The sense of duty is a virtue of caring, not directly about the good, or even about justice, but about doing one’s duty. Insofar as doing what one takes to be one’s duty is in fact to do what is good, the sense of duty functions as a backup for the more direct virtues of caring – generosity, compassion, and truthfulness, as well as justice. Being a virtue of caring, the sense of duty can be expressed in emotions: a feeling of satisfaction in having done one’s duties or feelings of guilt or shame at having neglected them. The sense of duty can vary, emotionally, according to how one conceives the authoritative source of duty, on a spectrum from reverence, through respect, to resentful acceptance. Example of the extremes beyond the spectrum are some Hebrew psalmists’ delight in the law of God and the contempt of the utter moral cynic.

Chapter 9 draws on the evidence outlined earlier in the book to evaluate a range of possible legal interventions. Structured according to the five potential equality objectives outlined earlier, the measures include steps to increase the visibility of people with disfigurements in daily life, methods of motivating employers to become appearance-inclusive and changes to influential institutions outside the employment context. They also include a range of legislative reforms to replace the severe disfigurement provision with a better remedial mechanism, such as the creation of a new protected characteristic of disfigurement or the reformulation of the definition of disability.

Leibniz defends teleology or purposive activity against the overly mechanical worldview of Thomas Hobbes, and develops an idea of spontaneity as self-originating action irreducible to mere mechanistic reaction. He links free activity with justice as the enabling conditions for the exercise of freedom, and with the progressive deployment of individual and collective powers. He thus sets the agenda for subsequent idealism, which reconfigures the idea of spontaneity and reflects on the harmonisation of diverse individual efforts as a problem of ongoing juridical reform

Educators within contemporary Australian educational settings are increasingly being called on to enact their pedagogy in multicultural classrooms, yet pedagogies remain oriented towards a narrow learner cohort. Meaningful inclusion of culturally and religiously diverse learners not only focuses on what is being taught or what knowledge is privileged, but is concerned with how it is taught and from whose perspective. Importantly, it prioritises what learners bring to educational settings – their diverse knowledge(s), languages, values and beliefs; all of which are embedded in their ways of knowing, being and doing informed by their cultural and religious traditions. This chapter aims to support educators in enacting culturally responsive pedagogy, including consideration of learners’ world views, knowledge(s) and ways of knowing, as well as respect for identities and backgrounds as meaningful sources for optimal learning, while simultaneously holding high expectations of them all. Educators will be challenged to examine epistemological and pedagogical diversity in HASS teaching and learning, to further develop learners’ knowledge, values and beliefs towards engaged and informed citizenship.

In acts that are properly acts of justice (rather than, say, compassion or generosity), what is good for people is sought under the mediating description what is due them. The virtue of justice is the generalized concern that people get what is due them. Objective justice is the property of states of affairs, actions, institutions, and personal relationships in which people tend to get what is due them. So the virtue of justice is the concern that such objects have that property. When is some good or evil due a person? It is due on at least eight kinds of basis: desert, status, need, current possession, agreement, legality, parity, and freedom. We appeal to these conditions in justifying justice claims. The person who has the virtue of justice is one who is consistently and intelligently concerned that states of affairs, actions, institutions, and personal relationships be objectively just.

Forgivingness is virtue, a specification of generosity, a disposition to give offenders, especially against oneself, more of good and less of evil than they deserve. It is an interconnected set of sensitivities to features of situations marked by wrongdoing. The forgiving person is responsive to these features in ways that tend to mitigate, eliminate, or forestall anger in the interest of wishing the wrongdoer well and/or of enjoying a positive and harmonious relationship with him or her. The chief considerations favoring forgiveness are (1) the offender’s repentance, (2) excuses for the offender, (3) the offender’s suffering, (4) moral commonality with the offender, and (5) relationship to the offender.

This chapter explores the priestly theology of space within the tabernacle and how this expands to the holy land where Israel will dwell. The tabernacle and God’s abiding presence are the center of all holiness for the priestly authors. Only ordained priests may approach his holiness. The consecration of the altar is a high point in the theology of Leviticus and has an impact on its theology of the land and the Jubilee.

