This chapter argues that ideas – not just capital or labor – are central to economic transformation. Innovation does not arise spontaneously; it requires deliberate institutional support, including investments in education, basic research, and infrastructure. The chapter explores how countries cultivate innovation ecosystems that enable risk-taking and creativity. It highlights the role of the state in shaping markets, fostering entrepreneurship, and guiding long-term strategic investment. A society’s capacity to generate, diffuse, and apply knowledge is a key determinant of its developmental trajectory.

Ideas drive economic growth by freeing us from the curse of diminishing returns. That is true today and was true when economic growth began in northwestern Europe in the 1700s. Back then, ideas such as Arkwright’s factory revolutionized the cotton textile industry and drastically cut the cost of spinning cotton. A torrent of such new ideas, in fact, began began to flow through northwestern Europe from the 1600s on. Some came from scientific discoveries, although the wholesale application of scientific theories had to wait until the 1800s. Others reflected the new belief that innovation was possible and a new epistemological standard for determining what was true and worth investigating. The ideas could not be put to work, though, without the mechanics and engineers who had the skills needed to put the new concepts into practice. Northwestern Europe had such skilled workers, along with institutions that encouraged the search for new ideas. Did Europe’s religion also spur economic growth? Max Weber believed that Protestantism did, though recent research belies his claim. Christianity as whole, however, did foster economic growth in northwestern Europe in a variety of ways.

Economic growth boosted living standards after it first surfaced in Britain in the 1700s. Why did it not arise earlier or somewhere else? Why did it spread quickly to northwestern Europe, but take longer to reach much of the rest of the world? The answer is not slavery, colonialism, or capitalism. Rather, it lies with advantages shared by much of northwestern Europe: institutions that secured property rights with benefits beyond a narrow elite; states that could rearrange property rights with credible compensation to improve transportation and agricultural productivity; cities made possible by productive agriculture that spawned agglomeration effects like those at work in Silicon Valley; skilled workers who could implement new ideas; and access to the ideas themselves from the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. Northwestern Europe had these advantages for four reasons: its history, its religion, its intellectual heritage, and its distance from Eurasia’s steppes. Those four reasons are the ultimate causes for the onset of sustained economic growth in Britain in the 1700s and for its spread to northwestern Europe.

Chapter 3 introduces the concept of Big Ideas in mathematics—such as number sense, algebraic thinking, and spatial reasoning—and how these support deep learning. You will consider ways to develop and connect key mathematical ideas, using strategies like Fermi problems to promote critical and creative thinking.

Three questions have usually been asked about the French Revolution: why did it happen?; why was it so violent? and what was its legacy? At first sight all three questions seem to beg other, more conceptually ambitious questions, whether about causation, violence or legacies. The aim of this short book is to answer both sets of questions by bringing together events with ideas. Combining the two actually helps to make the answers to the second, more conceptually oriented set of questions more historically and analytically focussed. It does so because the French Revolution owes much of its complexity to ideas and, more particularly, to the range and multiplicity of appearances and temporalities that ideas can lend to events. Complexity, not only in France and not only at the time of the French Revolution, is more than an effect of large numbers of people living in different circumstances with different, sometimes antagonistic, interests. It is also an effect of the range of occasionally compelling, but occasionally competing, emotional responses, moral evaluations and causal assessments made by, or of, people living in similar circumstances with similar, overlapping or complementary interests.

This chapter introduces the ‘structuralist’ form of political settlements analysis employed in this book. The political settlements framework, initially developed by Mushtaq Khan, has gained increasing popularity but has evolved in very different directions. Political settlements analysis (PSA) was appealing to scholars because it encouraged analysis of power relations shaping development policy, highlighting how distributions of power among organised groups shaped how institutions operated. Influential donor-funded research programmes have aligned it more with neoclassical economics, and this has led to the obfuscation of the structuralist and historical materialist roots of the framework. This chapter elaborates the structuralist and historical materialist roots of political settlements analysis. It highlights the differences between non-structuralist and structuralist approaches to political settlements analysis in relation to the concept of holding power and its components: economic structure, rents, ideas and ideology, and violence and conflict. The chapter highlights how PSA can be used to help understand the contemporary transnational nature of vulnerabilities shaping late-development challenges.

Chapter 4 analyses processes of making climate mitigation into a policy area during the 1970s to mid 1990s. It explores the ideas, frames, and interests that informed United Nations climate change debates, how mitigation came to be defined as a policy area, and, ultimately, the specific compromises that were necessary to agree emissions reduction targets for Annex 1 countries. The role of political compromise in processes of reaching agreements and on governing bodies is foregrounded. Particular attention is also paid to questions of how pro-mitigation groups articulated the need for change, the role of climate science within this, how anti-mitigation coalitions narrated their contestations, and how these debates informed compromises reached. Although negotiated outcomes were unsatisfactory in many ways, there is a sense that all parties did, to greater or lesser extents, compromise to engender these first stages in the politicisation of climate mitigation.

