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Every serious analyst of Britain’s role in global politics understood that the country’s decision to leave the European Union would have a significant – perhaps fundamental – effect on its standing in the wider world and the way it would henceforth pursue its foreign, defence and security policies. It was the biggest strategic reorientation in Britain’s external relations for over half a century; a shift for which the country was completely unprepared and in which the policy establishment was explicitly prevented from doing any contingency planning. With the shock of the Brexit decision in 2016, the prospects for British foreign affairs seemed to range from the excitingly uncertain to the simply dire. In the event, Britain’s standing in the world has both risen and sunk in the decade since, driven by challenges, events and responses only peripherally connected to Brexit issues as they arose at the time. ‘Brexit Britain’ certainly figures in the way the country is perceived internationally, but those perceptions are overlaid by more imperative judgements about how the country now positions itself in response to more fundamental challenges than were ever envisaged in Brexit debates at the time.
The biggest problem that the vote threw up was precisely the lack of clarity about what would come next; what unexpected surprises were to come next? What would the UK’s departure mean for Britain and for the European Union; what, indeed, would it mean for countries in other parts of the world? Would Brexit start a domino effect in Europe; might it even start a chain reaction elsewhere too, as countries stepped back from international commitments and out of regional or global institutions – and turned their backs on former partners and allies? In the days after the vote, press commentaries around the world began to harden. On 24 June 2016, for example, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that it respected the results and hoped for early agreements between London and Brussels to help clear up uncertainty. Three weeks later, voices in Beijing had a better grasp on what had happened – and in particular realised that the promises given by Brexit’s chief cheerleaders were hopelessly naïve at best and downright dissimulations at worst.
This chapter analyses security exceptions in international trade law, focusing on their interpretation and application within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs). It examines the evolving nature of national security concerns, particularly in cybersecurity, and how these concerns intersect with trade regulations. The chapter discusses the justiciability of security exceptions, the level of deference accorded to states in defining their security interests, and the challenges posed by the expansion of security concerns beyond traditional military domains. It also evaluates the adequacy of existing WTO and PTA frameworks in addressing contemporary security issues, suggesting that further innovations may be necessary to balance trade liberalisation with national security imperatives in the digital age.
From the late seventeenth century to the early nineteenth, the Qing dynasty was the dominant power in East Asia. It waged numerous wars with its neighbours, both within the orbit of its tributary system and without. Coming from Manchuria and with their past tribal war tradition, the Manchus did not have an inherent expansion agenda when they conquered China. Use of force by the Qing dynasty in dealing with frontier crises was often case-specific. The Qing state constantly adjusted and revised its underpinning in justifying its decision to wage war or keep peace on or beyond its borders. In chronological order, this chapter delineates the evolution of Qing China’s normative system. It starts with the Manchus’ formative era in Manchuria, then focuses on the Qing dynasty’s empire-building endeavours and subsequent retreat from frontier activism in the early nineteenth century, and ends with a brief discussion of its last decades, during which the Qing dynasty’s doctrine and practice in managing its international affairs changed radically owing to intensified interactions with Western countries and the introduction of the Western international law.
The European Union stands at a crossroads. Its founding promises of peace, convergence, and multilateralism are increasingly strained by debt, migration, sovereignty, and militarization. The introduction to this Special Issue begins with the question: who is the EU for? To stretch this question analytically we move beyond conventional debates on globalization and sovereignty foregrounding the colonial and racialized conditions that shape European integration. Colonialism, we argue, remains operative, structuring the production of race, racism, and anti-Blackness within and beyond Europe. Drawing on radical traditions of thought on colonialism and anti-Blackness, critical political economy, postcolonial theory, and institutional analysis, the introduction reframes the analytic of who the EU is for by showing how the Union’s commitment to universal values coexists with practices that reproduce hierarchies of life and death. We argue that the EU operates as a form of global power that mobilizes race and racism as constitutive mechanisms of legitimacy, authority, mobility, and value. Contemporary militarization, through defense integration, rearmament, and strategic autonomy, intensifies these dynamics by recoding racial hierarchies as security imperatives. Competing responses, from right-wing sovereign internationalism to left critiques of neoliberalism, rarely confront Europe’s colonial and racialized constitutive role in sustaining global inequalities. These unresolved contradictions and failures open up urgent questions about how Europe’s political and economic order continues to reproduce global hierarchies of power. It is precisely this tension that the special issue takes up, responding by engaging the intertwined colonial and racist projects in the EU. The contributors collectively frame crisis as a key site through which colonial violence is reconfigured, displaced, and normalized in contemporary EU governance. In so doing, they reposition the EU not as a neutral arbiter of order, but as an active geopolitical site where racialized and imperial forms of power are continuously produced, contested, and reimagined.
