The Arctic, once a climate victim, is now becoming a climate stressor. The melting ice has brought us closer to climate tipping points and, simultaneously, has made oil reserves in the Arctic more accessible. As a result, a clash has emerged between scientific warnings and climate change obstruction (CCO) discourses that prioritise economic ambitions over climate concerns. This study investigates whether, despite scientific warnings, Norway defends further oil extraction in the Arctic, thus aligning with CCO discourses by prioritising economic interests over climate urgency. Based on a qualitative inductive approach, we analyse four official White Papers from the Norwegian government, identify their discursive patterns and contrast them with CCO discourses found in the literature. We found that the Norwegian government exhibits an affinity with six CCO discourses: 1) Non-Transformative Discourse, 2) Responsibility Deflection Discourse, 3) Discourse of the Common Good, 4) Discourse of Higher Priorities or Loyalties, 5) The Legal Discourse, and 6) The Discourse of Good Intentions. We conclude that the Norwegian government has constructed a narrative where the recognition of climate urgency does not mean the renouncement of its long-term petroleum interests and further oil extraction in the Arctic. This narrative, named here as the “green oil” narrative, uses renewable energies to electrify the oil industry, thus presenting renewables as an ally of oil expansion rather than a step toward a fossil fuel phase-out. Overall, Norway’s current narrative fails to address oil dependency, defending and justifying oil extraction in the Arctic.

This article attempts a first historical periodisation of the checkered history of the French Southern Islands in the Indian Ocean. Beginning with early extractive activities during the 18th and 19th centuries and followed by colonial ambitions during the first half of the 20th century, the article also discusses the more recent efforts of the French government to reinforce sovereignty in the form of permanent bases, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. The most recent period covered of scientific affirmation and ecological restoration (1970s–2006) introduces a solid historical perspective on the still ongoing efforts (from 2006 onwards) of reinforced patrimonialisation and environmental protection of the French Southern Islands. Throughout all periods, our main attention is directed towards various forms of projects. Indeed, the project perspective allows to uncover largely forgotten ambitions and shows that the history of the French Southern Islands is closely connected to larger historical developments in the entire Antarctic and sub-Antarctic region.

Rare Earth Elements (REEs) are essential for green energy technologies and defense systems, yet global supply chains remain concentrated in China. This has intensified geopolitical competition for alternative sources, positioning the Arctic as a strategic frontier, as retreating ice exposes mineral deposits. A comprehensive discourse analysis of strategic documents, scholarly literature, and media sources from 2010 to 2025 reveals a dramatic shift from geological characterization and economic speculation to urgent securitization and strategic alliance formation. Academic research has evolved from establishing natural baselines to governance and social conflict analysis. Media coverage of REE in the Arctic peaked in 2025, with rising emphasis on governance, sovereignty, geopolitics, and Greenland’s strategic position. Critical gaps persist in addressing Indigenous rights, holistic impact assessments, and Arctic-specific innovation. Sustainable Arctic REE development requires integrated frameworks that balance geopolitical imperatives with environmental protection and Indigenous self-determination, preventing the region from becoming a sacrifice zone for global decarbonization.

September 2024 marked the 20th anniversary of the commencement of operations of the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat. Despite the importance of this institutional milestone, it went largely unnoticed and sparked little critical reflection in Antarctic governance circles. This article seeks to fill that gap by assessing the Secretariat’s role, performance, and evolution within the Antarctic Treaty System as a whole. The article explores the Secretariat’s contributions to continuity, coordination, transparency, and institutional memory. It also examines the constraints the Secretariat faces due to its lack of international legal capacity, limited mandate and budget, and the political dynamics among the Consultative Parties. Finally, the article offers reflections on the Secretariat’s future role in a changing geopolitical and environmental landscape, arguing that strengthening its functions may be essential to ensuring the continued order and stability of the Antarctic region.

The circumpolar Arctic region has undergone a major geopolitical transformation because of two external forces altering regional security: climate change and increasing great power competition, notably due to the Russian war against Ukraine. Underscored by the de facto suspension of pan-Arctic cooperation after Russia’s expanded invasion in February 2022, the circumpolar Arctic has fragmented into two distinct blocs: the Russian Federation and the Arctic 7 (A7) group of allied democracies. These blocs are informed not just by different security policies between Russia and its polar neighbours but by differing Arctic security public opinion among their populations. Drawing on an original dataset of 164 polls and surveys from all eight Arctic states taken between 2007 and 2024, we outline sub-regional patterns in security public opinion that demonstrate different attitudes between Russia and the A7 with respect to the two defining issues in Arctic regional security: climate change and great power competition between Russia, China, and USA. We find that climate change is universally considered the most serious security issue in the Arctic; Russia is widely seen as a threat to other Arctic states; China is not seen as a major threat nor as particularly relevant to Arctic security; and USA is strongly supported in all Arctic states but Russia. We also conclude that sub-regional analysis may offer clearer insights into Arctic security public opinion than pan-Arctic analyses.

