This Chapter will provide a detailed examination of IHL’s threshold of termination and is comprised of five substantive sections. The first section explores the temporal architecture of Common Article 3 (CA3) and Additional Protocol II (APII) to determine what, if anything, conventional IHL has to say about is threshold of termination during NIAC. The second section unpacks and critically examines four doctrinal approaches for determining the temporal scope of IHL during NIAC: the ‘peaceful settlement’ approach, the ‘lasting pacification’ approach, the ‘two-way ratchet’ theory, and the ‘human rights law’ approach. While each of these approaches possess certain advantages and limitations, it is argued that none produce entirely satisfactory results. For this reason, the third section revisits the logic that underpins and informs the theory and practice of IHL’s temporal scope during NIAC. Following from this analysis, the fourth  section proposes an alternative ‘functional approach for determining IHL’s threshold of termination during NIAC, and demonstrates the utility of the ‘functional approach’ over existing approaches by exploring its practical application to specific examples from the hostilities regime and the protections regime during NIAC.

This chapter, which is divided into four sections, examines the personal scope of IHL during NIAC by identifying the principal bearers of obligations and beneficiaries of protection. The first section analyses the conventional ratione personae architecture of both CA3 and APII to identify areas of convergence and divergence between the two and determine whether a single ratione personae framework exists for NIAC. The second section identifies the principal bearers of IHL obligations and explores how and when IHL creates obligations for both entities and individuals. The third section determines the primary beneficiaries of protections, with an exclusive focus on the concept of civilian during NIAC. The fourth section explores the relationship between obligations and protections by examining the phenomenon of intra-Party violence to determine whether and, if so under what conditions, IHL provides legal protection to non-opposing forces during NIAC.

Chapter 9 continues to explicate Machiavelli’s theory of the state in the Discorsi, showing how he avails himself of many of the conceptual materials whose place in his earlier thinking has now been observed. It illustrates how Machiavelli continues to conceptualize the state as a body and to understand the work of state formation as an aesthetic process which involves carefully shaping its human material, although he now tracks that process across the course of centuries in a complex account of the phenomenon of corruption within the career of the Roman state. The chapter also underlines how Machiavelli continues to insist that benefits are a powerful way of generating obligations to the state, although he is now noticeably more concerned about the effects of ingratitude upon beneficiaries who are prone to forget or renege upon their debts. And, as the chapter further emphasizes, he continues to maintain that those who hold office within the state should not be mistaken for representative figures in any capacity whatsoever. This point raises a fundamental problem in how to construe his overall theory: is the state a person as well as a body? The chapter culminates in an attempt to resolve this complex question.

This chapter distinguishes solidarity as a legal concept (LS) from solidarity as a social practice (SP). It matters for our understanding of the law to reflect on how, when and why law is able to interact with solidaristic practices. Section 1.1 explores the distinction. Section 1.2 stresses the ubiquity of solidarity in the law, from the traditional private law understanding of obligatio in solidum, to solidarity as a cohesive social force, to solidarity as a source of state duties. Section 1.3 shows that, despite its omnipresence, solidarity is an underinvestigated legal concept. Section 1.4 offers a typology of interactions between SP and the law, to show the many ways in which legal scholars may relate to SP. I list several types of interaction, and object to one. I argue that law cannot command us to act solidaristically since solidarity presupposes an intimate form of identification with others. But law may disrupt solidarities, sometimes in morally justified ways; it may compensate for the failing solidarity, recognizing and integrating it; and it may foster solidarity by its status-generative function, albeit merely in an indirect and not often controllable way.