This final chapter looks broadly at the remaining years of the twenty-first century and the start of the twenty-second. Considered are the implications of a world population in 2100 that approaches or exceeds 10 billion. Some, if not all, of these musings may appear dismal to many. Most certainly the world facing monumental population and environmental challenges. Some of them are addressed in this chapter. There are also demographic implications for governance and civil society, national security, human rights, and international relations. The world is witnessing enormous advances in technology. Both population and noetic exponentialism are becoming even more problematic. The era of the Industrial Revolution is long over. The world is now experiencing the Information Revolution. Population size and change are in the middle of this incredible phenomenon.
The ancient Greek author Thucydides is widely cited in discussions of international affairs and contemporary politics, such as the Russian-Ukraine War and relationships between the United States and China. However, he is often presented in such debates as a purveyor of universal theories or inspirational slogans. His reputation as an authoritative thinker, founded in the complexity and originality of his account of the past, is used to legitimise simplistic claims about the present. This article surveys three common examples of such readings—the Melian Dialogue and its relation to Realism, the Thucydides Trap, and the plague at Athens—to consider how they may offer a misleading idea of Thucydides’ work and what it could actually tell us about politics today.
This chapter provides an introduction to the book. The aim of the book is to examine the meaning, nature and value of Barry Buzan’s big picture as an approach to IR, and to use this as a stepping stone to a broader reflection on the benefit of big picture approaches or macro-perspectives. To that end, the chapter initially analyses the chronological development of Buzan’s big picture thinking, with a particular emphasis on three core monographs. That allows the authors to identify a number of ‘traits’ in Buzan’s evolving thinking. The rest of the chapter is concerned with comparing and contrasting Buzan’s approach to other macro-perspectives in International Relations and related disciplines, and to provide an overview of the remaining chapters and emerging issues. The chapter ends with some initial conclusions regarding the implications for the International Relations discipline.
In recent years, a group of influential authoritarian states has emerged that fall between the ranks of great powers and small states. These authoritarian middle-powers – such as Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates – exert considerable influence, particularly in their region. Yet this development has been overlooked in favor of a focus on superpowers, especially China and Russia. We therefore lack a framework for understanding their behavior and impact. This Element offers the first comprehensive analysis of how non-democratic middle-powers engage abroad. Drawing on critical case studies, it shows how the combination of authoritarian politics and mid-level status leads to distinctive foreign policies. In particular, these strategies erode global democratic norms and institutions through a combination of hard power and transnational repression tempered by hedging and legitimation strategies. In this way, authoritarian middle-powers are helping to unravel the liberal rules-based order. This title is available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Barry Buzan is one of Europe's most prolific scholars of international relations, renowned for his interdisciplinary collaborations and commitment to making complex ideas accessible. This volume features a detailed analysis of his practised 'big picture' approach and its value to the international relations discipline, as well as related social science disciplines. It starts with an explication of the intellectual project of Barry Buzan over his long career, the development of his thinking in relation to the big picture and the style of research he engages in. The contributors then use this as a stepping stone to reflect on the broader value of the big picture approach, taking their point of departure in five scholarly fields: international relations theory, the English School, world history, international security studies and international political economy. In the concluding chapter, Barry Buzan reflects on the undertaking and the path forward.
This chapter examines how international relations (IR) scholarship has approached two central questions concerning international law and legalisation: why do states create international law, and what makes a particular norm ‘legal’ in nature? It then outlines the concept of legalisation as described in Abbott et al.’s well-known article of the same name. Under the classic legalisation framework, legalisation has three components: obligation, precision and delegation. The chapter argues that the classic OPD framework cannot fully capture the expanding role of non-state actors or conceptualise law as a process. It therefore proposes an adapted model for the transnational legal system that incorporates a crucial omitted dimension – implementation. Implementation refers to the concrete actions taken by agents to translate legal or law-like principles into practical, workable instructions for courts, governments, companies, and other non-state actors.
This introductory chapter sets out the book’s key findings, methodology and structure. It also introduces the principal questions the book seeks to address. How have agents, operating at national, international and transnational levels, attempted to institutionalise the norm of corporate accountability for human rights violations linked to transnational corporate activity? What do these initiatives reveal about the nature of transnational legalisation, and how legalisation should be framed or conceptualised in the twenty-first century? Finally, could a revised framework of legalisation help explain when transnational litigation and soft law initiatives are more likely to succeed in the future?
Iran is one of the most stigmatised countries of the twenty-first century: having been sanctioned by the US since 1979, the Islamic Republic was declared part of the ‘axis of evil’ by President George W. Bush in 2002, and from 2006 onwards, it has been subject to multilateral, comprehensive and wide-reaching economic sanctions. In June 2025, this discursive and economic attack on Iran transitioned to direct military bombardment. For the United States and its allies, Iran is a pariah state. This stigmatisation of Iran is an example of the kinds of practices that contribute to the social construction of the international order, whereby some countries are designated as ‘inside’ and others as ‘outside’ the community of established states. Needless to say, Iran has been placed firmly in the ‘outside’ category ever since 1979. At the same time as accepting and even at times embracing this ‘outsider’ status, however, Iran has also sought to raise its own international standing and to be accepted as an ‘insider’.