In this paper, I investigate four sites connected to animist narratives in Northern Norway. The unrest associated with these sites is seen as being caused by human activity but carried out by disruptive forces. Sometimes the causes are known; sometimes they are unknown, but still connected to active agencies in these landscapes. The narratives relate to two types of forces that can make a place uneasy: chthonic forces and harmful deeds of humans against nature or other people. Implicit within these narrations and interpretations is an animistic worldview: places can and do remember. The places presented here are situated close to current or past Sámi settlements, suggesting that they are the result of animist and possibly shamanic practices and cosmologies. This reveals an ongoing concern with disruption of human/nature relations and attributed continued meaning through the Sámi narrative tradition. Sámi language originally had no word for nature. Luondo, the name used today, originally meant personality of humans, animals, or places, and illustrates my entry point into these phenomena.

This paper explores Japan’s maritime and Arctic policies. Japan’s interest in the polar regions emerged early due to its geographical characteristics and the impacts of climate change, expanding its scientific research activities in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. Over time, Japan has broadened its involvement in the economic, scientific, environmental, and security domains. As a non-Arctic state, Japan has expressed its intent to contribute to resolving Arctic issues and has sought to take a leading role in Arctic governance within the international community. In 2007, Japan enacted the Basic Act on Ocean Policy to promote comprehensive and strategic maritime policies. Japan announced its 4th Basic Ocean Plan in 2023, which plays a crucial role in the sustainable use and protection of marine resources, marine environmental protection, and maritime safety. This paper comprehensively analyses Japan’s Basic Ocean Plans and Arctic policy, exploring the relationship and evolution between maritime and Arctic policies and examining how these policy changes reflect Japan’s international maritime strategy. While previous studies have treated maritime and Arctic policies separately, this paper analyses the interrelationship between the two, investigating the evolution of Japan’s maritime policy up to the present and the development and characteristics of its Arctic policy.

As Arctic stakeholders navigate a new era of great power competition, this article reflects on the influence that Indigenous Peoples have had on Arctic and international politics through their roles as co-founders of the Arctic Council (AC) system and as Permanent Participants (PPs) within it. Through a constructivist lens, this article highlights the influence the PPs have had on the evolution of the Council’s interests and practices. Based on findings from multiple interviews and an extensive document analysis of the AC’s official Declarations between 1996 and 2021, the article identifies how PP advocacy for the inclusion of Indigenous worldviews, Knowledges, and rights has shaped the AC over time. The article argues that the PPs are a crucial part of the AC’s structure and co-constitute its identity, challenging state-centric understandings of the Council’s existence. It asserts that the PPs’ co-constitution of the AC is what has endowed it with its legitimacy in Arctic and international affairs. However, despite being a core element of what makes the Council what it is, the research findings highlight a variety of challenges and limitations that remain for the PPs. Additionally, the article discusses how the pause of AC work following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed gaps in the recognition and full implementation of the rights and self-determination of Indigenous Peoples.

This article is an attempt to understand how diverse and seemingly incommensurable aerial perspectives on Arctic exploration could co-exist during the search for the John Franklin expedition in the 1840s and 1850s. I begin by examining the cultural context of ballooning before turning to proposals to send balloons and other aerial missions to the Arctic. Why did balloons and ‘balloonacy’, as the popular periodical Punch described this craze, come to feature so prominently in responses to the Arctic mystery, and how did women feature in these responses? I then discuss the clairvoyantes who were put into mesmeric trances and then described visiting Franklin and his men in the Arctic. Beginning at the time of greatest anxiety regarding the fate of the expedition, clairvoyante visionaries and their operators formed part of an emotional field of speculation and experimentation centred on the Arctic. I conclude by arguing that actual balloon expeditions in search of Franklin echoed many of the mesmeric and imaginary projects emanating from popular culture. This connects women’s perspectives about the Arctic with aerial exploration schemes and suggests that we look at both together for a deeper understanding of polar culture in the 1840s and 1850s.