This chapter explores how international law and its legitimacy could be improved and made more aligned with the demands of justice. It focuses on two types of requirements. First, there are the principles and accompanying procedures on the basis of which actors ask their agency (and their rights) to be recognized by international law and its culture of legitimacy. These principles are consent, justification, accountability, consistency, representation and participation, and non-abuse of power. Second, there are the topics around which this quest for the recognition of agency (and rights) takes place. They are better universality of international law, human rights as a benchmark of the legitimacy of sovereignty, compliance/enforcement/accountability, and human rights supported by public goods. These two kinds of requirements have been at the center of the efforts to make international law more inclusive as well as more legitimate, and they need to be taken more seriously in the future.

In this book, I have tried to make sense of legitimacy at the international level, especially in relation to international law. I have paid a lot of attention to international law, in particular aligned with the demands of legitimacy and justice. But international law is only one aspect of the forces and the ecosystem that shape international order. Therefore, alone it cannot engineer the change that the international system requires today. This change has to be part of a more comprehensive approach. Here is not the place to offer a full account of the areas on which research could concentrate in the future to further encourage justice and legitimacy at the international level. However, it is worthwhile to present a general overview of these areas. In particular, three domains offer a possible road map for facilitating a constructive path forward: globalization, emotions and passions in social life, and the geopolitics of tomorrow.

This first chapter in the series of three turns to one – if not the – foundational Islamic philosopher, al-Fārābī, and his use and conception of fiṭra. His engagement is marked by an interest in logic and politics and would influence the philosophical engagements with fiṭra for generations. More specifically, the author shows how al-Fārābī invokes fiṭra to convey fundamental insights about human nature and society learned from his engagement with Greek philosophy, including his adaptations of Aristotle’s logic and Plato’s political vision, to an Arabic-speaking and potentially Islamic audience. By using fiṭra, rather than ‘nature’ or physis (ṭabʿ and/or ṭabīʿā ) at certain points, al-Fārābī is able to keep an implied connection to the creator God. Fiṭra, then, was not only a convenient term for communicating ideas about virtue, logic, and politics drawn from Greek thought to Arabic-speaking audiences; al-Fārābī’s use of the term also points to what might be “Islamic” about his apparently “Greek” philosophy.

The book has shown that, like any other concept, fiṭra has a complex history. And like any concept with a lively history, fiṭra needs to be interpreted. The philosophers’ ethics and politics, and particularly their commitment to intellectual, social, and political hierarchies, do not map onto our ethics or politics. However, that does not mean that their engagement with fiṭra is not crucial in the current moment. Working through fiṭra among the philosophers creates tensions – among them, and between them and other Islamic interpreters such as the scriptural commentators. In these tensions the ethical work lies, opening space for both a more robust conception of Islamic intellectual history and more informed debates in the present. The possibilities of what it means to be human in Islamic thought are so much more diverse and contextual and signal that if one of our most foundational concepts, human nature, is under contestation, then so is our moral life. In fact, this contestation is necessary, deeply human, and traditional.

In 1537 in Mexico City, Zumárraga’s Inquisition pursued a massive investigation into a network of suspected African and Spanish witches. Those punished were two African slaves, probably of Senegambia, Marta and María. Two freed slaves, María de Espinosa and Margarita Pérez, a Spanish woman Isabel de Morales, and a Nahua man whose name was Antón Cuatecu or Coatecu, were also condemned. The African women were accused of performing sorcery for multiple Spanish women, who were never arrested or prosecuted. These women offered multiple forms of love magic for their Spanish women patrons. Cuatecu was the cultural intermediary and supplied both the African and Spanish women with Mesoamerican plant material, which is not identified by name, only as roots, powders, which is clear evidence that Spanish and African women communicated with Cuatecu in Nahuatl. This network was multiethnic and composed of Senegambian, Maghrebi, Spanish, and Nahua peoples.

Describe how children develop fairness, spite, and helping behaviours; understand the role of emotions, punishment, and reputation in moral development; explore cross-cultural differences and similarities in morality.

The series of cases discussed in Part III are humbling reminders of how intertwined our patients and their support systems are with healthcare practitioners. TJ, Jimmy, Mrs. Blue, and Mrs. Winthorpe all have unique experiences in different corners of the healthcare system. Each case touches on the familiar experience of a healthcare team identifying what they believe is in the best interest of patient, and there being a factor, often the patient themselves, complicating that coming to fruition. Their experiences, and different experiences of privilege and power, or disempowerment are salient elements of their stories. These “haunting” and morally distressing cases are revisited with an additional lens of diversity, equity, identity, and bias and considerations for how ethicists might more fully integrate these critical perspectives into ethics consultation.