This semi-autobiographical essay offers the perspective from the 1970s to the present of a leading historian of Nazi Germany. It shows how a series of paradigms in one way or another obscured the Holocaust, while at the same time underling the importance of the scholarship on the Final Solution that took off in the 1960s. A particular focus of the essay is the debates around fascism and the difficulty of acknowledging the centrality of racism within the fascist model.

Chapter I elucidates Tolkien’s puzzling claim that The Lord of the Rings should be primarily considered as “an essay in linguistic aesthetic”. It first analyses a passing reference to the “cats of Queen Berúthiel”, described by Tolkien as the only element in The Lord of the Rings “which does not actually exist in legends written before it was begun”. This example introduces a discussion of a typical pattern of composition of Tolkien’s works: this begins as an experience of purely aesthetic fascination for a linguistic entity, which is then expanded into a narrative item, and later developed into a full, meaningful tale, through a heuristic process of ‘sub-creative discovery’. The second part of the chapter investigates the theoretical implications of such an approach, reconstructing Tolkien’s perceptions on the value and heuristic potential of a ‘gratuitous’ aesthetic event, and especially of a linguistic one, given the ‘divine’ inspiration of language and its original expression of both wonder at and knowledge of created reality.

This concluding chapter reflects on the volume’s contributions to how we see, think, and do international organisations. The editors of this volume draw a sharp distinction between doing international organisations law and thinking about international organisations, and propose that the discipline must ‘start seeing international organisations differently’. Yet the sequence could just as easily be reversed: what one sees will inevitably be shaped by what one thinks, how one imagines the world, what one expects to see. This chapter begins with ‘ways of doing’ scholarship on international organisations – crudely divided into ‘deconstructivist’ and ‘(re)constructivist’ approaches – and proceeds to reflect on the diverse ways of seeing and thinking suggested by the preceding chapters, before making some tentative suggestions about possible ways forward.

What does it take for international institutional law to break away from its problem-solving tendencies and fixed list of subjects and methods, and explore international organisations as sites of socio-political struggles over the shape of local and global life? This editorial introduction discusses ethos and epistemological boundaries of the mainstream international law scholarship, and the prospects of critical and interdisciplinary approaches for the study of international organisations in international law. It offers an overview of the objectives of the volume and its five sections, and argues that combining macro and micro critique, as reflected in the volume chapters, offers a promising pathway for mapping power, stability, and change in the world order.

As interdisciplinary work inquires into the scope and content of the right to freedom of thought, we confront two crucial questions; for the purposes of this legal right, what should qualify as thought and what makes thought free? This chapter draws upon philosophical and psychological literature to suggest answers to these questions. First, we argue that thought does not only occur in a forum internum inside our heads. We propose that the right to freedom of thought should recognise and protect two types of what we call forum externum thought. Type 1 is ‘extended thought’. This occurs when we extend our mind using features of our body or environment, such as diary use and internet search (under certain circumstances). Type 2 is ‘thoughtspeech’. This occurs when we speak with others to think aloud together. We propose Type 1 and Type 2 forum externum thought should receive absolute protection only when they are employed for the purposes of self-government and truth-seeking respectively. We then turn to the question of what makes thought free. Here we focus on how the ‘trust and glue’ criteria for the extended mind can inform our consideration of what should count as impermissible alteration of extended thought. We conclude by pointing to the need for future transdisciplinary work to support the development of this right.

The chapter discusses the history of the Berlin housing system, the Kantian roots of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) and the events leading to the emergence of Deutsche Wohnen & Co. enteignen (DWE). It explains the origins of the liberal notion of property and how corporate property is premised on ‘blasting the atom of property open’, that is, destroying the links between person and a thing that constitute classical liberal understanding of property.

The introductory chapter outlines the need for a rethink of territory. Beneath the surface of international and transnational discourses about globalisation and global governance is a conceptual and theoretical indeterminacy deriving from the, often unperceived, conflicting nature of the spaces of globalisation and the spaces of sovereignty. Where global law and governance are discussed, the old statocentric conceptions of spatiality provide the governing model, dominating such that if there is no state-territory, it is asumed there is no territory at all. There is tension between theories of a system with an overly determined spatial logic to ones without much account of space. There is little discussion about where functions go nor of the logics of the spaces in which they are exercised. The spaces of reterritorialisation are missing. As a result, functions exercised ‘beyond’ state territories appear to ‘float free’ of the highly specific territorialised legal order. Many theories cannot account for reterritorialisation because the territories of non-state actors are invisible to international legal thought because its orthodox spatial imaginary only makes visible state spaces.

Chapter 2 provides an overview and critique of discourses about deterritorialisation in international law. The first sections sketch out three main strands to these discourses. The first strand contains accounts of a fundamental transition in the organising logic of international law; a shift from ordering competences on the basis of territory to functions. The second strand groups together accounts addressing the relocation of power but containing imprecise and undertheorised understandings of these spaces. The third strand includes accounts concerning the porosity of states. The chapter then problematises these discourses. Each strand applies a similar legal-spatial imaginary, and in so doing omits the resulting spaces produced by deterritorialisation. Common to all is a tendency to continue to applying a particular and unproblematised concept of territory, limiting theoretical insight, consistently producing deterritorialisation without reterritorialisation, and often conflating at an analytical level actors, spaces, and functions. The reason for this again lies in the continuing prioritisation of the stato-centric approach to territory in international law’s implicit geography.