This article explores how young people in Norilsk – Russia’s largest Arctic city and a global exemplar of industrial monotown development – negotiate their futures amid extreme environmental challenges, social isolation, and economic uncertainty. Drawing on 31 in-depth interviews with vocational students of industrial specialisations, the paper examines the ways in which youth navigate a unique “here” (Norilsk) versus “on the mainland” (the rest of Russia) divide that shapes both lived experience and imagined mobility. The analysis reveals that youth typically approach life in Norilsk as a temporary, but agentic strategy: they seek financial security and work experience locally before considering uncertain migration elsewhere. This calculated “staying,” termed “permanent temporality,” is influenced by limited educational and career opportunities, strong vocational pipelines, and family narratives that valorise the accumulation of a “safety cushion” prior to moving. While Norilsk offers predictability and stability, it is rarely seen as a place for long-term residence or generational settlement. The findings challenge assumptions of Arctic youth passivity or inevitable depopulation, highlighting instead the adaptive agency young people display in a context of structural constraint. The study situates these strategies between broader transformations in Russian education, shifting value attached to vocational and university pathways, and the specific vulnerabilities of Arctic urban environments. The article concludes by discussing the implications for regional policy, urban sustainability, and broader understandings of youth transition and mobility under conditions of global peripherality and rapid socioeconomic change.

This article examines recruitment practices in Swedish polar expeditions during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, focusing on A.G. Nathorst’s Arctic voyages 1898 and 1899, the Swedish-Russian Arc-of-Meridian surveys 1898–1901, and the 1903 Antarctic rescue expedition. Drawing on preserved correspondence, this article explores who conducted recruitment, how it was done, and what competencies were sought. The expedition leader recruited other scientists on his own, relying on recommendations from fellow academics. Hiring of sailors involved several persons; the leader, the ship’s captain, other seamen and semi-professional commissioners. The default mode was to re-hire old shipmates. When that was not possible, new recruits were evaluated through acquaintances or based on their reputation. Experience of travel in icy waters was considered valuable. Sailors with references from scientific expeditions were especially sought after, and could use this to attain higher wages than was the norm in ordinary work at sea.

This article revisits the Finnish contribution to the First International Polar Year (IPY) (1882–1883) by examining a largely overlooked primary source: “On the Finnish Research Expedition to Sodankylä and Kultala in 1882–1884, with Sketches from Lapland” (Helsinki, 1885). Contrary to claims in recent scholarship that no detailed accounts of daily life at the Finnish polar station have survived, this volume offers rich descriptions of the expedition’s routines, challenges, and social interactions. Drawing on these narratives, the article reconstructs the everyday realities of scientific work in Sodankylä, including the arduous journey north, the setting up of observation facilities, the strict schedule of meteorological and magnetic observations, and the experimental studies on auroral phenomena led by Professor Selim Lemström. The analysis highlights why these accounts were forgotten – due to linguistic barriers and limited popular dissemination – and argues for their significance in understanding both the material culture of polar science and Finland’s role in the First IPY. By bringing this evidence into the historiography of Arctic research, the article challenges prevailing assumptions and calls for renewed attention to local perspectives in global scientific enterprises.

High-latitude environments subject residents to extreme seasonal variations in light. This qualitative study examined how civilians living at high northern latitudes experience and manage sleep, mood and time across winter darkness and summer light. Twenty-eight adults residing in Scandinavia, Estonia and Canada completed an in-depth online, open-ended survey. Using reflexive thematic analysis, we identified a lived ecology of seasonal strain spanning physiology, emotion and temporal experience. Participants described winter as heavier sleep with difficult awakenings, inertia and flatter affect and summer as shallow, fractured sleep and a “wired” restlessness. Evening-type (“night-owl”) individuals reported greater strain across both seasons: winter mornings felt biologically unworkable, whereas summer nights never properly “started.” Crucially, people also reported changes in how they experienced time itself. Under unstable photoperiods, “day” and “night” became things to make rather than to feel: weeks “blurred” without deliberate anchors, prompting intentional “temporal scaffolds” such as fixed wake times and mealtimes, blackout in summer, morning light in winter, seasonal rituals, scheduled outdoor exposure, and, for some, temporary relocation. We interpret these accounts within circadian alignment and social zeitgeber frameworks and extend them by specifying temporal experience, not just sleep or mood, as a key outcome of environmental light. Implications include chronotype-aware screening in primary care, normalising circadian and temporal hygiene in public messaging, and embedding light scheduling and routine-based supports within fatigue-risk management for isolated, confined and extreme operations. The findings provide an ecological description of civilian adaptation at high latitude and generate testable predictions for future quantitative and operational studies.

