Brexit was an act of gross economic vandalism. Many leavers understood that at the time. Most were indifferent. When push came to shove, an economic hit seemed, to those who thought about it at all, to be a price worth paying for autonomy. ‘Take Back Control’ proved to be a winning formula. Ten years on, we are in a better position to decide how much control we have really gained, and how much it has been worth to us. Control and autonomy are legal and constitutional concepts, but their value depends on political realities. In a world of huge nations like the United States and China, it is in the interest of smaller nations to join together in powerful multinational blocs like the European Union. Its members have more control and more global power collectively than they can ever hope to have individually. Britain’s own ability to exercise ‘control’ over its own fate is inevitably more limited outside the European Union.

This chapter examines the relationship between geopolitical rivalry and world trade law. It begins by discussing the consequences of trade for national power and security, and how dominant states approach foreign economic policy. It then analyses recent geopolitical developments and their implications for the evolution of the international economic order. It concludes by discussing the implications of the analysis for world trade law and policy in the future.

The day after launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, in a public speech addressed to multiple audiences, Putin called for the ‘overthrow’ of the Ukrainian government, which he labelled a ‘gang of narcomany (‘drug addicts’) and neo-Nazis’ (Roth, 2022). We will return to the significance of this speech later; here we would add to the picture that after Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, in all territories under Russian occupation, opioid agonist therapy (OAT) programmes were immediately shut down, reflecting their status as being also banned in Russia.

International investment law faces a paradigm shift with the rise of the digital economy. Emerging technologies such as blockchain, artificial intelligence, and the platform economy redefine investment dynamics while challenging traditional regulatory frameworks. Digitalisation expands cross-border investment opportunities in areas like AI, genomics, and smart infrastructure, while also complicating traditional jurisdictional and territorial considerations. The shift from physical to digital assets necessitates a re-evaluation of the classic definitions of an ‘investor’ and ‘investment’. Meanwhile, states increasingly regulate strategic digital assets under national security concerns, introducing measures ranging from data localization mandates to investment screening mechanisms. These changes raise geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions and highlight disparities in digital governance models between major powers. Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) may have to adapt to address disputes over digital assets and data, as well as leverage AI and other digital technologies for efficiency while safeguarding due process. This chapter, along with the broader volume, examines these themes, emphasising balanced frameworks that promote innovation while safeguarding public interests in the evolving digital economy.

Chapter 7 considers the developments that have taken place since the beginning of the von der Leyen II Commission, identifying how there has not only been continuity in the EU’s approach to technology control and its links to digital sovereignty but also an expansion and reinforcement of the approach. Faced with increased instability and geopolitical threat, the linkage of security and economy has become even more explicit for the von der Leyen II Commission, with the Competitiveness Compass taking an approach that appears to be a more assertive form of regulatory mercantilism, in which the element of defence is specifically incorporated into the EU’s rationale for action, with an expansion of technology controls including the development of an explicit push for defence technology industrial policy, the increased control over external dependencies and supply chains through its Preparedness Strategy, and an AI policy for Europe that includes significant investments for AI gigafactories.

Chapter 3 moves to the global level, exploring the history of technology control and its historical links to geopolitics. It begins by considering control of technology in the context of the Cold War and technology as being explicitly considered a security issue in terms of the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union. It covers the CoCom technology restrictions imposed by the US, and Soviet Union attempts to gain access to critical technologies through Comecon, before considering how the approach to technology changed substantially with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the belief in the triumph of the liberal international order and globalism as reflected by the World Trade Organization and ‘free trade’. It then explores the multifaceted crises impacting upon this conviction in the benefits and resilience of the global trade system, the increased economic conflict between the US and China as a rising technological power, and a move from multilateralism in a ‘unipolar’ system to increased nationalism and protectionism in a ‘multipolar’ system, and what this meant for the EU’s sense of insecurity and vulnerability in the context of geopolitical reordering.

This chapter examines the discontinuous history of Chinese multinationals and their role in China’s evolving globalization. It highlights that China’s global engagement has been shaped by both market forces and geopolitical dynamics. The first wave, following the Opium Wars, saw Chinese firms competing unequally with Western multinationals, with growth ultimately limited by political forces. A resurgence occurred in the 1980s as China reengaged globally, leading to renewed overseas investment by Chinese firms. Currently, amid rising geopolitical tensions, Chinese multinationals are strategically reorienting investment from developed economies toward emerging markets. The chapter emphasizes the multifaceted impact of this globalization, but also a changing global landscape where politics and power are equally pivotal to understanding the trajectory of Chinese firms’ activities abroad.

