We examine how governments use accounting information, specifically administrative ratios, in their decisions regarding the funding of nonprofit organizations (NPOs). Using data in the setting of Canada, we find that when funding NPOs for the first time, governments consider NPOs’ sustainability and are more likely to award funds to NPOs with reasonably high administrative ratios, as long as these ratios are below the government-suggested threshold. In subsequent funding decisions, governments tend to ignore administrative ratios and stick with previously funded NPOs to extend subsequent funding(s). We further find that governments react to low-quality accounting ratios by reducing the likelihood and the value of funds awarded, and this reaction is more pronounced at initial funding than at subsequent funding(s). The practical and policy implications of these findings are discussed.

Governments face the challenge of fostering the social economy in a context of economic crisis and austerity policies. Despite the high levels of institutional recognition for the considerable social and economic value added by the social economy (SE), government policies following this approach have been scarce during the latest economic recession. This article analyses the case of Spain, a country that has endured deep austerity policies and has a strong SE sector. Building on the SE approach that combines quantitative and qualitative data, this study examines the policies that promoted the SE during two periods: before and during the economic crisis. As a novel contribution, the study compares the political discourse with the policies implemented. The findings highlight a gap between the discourse and the policies implemented during the crisis, showing that the SE has not been prioritized by policymakers, and link that gap with the recent EU economic policy.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the moderating effect that the level of development of countries exerts on the factors that define the behavior of social entrepreneurs, distinguishing the effect produced in innovation-driven economies from that in factor/efficiency-driven economies. Our study contributes to the advancement of one of the most relevant problems detected in social entrepreneurship research: the lack of empirical quantitative studies, mainly due to the lack of harmonized and comparable international data. We perform an empirical multivariable analysis using 2015 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data related to social entrepreneurship. The results show that both the variables that measure the values and skills to start a business and those related to the environment differentiate social from commercial entrepreneurs. In addition, our findings show how the development of the country plays a decisive moderating role, modifying the effect of the values and skills to be a social entrepreneur, the influence of gender, and even the relevance of entrepreneurs’ perception of their environment.

This paper is a single-project meta-analysis of four experiments that model charitable giving as individual contributions to a multiplicity of competing threshold public goods. We pool 17,136 observations at the individual level to summarize the project and investigate the role of learning, gender, and risk attitude, since the included studies are inconclusive in this regard. We find that equally effective coordination devices are the existence of a single contribution option that stands out on its merits, learning, and delegation as long as the intermediary is formally obliged to pass along a high enough percentage of the transferred resources. Women delegate less than men, and consequently prefer direct contributions. Risk tolerance increases overall donations but decreases individual earnings. We discuss possible implications of our findings.

This paper examines how image concerns affect the way giving behavior responds to social information. Subjects in the laboratory decide first whether they wish to donate part of their earnings to a charity, and then, conditional on opting in, decide how much to donate. They receive information on the size of a previous donation either before or after opting in, which allows one to examine the effect of the social information on the extensive and intensive margins of giving separately, and thus distinguish self-image concerns from potential alternative mechanisms. Information on a large previous donation caused subjects to opt out, but when shown only after opt-in, the same information caused subjects to increase donation amounts and did not lead to $0 donations. As further evidence of the influence of image concerns, the reaction to the social information was found to be correlated with a preference for quietly exiting a dictator game, and with scoring high on neuroticism. The results have implications for the inferences we draw about donor motives and welfare based on changes in giving in response to social information.

An influential result in the literature on charitable giving is that matching subsidies dominate rebate subsidies in raising funds. We investigate whether this result extends to “unit donation” schemes, a popular alternative form of soliciting donations. There, the donors’ choices are over the number of units of a charitable good to fund at a given unit price, rather than the amount of money to give. Comparing matches and rebates as well as simple discounts on the unit price, we find no evidence of dominance in our online experiment: the three subsidy types are equally effective overall. At a more disaggregated level, rebates lead to a higher likelihood of giving, while matching and discount subsidies lead to larger donations by donors. This suggests that charities using a unit donation scheme enjoy additional degrees of freedom in choosing a subsidy type. Rebates merit additional consideration if the primary goal is to attract donors.

When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.

We examine in the laboratory how having the opportunity to donate to a charity in the future affects the likelihood of engaging in dishonest behavior in the present. We also examine how charitable donations are affected by past ethical choices. First, subjects self-report their performance on a task, which provides them with an opportunity for undetected cheating. In the second stage they can donate some of the money earned in the first stage to a charity. Only subjects in the treatment group know about the opportunity to donate in the second stage. We find that more subjects cheat if they know they can donate some of the money to charity. We also find that subjects in treatment end up donating less to charity and that both honest and dishonest subjects donate less in treatment. We propose a new hypothesis that explains these results: past violations of social norms numb one’s conscience, leading to more antisocial behavior.

Recent literature has clearly charted the growth of pawn credit in nineteenth-century developing countries in Europe. Such expansion has frequently been associated with governments’ concerns to prevent malpractice and promote the establishment of public agencies that mirrored the Italian Monti di pietà. Precisely at the time modernizing European societies adopted the model of Italian public pawn banks, Monti were being dismissed as a relic of a bygone age in their home country. Assembling and comparing data from an 1896 national survey, we conclude that, contrary to traditional assumptions, Italian pawn banks were not obsolete or out of place in the European context of nineteenth-century pawn credit. However, ideology and hostile legislation did hamper the access to credit of those most in need, and the choice hardly assisted the modernizing spurt of Italian society.

Defined benefit pension plans are an important and unexplored aspect of not-for-profit compensation, covering between 15% and 21% of the estimated national not-for-profit workforce. Here we consider whether pension contributions and actuarial assumptions are mechanisms for achieving not-for-profit financial management objectives such as smoothing consumption, managing reported net earnings, and minimizing pension liabilities. The empirical results indicate a variety of these behaviors. Not-for-profit pension plan sponsors use accumulated net assets to smooth consumption. Further, not-for-profits manage reported profits downwards when they exceed expectations by increasing pension contributions, but both minimize contributions and liberalize actuarial assumptions when they underperform relative to their desired earnings targets.

This article analyses the success of the Bordeaux Mont-de-Piété between 1801 and 1913. This success was related to several factors. While the legislative environment was already advantageous (monopoly status for pawnbroking), the establishment prospered courtesy of the social and economic environment. There was indeed high social demand for financial aid linked to the individual needs of a population that found itself in a situation of virtual exclusion. The establishment also benefited from high repayment rates, which limited additional costs, regularly found ways to refinance its operations and took advantage of there being no people's banking system.

This study estimates two multi-product cost functions for the entire population of 773 Flemish secondary schools supplying a six-year study program. From the estimated parameters of a quadratic and a generalised translog cost function the degree of ray and product specific (dis)economies of scale as well as the degree of (dis)economies of scope is determined. The paper also describes how marginal costs and cost elasticities can be derived. Three major study fields can be distinguished. Student loads in each of these study fields are used as output variables. Evidence is found for ray economies of scale and global economies of scope. Especially in technical education product specific economies of scale could be realised. Cost savings by supplying two study fields jointly (pairwise scope effects) are also considerable.