This chapter theorises the embodiment of timbral gesture in electronic dance music (EDM) as a convergence point between the vexed categories of affect and meaning. It is argued that timbre is inseparable from gesture in the listening experience and that the embodiment of synthesised gestures affords listeners new ways of experiencing their body-minds by exercising their perceptual agency through sonic prosthesis. In social EDM settings, the heightened potential for entrainment to both the music and other co-participants, together with the established role of entrainment in facilitating social bonding, suggests that the timbral gestures of EDM could be key to fostering intersubjectivity among those present. Considering this, the imaginative embodiment of timbral gestures is shown to constitute a necessary first step towards the communal rationalisation of the EDM experience and the social emergence of musical meaning.

Several prominent Anglo-American philosophers – the concept theorists, as I shall call them – argue that to engage rationally in inquiry, one must grasp and apply non-linguistic entities called concepts, which, when properly combined, yield non-linguistic entities called propositions, or thoughts that are true or false. Arguments of this sort have a long history that extends at least as far back as Plato. What is distinctive of theorizing about concepts since the late 1930s, however, is its reliance on methods of metalinguistic semantic analysis first devised by Alfred Tarski. My goals in this chapter are to explain this reliance and to reconstruct and evaluate a small but representative selection of the most influential philosophical views on concepts since 1945.

Wittgenstein was associated with conceptual analysis and it is widely presumed that that there is a Wittgensteinian account of concepts, yet sustained treatments of the topic in his work are difficult to find. My contribution shows that this irony is more apparent than real. Wittgenstein discussed concepts at some length in material from the early 1930s and manuscripts and lectures from his final period. On that basis I discuss Wittgenstein’s answers to five crucial questions about concepts – concerning their definition, possession, individuation, function and how best to investigate their nature. Wittgenstein and thinkers who influenced or were influenced by him (Frege, Dummett, Peacock) have contributed substantially to our understanding of concepts in two ways: first, methodological reflections on how to approach philosophically contested concepts, the concept of a concept included; secondly, elucidation of the nature and role of concepts through their connections with linguistic meaning, explanation, understanding, abilities and rules.

Conceptual engineering is, prima facie, the engineering of concepts. But what are concepts? And in what sense, if any, can they be engineered? In this chapter I introduce conceptual engineering and then distinguish three different understandings of concepts. The first, prevalent in parts of cognitive science, is the psychological account, which sees concepts as psychologically real cognitive structures in individuals’ minds. The second, with historical connections to the pragmatism of Carnap, is the semantic account, which sees concepts as semantic meanings determined by conventional principles of use. The third, rooted in Frege’s rationalism and in anti-individualism, is the representationalist account, which sees concepts as publicly accessible components of thought, determined ultimately not by use but by direct relations between individuals and the world. Disagreements over the nature, target and possible implementation of conceptual engineering are, I will claim, ultimately grounded in the more fundamental disagreement over the nature of concepts.

Abstract: In this chapter, Waks examines John Dewey’s concept of growth in Human Nature and Conduct (1922) and its relation to the good. Growth, for Dewey, is not biological or economic but an evolving moral and intellectual responsiveness to changing circumstances. Dewey defines morality as the “growth of conduct in meaning,” linking ethical life to an expanding awareness of action’s conditions and consequences. As Waks shows, Dewey argues that meaning develops through experience as habits are reconstructed in response to feedback. Conduct, unlike mere behavior, involves conscious ends-in-view, and growth occurs when experience expands our meanings – that is, deepens our understanding of how means connect to our ends. Waks distinguishes between proto-meanings in instinctual behavior and the fully articulated meanings made possible by language. Dewey defines the good as the expansion of meaning resulting from the resolution of conflicting impulses into a unified course of action, rejecting moral absolutism in favor of norms shaped by lived experience. Waks concludes by connecting personal growth with democracy as a moral ideal. The good person, in this view, is one who adapts, learns, and creatively responds to new social challenges and freely communicates with others – that is, the person with a democratic personality.

Following a socially embedded approach to the study of corruption, this chapter shows how corruption, its meaning, and the battle against it are deeply local and temporal. Relying primarily on original party documents and news reports, this chapter traces the chronological order of anti-corruption practices between 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was established, and 2020 to illustrate how the meanings of corruption, types of misbehavior to address, and the type of selected punishment were all articulated temporally.

