In this chapter I argue that self-defense is permissible against an unjust attack, but that any lethal harm must be, in Aquinas’s phrase, praeter intentionem, outside the intention of the defender. I argue that public authorities must also not intend death, but that because of the nature of the political task, public officials are capacitated to use force to a greater extent and in greater measure than are private individuals.

In Chapter 1, we set the scene by examining the dynamics of online offensive language. We examine offensive language across a spectrum, ranging from non-polite expressions to grossly offensive (potentially illegal) speech. We also explore the conceptual links between offensive language and related notions such as impoliteness, hate speech and language aggression. Importantly, this chapter focuses on why understanding offensive language is, above all, a concern best addressed by linguists. To achieve this, we discuss the similarities and differences between grossly offensive and (im)polite language. We specifically focus on pragmatic concepts such as locution, illocution and perlocution to explain how they operate at both ends of the spectrum. Finally, we address the challenges of detecting offensive language in computational approaches to combating online hate, emphasising the vital role of linguistic contributions.

In this chapter I argue that God’s love and goodness make it impossible for him either to intend the evil of human death or to delegate the authority to take a human life. This concludes my argument for the absolute norm against intending death.

In this chapter I extend the analysis of the previous chapter to defense against innocent threats. Once again, the norm against intending death applies, but the standards for permissible killing as a side effect are stricter than in the case of unjust threats.

In this chapter I give a preliminary argument against suicide, based on the core argument of the book. Suicide is distinguished from permisible acceptance of death as a side effect of some other permissible action.

In this chapter I present the Core Argument for why intending death is always wrong. The argument gives reason to hold a sanctity-of-life view but does not depend on such a view.

The criminal law comprises a state response to wrongdoing on the part of the population, proscribing conduct that lies outside of the normal expected conduct of citizens. As such, the criminal law seeks to regulate socially transgressive or unacceptable (criminal) behaviour.In providing a framework of rules to address these behaviours, the criminal law actually comprises two discrete branches: substantive criminal law and procedural criminal law. This chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 1.2 looks at the nature of the criminal law; its purposes, limits and sources. This part examines a number of important issues, such as the purposes of the criminal law, the legitimate limits on its scope and its sources. Section 1.3 examines the notion of criminal responsibility, looking at who may be held liable for a criminal offence and the principles that underlie the state’s obligations in proving an offence.

This chapter consists of two parts. The brief first part provides an overview of some of the main issues connected with sin that were discussed by early scholastic theologians. The second part focuses on the problem of the source of evil actions: are they 'from God' or 'from humans or the devil'?

Chapter 2 maps the contours of this doctrine, indicating the sources of the questions on which the critique builds. This chapter purposefully identifies doctrinal understandings (inclusions, exclusions, preponderances and assumptions), as focussed on definitions, distinctions, interpretation, contexts and conditions. In so doing, it maps the grounds for my broader claims as well as identifying entry points for their critique in subsequent chapters.

A comparison of ‘intention’ and its role in criminal law is made extremely difficult by the overlaps and imperfections in terminology, both in common law and German law. There are also significant differences in how courts, academics and laypeople understand and apply the terms. The authors therefore concentrate on the substantive questions behind the legal terms: what makes ‘intentional’ offending more dangerous and more blameworthy than non-intentional causation of similar harm? What types or degrees of intention can be differentiated because they imply more or less intense subjective violations of legal rules? In particular, is there a normative difference between actors who wish to achieve a certain result and those who do not but are reasonably certain that they will bring about this result? How should the law deal with actors who know that they engage in risky behaviour but are unsure about its effect?

Previous chapters have examined forms of action that the standard belief-desire model ignores. This chapter starts to dig deeper into the standard model itself. It is about how decisions get made (especially decisions that are commonly described as conscious ones), and about how those decisions subsequently give rise to actions. It draws on the scientific literature on prospection and on what is often called “neuroeconomics” to argue that valence (pleasure and displeasure) is the common currency of all decision-making. It also argues that the goals and intentions that result from decision-making are real, and distinct from beliefs and affective forms of desire. The chapter begins by showing that the ordinary notion of desire conflates two very different kinds of mental state, however, and it concludes by discussing how intentions and affective desires interact when they conflict.

The standard philosophical model of intentional action-explanation appeals to states of belief and desire to do the explaining. This chapter evaluates what philosophers have had to say about the nature of desire. Chapter 5 showed that the ordinary notion of desire encompasses two very different kinds of mental state: goals and intentions, on the one hand, and affective or emotion-like forms of desire, on the other. The focus here is on the latter. The chapter shows that desires of this sort always incorporate anticipatory pleasure, and that pleasure itself is an analog-magnitude representation of value. The chapter begins with what the science can tell us about the respective natures of pleasure and desire, before comparing the results with claims made by armchair-philosophers. Many of the latter are false, albeit sometimes containing partial insights.