Growing attention is given in IR theory and diplomatic circles to the ambivalent role of religion in world politics. However, there is a need for more analytical clarity, identifying at least four different domains: religions and inter-state relations; religions and internationalism; religions and trans-nationalism; and religions and globalism. The most promising approach is the one that concentrates on the transnational projection of religions, connecting it to the way religions address global issues to influence international actors.
The paper examines the challenges of teaching about the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations to students who were born after the Cold War and suggests a variety of pedagogical approaches for helping them understand this impact including readings, media, and simulations. We first discuss the value of a multi-methods approach to teaching about nuclear weapons and then discuss resources for these different approaches. For readings, we identify key writing framed as debates that have worked with undergraduates like Waltz and Sagan as well as key articles and literature reviews and historical literature about the actual use of nuclear weapons during World War II. We then discuss different multimedia such as movies and music. Finally, we discuss in class simulations with a focus on Nuclear Diplomacy, providing some examples of student reaction to playing these simulations.
This paper advocates a holistic approach to assessing international relations in undergraduate education, which revolves around: (a) essays and (b) active learning-related tasks, such as simulation reflective statements/reports and performance. The paper argues that, on the one hand, academic essays are far from irrelevant and it is difficult to overestimate their practical significance. On the other hand, active learning-related tasks are best utilised as a supplementary assessment, expanding the students’ range of transferable skills. The assessment structure advocated in this paper results from a holistic approach to assessment design, which includes teacher’s own experience, familiarity with pedagogical scholarship and input from students. This last element is the least common even though it makes sense to understand how students see their own assessment. To that end, the paper shares the results of a pilot project run at one of the UK universities, which engaged students as partners in rethinking their assessment.
The Hunger Games has become a pop culture phenomenon. To a greater extent than many of the other books in the young adult fiction genre, The Hunger Games series has themes relevant to the study of politics. This study explores the usefulness of The Hunger Games trilogy for teaching and learning about international relations. In particular, I examine The Hunger Games in relation to major paradigms of international relations and normative issues related to war. As a series rooted in conflict in the arena and more broadly in Panem, the trilogy raises a number of questions relevant to the study of war, peace, and justice.
This article introduces the Debate on editing and publishing (in) Political Science and International Relations journals in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The Debate brings together editors of PoliSci and IR journals published in four CEE countries to examine the practice of publishing (in) these disciplines and explore the diverse strategies journals, and their editors employ to navigate the semiperipheral context of CEE. Going beyond structuralist accounts of semiperipheral inferiority, we introduce CEE journals as institutions endowed with agency, self-reflection and responsibility towards their academic communities. The Debate discusses if and in which sense these journals try to become (limited) innovators, how they are bound by different conditions stemming from the national or regional contexts, how they work with or challenge them and which opportunities they exploit to advance their goals.
Analysing transatlantic relations from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (KP) to the 2009 Copenhagen accord, the article identifies underlying explanations for the divergences between the EU and US during international climate negotiations. It traces how a climate divide opened between the EU and the US in the early 2000s, involving confrontation over the implementation of the KP. However, a phase of EU–US rapprochement closed the climate gap in the late 2000s, leading to common positions during the 2009 COP-15 negotiations. Yet the Copenhagen Accord served to reinforce American influence, while undermining the coherence and credibility of the European stance. This led to multiple rifts in the post-Copenhagen landscape concerning climate treaty architecture, policy implementation and international relationships, jeopardising the success of future negotiations.
How do active learning environments—by means of simulations—enhance political science students’ learning outcomes regarding different levels of knowledge? This paper examines different UN simulations in political science courses to demonstrate their pedagogical value and provide empirical evidence for their effectiveness regarding three levels of knowledge (factual, procedural and soft skills). Despite comprehensive theoretical claims about the positive effects of active learning environments on learning outcomes, substantial empirical evidence is limited. Here, we focus on simulations to systematically test previous claims and demonstrate their pedagogical value. Model United Nations (MUNs) have been a popular teaching device in political science. To gain comprehensive data about the active learning effects of MUNs, we collect data and evaluate three simulations covering the whole range of simulation characteristics: a short in-class simulation of the UN Security Council, a regional MUN with different committees being simulated, and two delegations to the National Model United Nations, for which the students prepare for 1 year. Comparative results prove that simulations need to address certain characteristics in order to produce extensive learning outcomes. Only comprehensive simulations are able to achieve all envisioned learning outcomes regarding factual and procedural knowledge about the UN and soft skills.