This chapter lays out two key tasks in reading Scripture that Augustine identifies in the Confessions, and especially in his exegesis of Genesis: “the task of grasping meaning” and “the task of grasping truth.” The first task is that of discerning authorial intention; the second is that of “seeing for oneself that what the author is saying is in fact the case.” The task of grasping meaning is difficult in part because of the peculiar character of the Scriptures; they are both accessible to all, using ordinary language (which is open to misinterpretation), and yet full of profundities that only the wisest readers can come to appreciate. It is also difficult because we cannot really know what is in another person’s mind; any judgments about authorial intention are provisional at best, and only pride would claim to have identified the uniquely correct interpretation. The task of grasping truth is likewise difficult. When it comes to intelligible realities, Truth speaks inwardly, not through any text, even that of Scripture. When it comes to historical realities, including the central truths about the life of the Incarnate Word, we cannot have knowledge in the fullest sense.

How we transform our memories and experiences into fiction beyond the injunction to ‘write what you know’. The imaginative process includes filling in the gaps of memory, embracing the freedom to invent, selecting a viewpoint and adding energy through dialogue. We need to consider not only which details and descriptions to include but which to omit: the balancing of information affects the meaning and impact of the story.

The chapter begins with a reconstruction of Kant’s conception of the relationship between thought and language, which aims to highlight its novelty and distinctiveness, especially in relation to the Wolffian tradition, as well as its affinity with Herder’s view. The analysis then focuses on Kant’s conception of the relation between word and concept in order to show how Kant abandons the ‘auxiliary model’ in favor of an inextricable, essential relation between word and concept. He identifies the particular cognitive force of the word in its nonrepresentational, nondepictional character and its consequent extrinsic relation to the imagination. The issue of how the meaning of empirical concepts/words arises is then addressed. A crucial role is played by the theory of Merkmale (marks): they allow a transition from intuitive traits to the concept and grant the possibility of the original relation of mere designation between the word and its object. On this basis, the process of gradual acquisition of meaning then takes place. The latter yields the synthetic enrichment and correction of the concept. This process is guided by the general transcendental framework that make it possible to identify a phenomenon ‘x’ to be referred to by means of designation.

Chapter 14 examines international legitimacy as a system of reference that influences how actors (primarily states and individuals) experience meaning in the international sphere and, to some degree, at the national level. As a way to unpack what to understand in how a sense of legitimacy can function as a reference and framework of meaning in an international system, this chapter focuses on three points: how the start of an international order can impact its legitimacy, which leads me to argue that it can happen in three ways: force, negotiation, and a combination of the two, each of these ways having an impact on how the sense of legitimacy of international order is perceived; how, once in place, the sense of legitimacy in an international system influences actors (their behavior, identity and values); and how the scope and depth of legitimacy internationally can vary with time and circumstances.

Attachment theory offered a solution to a long-term problem in developmental psychology; namely, the lack of evidence for stability in behavior from infancy to later life. What turned out to be essential was to focus on the emotional quality of early relationships. “Security,” or confidence in the availability and responsiveness of caregivers, is what predicted later functioning. Such “trust” becomes the core for building an organized system of meaning. Assessing the history of responsiveness, the quality of the attachment, and later child and adult outcomes, all hinge on attending to the meaning of behavior. None of this works without that. This work leads to a new understanding of how human development is organized.

The emerging awareness of self and other, especially with regard to compatible and conflicting aims, opens up dramatic new meanings for the toddler. Being able to be deliberately contrary gives the child experience with disruption and repair of the relationship and lets them explore the boundaries of appropriate behavior. The toddler also has a beginning capacity to control impulses and manage behavior, but doing this adequately requires continued scaffolding and guidance from parents. Meanings surrounding parental reliability brought forward from infancy impact how readily children now accept parental guidance. At the same time, clear, firm, and warm guidance can increase the child’s confidence regarding parents. This is how the transactional model works.

From cradle to grave human beings actively strive to abstract meaning from experience. The meaning making capacity builds step-by-step, beginning in the earliest years. At each phase of life, new capacities emerge and previous limitations in meaning making can be overcome. By adolescence all of the basic tools for making meaning have been acquired. All that remains to be achieved is the wisdom that comes from accrued lived experience in the subsequent years. Increasingly, a narrative identity may be formed.