Descartes and many of his followers sought to overcome the scholastic Aristotelian tradition. This attitude is also visible in their choice of terminology: while late scholastic philosophers described the operations of the intellect in terms of concepts, Descartes and many philosophers after him described our cognitive activities in terms of ideas. This leads to at least three questions: (1) What did late scholastic authors take concepts and ideas to be? (2) Why did Descartes prefer to articulate his theory of thought in terms of ideas rather than concepts? And (3) how did Descartes’s choice to articulate his theory of thought in terms of ideas shape his conception of thought? In this chapter I seek to answer these questions with reference especially to Francisco Suárez and Descartes, but also more briefly to John Locke and Nicholas Malebranche, who developed Descartes’s theory of thought in terms of ideas in interestingly different ways.

What is ideology? How can we discern significant, enduring ideas from more fleeting ones? With these opening questions the chapter lays out some ways scholars might investigate the impact of ideology on international history. The chapter offers how-to insights for historians to examine worldviews, national visions, and personal biases as they have shaped US foreign relations. In so doing, we are reminded to always consider our own ideologies, preconceptions, and assumptions, regardless of whether those presuppositions are more or less obvious. The chapter singles out key contested concepts – such as “civilization” and empire – and suggests a focus on language and rhetoric in approaching this subject. Biography and a concentration on people and groups is crucial to any deep investigation of ideology. The cultural embeddedness and historical context of the actors and ideas we focus on is critical to this work. International and transnational dimensions of thought are virtually omnipresent in the historical record; so, too, one must keep in mind the shaping role of markets and economic ideas and the impact of competing forms of nationalism. Overall, the chapter emphasizes the relationship between norms and ideology, the significance of religion, along with themes such as power, progress, and democracy.

National educational goals describe the responsibility of governments, schools and curriculum to ensure learners develop into effective citizens who can participate in society and employment in a globalised economy. This was initially outlined in the vision of the Melbourne Declaration on Educational Goals for Young Australians (Melbourne Declaration) and later in the Alice Springs (Mparntwe) Education Declaration. In promoting values such as social justice, peace, sustainability and democracy, the HASS educational discipline provides the perfect vehicle to achieve this vision. While the rationale and aims are different for each sub-strand within the HASS Australian Curriculum learning area (History, Geography, Civics and Citizenship, and Economics and Business), the overarching theme involves stimulating curiosity, imagination and wonder about the world we live in, ‘and how people can participate as active and informed citizens with high-level skills needed now and in the future’. In reflecting on your own education, were you encouraged to have such curiosity and interest in the world around you?

The human being is freely ‘self-determined’ rather than determined through some external authority (whether theological or teleological). This dichotomy conveniently expresses the usual understanding of modern political thought’s divergence from preceding tradition. By comparison, pre-modernity is teleological, anthropomorphic, realist; in a word, naïve – with its substantively rational nature, dictating essential ends to which we are subject. These received truths are past due for a re-examination. Just how naïve or dogmatic was the Greek understanding of freedom and nature? In this chapter, I argue that Plato’s view of man as naturally political is more complex and multivalent than our historical categorizations allow. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which, for him, politics does indeed depend upon a natural model. That model, however, is the Idea of the Good. And here, where Plato seems furthest from us, lies his greatest challenge to contemporary understandings of nature and freedom.

Italy shared many similarities with Germany: it was a patchwork of different political entities, economically backward, and divided by the Papal State in the middle. Unification was led by Piedmont, a state that was the Italian counterpart to Prussia. Piedmont’s nation builders were anticlerical liberals. In Italy, the confessional cleavage between state and church was of paramount importance after unification. Rapid liberalization and industrialization brought pauperization, and as in Germany, the religious cleavage added to the capital–labor tensions. Despite these similarities, Italy saw the emergence of a welfare state only half a century after Germany.

Religious ideas have been largely absent in the literature on the welfare state. Instead, class-interest based, rational efficiency, and institutional explanations have dominated. The absence of religious ideas is not a peculiarity of welfare state research but is paralleled by a treatment of ideas as ephemeral to politics in general. The introductory chapter reviews the literature on ideas and politics and the literature on the influence of ideas on welfare policy in particular. It shows why ideas could not play a role in the welfare state literature till today and proposes a solution: to integrate ideas into the study of welfare state evolution. The chapter creates an analytical framework for the study of evolving religious ideas and their impact on welfare state formation and reform in Italy and Germany. It engages with the weaknesses and strengths of both welfare state theory and the new ideational turn literature and introduces a theory of ideational competition. The chapter concludes with a short descriptive outline of the book and the following chapters.

Here we will see how a virtuous cycle of ideational competition led to the formation of the world’s first welfare state in late nineteenth-century Germany. In the first part, we will follow nation building and industrialization in nineteenth-century Germany. Industrialization and the confessional cleavage produced a specific political constellation in which the growth of a pauperized working class not only led to a political conflict between capital and labor but also reinforced the existing confessional cleavage between Protestants and Catholics. In the second part, we will see how the cleavages led to a specific cycle of ideational competition between the dominant political forces of the German Empire (Catholicism, conservative Protestantism, liberal Protestantism, and socialism). In the second half of the nineteenth century, they all started to develop modern social security ideas. The development of these ideas paved the way to the formation of the world’s first welfare state. This chapter looks closely at the evolution of German Catholic social thinking, developing from antiquated medieval social ideas to one of the most sophisticated Catholic social security ideologies at the end of the century. The third part of the chapter gives an account of the making of Bismarck’s social security legislation in the 1880s.