The final chapter of this book considers external challenges – namely, discourses and regulatory moves driven by concerns about state sovereignty and, relatedly, security and development – to the dual-sided framework in the current digital era. It starts by discussing to what extent China provides a counter-model to the liberal conception of information freedom and the dual-sided framework and argues that there is not really a Chinese (counter-)model. It moves to consider other Global South countries, looking at firstly Brazil and India and then the peripheries of the periphery. It argues that placed in a chain of dependence, practices of Global South countries generally do not present fundamental challenges to the dual-sided framework despite their genuine normative contestations. The chapter finally moves to recent sovereignist policies and discourses from the Western liberal world and observes that the main challenge to the dual-sided framework comes from an increasingly fascist United States.

Brexit was an act of gross economic vandalism. Many leavers understood that at the time. Most were indifferent. When push came to shove, an economic hit seemed, to those who thought about it at all, to be a price worth paying for autonomy. ‘Take Back Control’ proved to be a winning formula. Ten years on, we are in a better position to decide how much control we have really gained, and how much it has been worth to us. Control and autonomy are legal and constitutional concepts, but their value depends on political realities. In a world of huge nations like the United States and China, it is in the interest of smaller nations to join together in powerful multinational blocs like the European Union. Its members have more control and more global power collectively than they can ever hope to have individually. Britain’s own ability to exercise ‘control’ over its own fate is inevitably more limited outside the European Union.

By now, we have established firmly that the green transition will cause accelerated economic growth. By the performance-stability trade-off discussed in Chapter 3, this accelerated growth could occur at the expense of economic stability. This is because the green transition will cause untold upheaval. In this chapter, we lay out the pace and scale of this likely upheaval, looking at the great transformation that inevitably has to take place across industry, trade, investment and geopolitical power. Different countries will face different challenges, some gaining in international economic power, others losing. This will inevitably lead to a brand new map of international relations worldwide, of debtor–creditor relationships, of trade relationships and of international purchasing power. We discuss the challenges that developing countries face in financing a transition towards environmental and financial sustainability.

This chapter examines the relationship between geopolitical rivalry and world trade law. It begins by discussing the consequences of trade for national power and security, and how dominant states approach foreign economic policy. It then analyses recent geopolitical developments and their implications for the evolution of the international economic order. It concludes by discussing the implications of the analysis for world trade law and policy in the future.

The day after launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, in a public speech addressed to multiple audiences, Putin called for the ‘overthrow’ of the Ukrainian government, which he labelled a ‘gang of narcomany (‘drug addicts’) and neo-Nazis’ (Roth, 2022). We will return to the significance of this speech later; here we would add to the picture that after Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, in all territories under Russian occupation, opioid agonist therapy (OAT) programmes were immediately shut down, reflecting their status as being also banned in Russia.

International investment law faces a paradigm shift with the rise of the digital economy. Emerging technologies such as blockchain, artificial intelligence, and the platform economy redefine investment dynamics while challenging traditional regulatory frameworks. Digitalisation expands cross-border investment opportunities in areas like AI, genomics, and smart infrastructure, while also complicating traditional jurisdictional and territorial considerations. The shift from physical to digital assets necessitates a re-evaluation of the classic definitions of an ‘investor’ and ‘investment’. Meanwhile, states increasingly regulate strategic digital assets under national security concerns, introducing measures ranging from data localization mandates to investment screening mechanisms. These changes raise geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions and highlight disparities in digital governance models between major powers. Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) may have to adapt to address disputes over digital assets and data, as well as leverage AI and other digital technologies for efficiency while safeguarding due process. This chapter, along with the broader volume, examines these themes, emphasising balanced frameworks that promote innovation while safeguarding public interests in the evolving digital economy.

Chapter 7 considers the developments that have taken place since the beginning of the von der Leyen II Commission, identifying how there has not only been continuity in the EU’s approach to technology control and its links to digital sovereignty but also an expansion and reinforcement of the approach. Faced with increased instability and geopolitical threat, the linkage of security and economy has become even more explicit for the von der Leyen II Commission, with the Competitiveness Compass taking an approach that appears to be a more assertive form of regulatory mercantilism, in which the element of defence is specifically incorporated into the EU’s rationale for action, with an expansion of technology controls including the development of an explicit push for defence technology industrial policy, the increased control over external dependencies and supply chains through its Preparedness Strategy, and an AI policy for Europe that includes significant investments for AI gigafactories.

Chapter 3 moves to the global level, exploring the history of technology control and its historical links to geopolitics. It begins by considering control of technology in the context of the Cold War and technology as being explicitly considered a security issue in terms of the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. It covers the CoCom technology restrictions imposed by the US, and Soviet Union attempts to gain access to critical technologies through Comecon, before considering how the approach to technology changed substantially with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the belief in the triumph of the liberal international order and globalism as reflected by the World Trade Organization and ‘free trade’. It then explores the multifaceted crises impacting upon this conviction in the benefits and resilience of the global trade system, the increased economic conflict between the US and China as a rising technological power, and a move from multilateralism in a ‘unipolar’ system to increased nationalism and protectionism in a ‘multipolar’ system, and what this meant for the EU’s sense of insecurity and vulnerability in the context of geopolitical reordering.

This chapter examines the discontinuous history of Chinese multinationals and their role in China’s evolving globalization. It highlights that China’s global engagement has been shaped by both market forces and geopolitical dynamics. The first wave, following the Opium Wars, saw Chinese firms competing unequally with Western multinationals, with growth ultimately limited by political forces. A resurgence occurred in the 1980s as China reengaged globally, leading to renewed overseas investment by Chinese firms. Currently, amid rising geopolitical tensions, Chinese multinationals are strategically reorienting investment from developed economies toward emerging markets. The chapter emphasizes the multifaceted impact of this globalization, but also a changing global landscape where politics and power are equally pivotal to understanding the trajectory of Chinese firms’ activities abroad.

This chapter traces how multinationals have historically navigated nationality-related challenges, adapting their strategies to evolving political, economic, and regulatory environments. It examines five key dimensions of nationality – corporate nationality, ownership nationality, home–host country relations, national management styles, and product perception – and their shifting importance over time. Early globalization fostered flexible corporate nationalities. However, World War I, rising economic nationalism, trade restrictions, and foreign direct investment regulations led multinationals to actively manage their corporate and ownership nationality. Regardless of increasing global economic integration since the 1970s, national affiliation remained relevant for market access, competitive advantage, and mitigating political risk. The aftermath of the global financial crisis, however, marked by renewed economic nationalism, prioritization of national interests, and identity politics as well as new geopolitical conflict created new nationality-related challenges.