This chapter describes the main traits of the prevailing view on corruption. In particular, the current consensus view on corruption is all but monolithic, and at its “soft edges” we find themes that in fact deserve center stage, such as the elusive and contested nature of the concept. For example, although a narrow concept of corruption has predominated, it is acknowledged that the concept is elusive and its nature contested. Furthermore, it is frequently recognized that reference to corruption may have a certain degree of instrumentality, and specifically, that an anti-corruption discourse may be utilized as a means to settle scores with political adversaries. Another related theme at the edge of the current debate concerns the relationship between corruption and other social phenomena. On one hand, much effort has been dedicated to understanding the causes and effects of corruption. However, it is often recognized that the concept of corruption, being elusive, is also multifaceted and cannot be considered in isolation. The book intends to move these themes from the edges to the center of the debate.

Regional collaboration between states is increasingly vital to address the challenges of our time. Yet many regions struggle to collaborate effectively. Comparative regional law can contribute to effective regional collaboration. But it can also make a valuable contribution to the discipline of (comparative) law more generally, especially to rethinking the connection between law and the state, and better connecting our legal discipline to empirical methods. This contribution first sets out some key challenges for comparative regional law. For example, how to validly compare regions with vast and vital differences in history, (legal) culture, geography, language, and economies, and avoid pitfalls like EU-centrism or colonialism. As always in comparative law, no single perfect answer or method exists to address these challenges. Yet this contribution aims to help stock the comparative toolbox, so that researchers can pick and combine the proper methodological tools for the research questions they want to pursue. The main claim therefore is that, considering the nature of regional law, a functionalist method, complemented and checked by more critical methods, might often be a suitable approach. If done carefully, like two hedgehogs making love, comparing regional law can then produce academically and practically valuable results.

Comparative law has grown out of its traditional theoretical and methodological boundaries. However, much of comparative law scholarship may still be described as traditional. This chapter discusses the traditional view of comparative law research. What can be characterised as traditional comparative law has concentrated on the private law of major Western legal systems, leaving other areas of law and non-Western systems mostly aside. In substance, while it is not entirely clear what can be labelled as traditional methods, we can separate three essential issues. The first issue concerns the research process and how traditional comparative law scholars have outlined it. Traditional comparative law scholarship typically provides guidance on how research should be conducted. The second issue deals with the specific method of functionalism that has been recommended to be used in the comparative research. At the heart of the functionalist methodology lies the assumption according to which there are legal rules or institutions that serve a certain social function. The third issue concerns the underlying assumption behind functionalism, that is universalism. Universalism maintains that every society faces essentially the same problems, and that societies solve these problems by different means, though often with similar results. The chapter ends with a critical analysis and thoughts about the future of traditional methods.

When Comparative Politics emerged in the early 1960s, drawing on functionalist theory, the concept of political culture featured prominently in how political development might be best studied. In the prevailing functionalist perspective, political culture was defined as the sum of the views, values, and attitudes people hold towards the political system. Over time, with the decline of functionalism and the rise of positivist theory, political culture was marginalized and reduced to data collected (e.g., in interview surveys). Drawing conclusions about national political cultures using such instruments, however, is problematic. Following influences from hermeneutics, the concept has since been reinvented with a focus on discourse and empowerment. This involves accepting the public sphere as the forum for political discourse, and a recognition of public opinion as a driving force in shaping and changing political culture. This chapter traces the evolution of the study of political culture in mainstream Comparative Politics. It emphasizes the role that political culture has been playing as explanatory variable in the study of both development and democratization. Western countries have viewed themselves as embarked on a mission to disseminate progressive values to the rest of the world, arguing in their approach to political culture in Africa that reforms are needed. Originally conceived as “traditional”, the initial calls were to make it “civic”. The same premise has underpinned more recent research on democratization. In placing research on African political culture in its wider Comparative Politics context, the chapter highlights why approaching it through Western eyes has its limits. More attention needs to be paid not only to the values that underpin political culture in Africa but also to the voice of African political scientists and their interpretation of the success and failure of democratization on the continent.

The prologue to this book zooms in on the inherent tensions and harmonies in the transatlantic relations that evolved in the first half of the twentieth century and laid the practical, ideational, and emotional foundations for the take-off of European integration as of 1950. In doing so, the prologue, in a more essayistic way, critically reflects upon the reconstruction of the history of the origins of European integration as presented in this book and the history of European integration in general, and the deeper meaning of both for our understanding of present-day Europe and the unique phenomenon of European integration. The prologue also introduces some key concepts and figures in the historical reconstruction that follows in the chapters, such as the the policies and politics of planning, the functionalism of David Mitrany, and the analysis of the vicissitudes of transatlantic relations by Isaiah Berlin.