This chapter traces how multinationals have historically navigated nationality-related challenges, adapting their strategies to evolving political, economic, and regulatory environments. It examines five key dimensions of nationality – corporate nationality, ownership nationality, home–host country relations, national management styles, and product perception – and their shifting importance over time. Early globalization fostered flexible corporate nationalities. However, World War I, rising economic nationalism, trade restrictions, and foreign direct investment regulations led multinationals to actively manage their corporate and ownership nationality. Regardless of increasing global economic integration since the 1970s, national affiliation remained relevant for market access, competitive advantage, and mitigating political risk. The aftermath of the global financial crisis, however, marked by renewed economic nationalism, prioritization of national interests, and identity politics as well as new geopolitical conflict created new nationality-related challenges.

This chapter explores the intersection of jurisdictional arbitrage and geopolitics by examining how US-based CCMCEs structure their domestic and international operations. Drawing on CORPLINK data from the world’s top 100 non-financial firms, it identifies a distinct bifurcation in US corporate structuring: minimal use of intermediary or splitter subsidiaries within the United States and extensive use of such structures abroad. While domestic operations leverage Delaware’s legal infrastructure without intermediaries, international operations are frequently routed through offshore financial centres, enabling regulatory and tax arbitrage. The chapter argues that this structural asymmetry reflects more than corporate tax planning – it reveals how arbitrage is embedded in broader geopolitical strategies. Through permissive laws, ambiguous enforcement, and selective participation in global tax transparency initiatives, the United States may tacitly enable its firms to exploit foreign jurisdictions, thus reinforcing their global competitiveness. Though indirect, this alignment of corporate and geopolitical interests positions arbitrage as a quasi-strategic tool of US influence.

The Chinese economy has entered its most challenging period. The China Model, while less effective in growing personal income, was able to grow GDP in the past. Now even its ability to grow GDP has deteriorated, both because of the structural problems created by the China Model and because of the self-inflicted damage of the CPC’s policy choices in domestic and foreign affairs. The economic slowdown accentuates social tensions that can be destabilizing politically, all the more so because the costs of running Chinese government are exorbitant, as measured by the payroll size of the government employees. Unlike the Mao era, when low GDP growth was matched with low outlays, or the Deng era, when high growth was matched with high outlays, Xi’s China faces a rising disequilibrium in which there is a mismatch between low growth and its costly expenditures. China needs to make a consequential judgment call – whether to break away decisively from the China Model or to continue on its current path. This is ultimately a political, not an economic call, and given the opacity and the centralized nature of the Chinese political system it is a prediction we cannot make with any degree of certainty.

In this chapter we discuss the case of the Russian unicorn Yandex, also known as the ‘Russian Google’. The company has become one of the largest information technology (IT) champions in Russia over the years and seemed to be unaffected by government, political interests and geopolitical tensions. In 2022, after the military conflict with Ukraine triggered severe economic sanctions on Russia, the company experienced political pressures both from the sanctioning countries and its home country government. We analyse the journey of Yandex, which started as a national IT unicorn, and shed light on its transformation into a state-affiliated enterprise in a dynamic situation of geopolitical reshuffling.

This chapter illustrates the significant role of poetry in both the human experience of the continent of Antarctica and the human response to its unfamiliar icescape. The connections between Australia and Antarctica are geological, historical and cultural, and 40 per cent of Antarctica comprises the Australian Antarctic Territory. Australian poets have figured the continent as blank and cold, while Antarctic explorers have written poetry and held poetry competitions. The chapter discusses the imaginary landscape of Henry Kendall’s seafaring encounter with Antarctica, and Douglas Stewart’s poetic drama about the heroic explorer Robert Falcon Scott. The invitation of Caroline Caddy and Terry Whitebeach to visit Antarctica in the 1990s produced poetry of first-hand experience of Antarctica. Other poets who have written about Antarctica include Dorothy Porter, Les Murray, Anthony Lawrence, Robert Harris and J. R. Rowland.

One key puzzle of our moment is how economic elites of modern neoliberal states have come to be the people’s champions while educated citizens are labelled the new elites putatively against them. This chapter means to shed light on, and correct, this shift in perception. It first sets the context with the contemporary challenges that brought us to this pass. It then asks how liberal democracy – informed citizens working towards a freer, more just world – came to be replaced by democracy as mere self-interest. Following this, it summarises Michael Sandel’s theory of elitism in The Tyranny of Merit (2020) and his solutions for repairing the division between populists and elites. Then it argues that, despite much truth in Sandel’s critique, the educated elite is more a media meme formulated intentionally to silence liberals and incite conflict. Finally, it provides nine theses for a viable democracy in the age of the internet.