary subject of the international system is the state and the conditions for the creation of statehood are examined (permanent population, defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with other states). Each of these conditions is examined. The role of self-determination in the context of the criteria of statehood is discussed, as is the function of recognition. The fundamental rights of states, such as independence and equality are noted. There then follow sections on particular kinds of states, such as protectorates and federal states, and then sui generis territorial entities, for example, mandated and trust territories in the past, territories under international administration, and entities of disputed status such as Taiwan, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, Kosovo and Palestine. Special cases such as the Sovereign Order of Malta, the Holy See and the Vatican City, and international corporations are covered before the right of peoples to self-determination is examined.

This chapter examines the growing trend towards integration of gender considerations into international trade agreements. It analyses the rationale behind this trend, exploring both rights-based and economic efficiency-based arguments for promoting gender equality through trade. The chapter discusses various approaches to integrating gender provisions, including mainstreaming within functional chapters, as well as dedicated chapters, and highlights the variations in focus areas in particular agreements, ranging from economic empowerment to social concerns. It further categorises the roles of women addressed in these agreements, such as employees, decision-makers, mothers, and business stakeholders. The analysis reveals gaps in addressing critical issues like the informal sector and digital inclusion, and underscores the importance of enforceable provisions for effective implementation.

Human enhancement aims to make people ‘better than well’ by interventions in the human genome. I canvas four moral arguments against this – from (1) autonomy, (2) dignity, (3) inequality and (4) mastery – concluding that none is probative. Argument (1) overestimates the cost to autonomy of genetic technologies and underestimates the degree to which ordinary moral training is heteronomous. Argument (2) drives too sharp a wedge between the natural and the artefactual and thereby ignores the extent to which we already treat the body as a site of ameliorative intervention. Argument (3) invokes the spectre of a ‘genetic underclass’ that is ‘gene-poor’, but I argue that this can be guarded against by education and government policy. Argument (4) tends to rest on persuasive description and on consequentialist claims that are empirically weakly supported. I end by mounting my own, formal, argument against human enhancement. This holds that it collapses into transhumanism, this being an ultimately incoherent project, one that abandons the idea of human nature and with it any criteria for determining what it is to be ‘better than well’. Finally, I corroborate this argument from incoherence by unpacking a paper by Groll and Lott.

This chapter explores two kinds of vulnerability which appear to cause a problem for neo-republicanism as a form of relational egalitarianism: the vulnerabilities involved in intimate and caring relationships, and those generated by complex economic and social processes like the global financial system. I argue that the standard neo-republican strategy of constraining arbitrary power can successfully account for the former; the value of the vulnerabilities involved in intimate relations depends on the presence of constraints which prevent power being exercised in ways which do not track relevant interests. But this approach is less successful in dealing with the latter kind of vulnerability, which generates cases in which agents can be subject to domination without suffering the loss of status, and accompanying inequality, usually characteristic of domination. I argue that while these cases count as exceptions to the standard relationship between non-domination and egalitarianism, neo-republicanism remains a form of relational egalitarianism.

Paternalistic interference in an older person’s choices or actions appears to relegate the needs, values, and interests of that person as less valuable than the judgement of others about what is in the older person’s interests. For relational egalitarians, concerned to promote a society in which people stand in democratic relations of equality, paternalism prima facie undermines relational equality. This chapter draws on exploration of the sources of older people’s vulnerability and dependence on others for care, to better understand when and why paternalistic interference is objectionable. Objectionable paternalistic interference, on my view, occurs where it is either an effect of social relations of domination and oppression that prevent people from having their needs met without autonomy-undermining interference or it creates the conditions under which domination, exploitation, and oppression flourish, generating pathogenic vulnerabilities, including the risk of the person being denied the services they require to meet their needs.

This chapter describes the law governing transgender girls’ participation in girls’ sports. It compares the interpretations of Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination by the Obama and Biden administrations on the one hand and the Trump administration on the other. It explores the state laws regarding transgender girls’ inclusion or exclusion that have arisen against the backdrop of Title IX ambiguity. Finally, the chapter examines what courts have said about what Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause require with regard to transgender girls’ inclusion in or exclusion from girls’ sports.