During 1864–1869, Charles Hall led an expedition seeking answers to what happened to the 1845 Northwest Passage Expedition of Sir John Franklin. Hall recovered relics from the expedition and their history from the Inuit. This analysis correlates Hall’s records with the relics now housed at the Smithsonian Institution and those that Hall gave to others. Forty-six of the 83 relics catalogued in Hall’s “Part of List Sir John Franklin Relics” notebook were identified. Many of these were correlated with a 1869 contemporary illustration appearing in Harper’s Weekly magazine. We learn that the collection likely represented what was of value to the Inuit as Hall traded for the majority of the relics. Among these, Hall gave away nearly all relics connected to individuals participating in the Franklin Expedition, except for some cutlery belonging to Sir John Franklin. Hall’s efforts provided the first evidence of materials scavenged from the expedition ships themselves. It remains unclear why Hall donated as many relics as he did to the Smithsonian for similar materials were used for fundraising in the past. This suggests he did not plan to return to the Arctic to seek the Franklin Expedition or he had additional relics not yet located.

Since 1859, attempts to resolve the question of the identity of a sailor from the 1845 Franklin expedition whose body was found that year on the south shore of King William Island have been complicated by contradictory evidence found with the skeleton. Documents found with the body implied the man was Harry Peglar, Captain of the Foretop, but the clothing indicated the man held a domestic rating, a steward or officer’s servant. This paper examines the question of the sailor’s identity through a review of the investigative framework of past attempts to ascertain the man’s identity. It then presents results of comparative DNA analyses conducted on the skeleton and on samples provided by descendants of Harry Peglar and six of the eight stewards. Comparison of DNA profiles obtained from the skeleton with those of descendants of the stewards yielded no matches, but comparison of the mtDNA profile obtained from the skeleton with a presumed descendant of Harry Peglar yielded a match with a genetic distance of 0. We conclude that the DNA and genealogical evidence confirm that the identity of the sailor whose skeleton was discovered in 1859 was that of Henry Peter (“Harry”) Peglar, Captain of the Foretop, HMS Terror.

A 23-foot cutter lies adjacent to the wreck of HMS Terror (Franklin Expedition, 1845–1848). Historical accounts of the 28-foot boat found in 1859 at site NgLj-3 in Erebus Bay (“Boat Place”) describe extensive field modification, including lightened upperworks, an altered rail arrangement, and a 9-inch weather-cloth supported by iron stanchions that also served as thowells. This paper uses reproducible image-processing methods to test whether the cutter preserves visible features consistent and convergent with elements of the NgLj-3 modification suite. Using still imagery, contrast-limited adaptive histogram equalisation, colour-index segmentation, and gradient-based seam detection, we assess three markers: anomalous rail height relative to the stemhead, preferential loss of upper planking, and a rail-mounted upright compatible with a stanchion. The imagery shows a pronounced mismatch between rail height and stemhead elevation relative to Admiralty cutter plans. A sub-gunwale void consistent with missing upperworks, which is notably similar to the strake replacement described, and a small upright feature of approximately the same order of magnitude as the reported weather-cloth height. These observations are suggestive rather than diagnostic, but taken together, they support a hypothesis that the Terror cutter may preserve traces of field modification comparable to those described at NgLj-3.

This article examines how the participation and designations of the shared delegation of Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands to the Arctic Council have developed since the council’s establishment in 1996. Drawing on data from 223 meetings across all Arctic Council meeting types, we analyse participation patterns and delegation designations, linking them to shifting priorities and internal dynamics within the Kingdom. The delegation is unique for its frequent designation changes and documentation of nationality shifts. Our analysis shows that since 2013, designations have gradually standardised at ministerial and Senior Arctic Official (SAO) meetings, while at the working group level, designation practices are more fragmented. Denmark maintains the largest presence across all meeting types, but Greenland and the Faroe Islands have increased their engagement in specific groups in line with their foreign policy strategies. These developments highlight a broader rebalancing within the Kingdom, where Greenland and the Faroe Islands have strengthened their Arctic engagement and foreign policy agency.

We have used a modern, medium-sized hovercraft to further explore air cushion transport in Antarctica. Hovercraft travel over hard-blown snow at safe cruising speeds of 40–60 km/h requires about 50% of the fuel consumption for hovercraft travel over a flat ocean surface. The Griffon 2000TD craft used here has an endurance of >1000 km with a 1-tonne payload (personnel and equipment). However, this standard craft, designed for operations at sea level, is limited to altitudes below about 700 m elevation by the decrease in air density. The hovercraft provides accommodation, communication and first aid facilities for its crew in the event of any weather or operational issues. Two safety features of air cushion travel in Antarctica stand out: (1) low ground pressure per unit area (15% of a human), and (2) the ability to freely cross open ice cracks of dimensions of a metre or more. The total considerations of fuel economy, safety and environmental impact suggest the surface of hard-blown snow in Antarctica provides the optimum conditions for air cushion travel on planet Earth.