The late ancient rabbis of Roman Palestine (ca. 2nd–5th centuries ce) are properly included in a history of rights despite the absence from their literatures of a discrete term for “rights.” Nearly a century ago, Dr. Isaac Herzog introduced “rights” as among the “fundamental concepts” requiring examination early in the first volume of his The Main Institutions of Jewish Law, which surveys and analyzes Jewish law sources from the rabbinic period through early modernity. Herzog observes that “‘Right’ and its correlative ‘duty’ are fundamental concepts in law” without which “law would be unthinkable.” He draws inter alia on John Salmond in defining a “right” as “an interest recognised and protected by a rule of right” and “any interest respect for which is a duty and the disregard of which is a wrong.” By way of illustration, Herzog observes that if A owes money to B, then B has a right against A to recover the debt. Herzog proclaims it “self-evident” that “these elemental concepts are present in Jewish law” while observing that the “ancient sources” lack terms corresponding to English law’s “right” and “duty.”

In terms of social and legal history, Ptolemaic Egypt is the best known of the Hellenistic kingdoms, as the dry sand conserved an abundance of papyri for centuries. Its multi-ethnic population and the combination of ancient Egyptian, Persian, and Greek cultural elements make it an even more interesting case study. A direct equivalent to the modern concept of rights probably did not exist in Ptolemaic Egypt, even if there is discussion around the terms used. Aspects of the concept of rights can be traced at different levels of intensity. Rights and duties in the sense of obligation deriving either from contract or violations of other persons or their belongings are found in hundreds of contracts, petitions, claims, or court proceedings in Greek as well as in Egyptian contexts. Beyond this two-person relationship, more abstract rights over things and persons are found relative to property, paternal authority, or slavery, which are all sometimes categorized as absolute rights today. On the other hand, to assume rights in the sense of liberties of an individual against the state or of legal power within the state is probably anachronistic.

This chapter examines the obligations and responsibilities for protecting human rights and it does so by focusing mainly on ways in which states and other entities contribute to the violation of human rights standards. One of the major questions addressed here is whether the human rights obligations of states end at their territorial borders, or whether they also have extraterritorial obligations as well.

This chapter discusses laws and arrangements that impose obligations upon intermediaries to achieve some protection of clients involved in financial product transactions. We have already encountered some intermediaries who provide financial services in Chapter 17—the brokers who participate in the ASX markets. However intermediaries are usually involved in transactions involving financial products, so the range of people who are involved in, or who can influence financial product transactions is much wider and clearly includes financial advisers. Now we examine how the activities of some people in this diverse group are regulated to achieve a measure of investor protection.

The question of regulation of financial advice and financial services has been contentious in Australia over the last two decades. Following several large financial collapses, it is now recognised that the quality of financial advice in Australia is often poor, particularly to retail and other non-professional investors.

This chapter explores the intricate legal concepts of co-ownership and neighbour relations under Chinese property law. The first section delves into co-ownership, explaining its categories: co-ownership by shares and common ownership. It discusses the rights and obligations of co-owners, the management of co-owned property and the legal remedies available for disputes. The chapter highlights how co-ownership can be established through contracts, partnerships and familial relationships, and examines how these relationships influence the management and division of property.

The second section focuses on neighbour relations, covering the concept and content of neighbour rights. It outlines the principles governing these rights, such as facilitating production and ensuring convenient living while balancing fairness and reasonableness. The chapter discusses the impact of civil customs on neighbour relations, providing case studies to illustrate how local practices influence legal decisions. By examining these elements, the chapter provides a comprehensive overview of how co-ownership and neighbour relations are regulated, emphasising the importance of harmony and co-operation in property management and dispute resolution.

This chapter focuses on the 1970s and 1980s during which MacCormick confronted and developed his political philosophy, with a special focus on the essays that were collected in Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982). This includes how MacCormick crafted a middle space between liberalism and socialism, which he called ‘social democracy’. It also includes MacCormick’s work, in this period, on obligations and rights. This chapter discusses the sense in which this conceptual work can be read with character, e.g., how his concepts of obligation and rights relate to his basic commitment to respect for persons (including a concern for the temporally-extended quality of relations between persons). It also places this philosophical work in the context of the politics of the period, e.g., the SNP’s own eventual endorsement of a social democratic platform, and it discusses how MacCormick’s political interventions in this period (e.g., his actions with respect to the’79 Group) can also be understood as expressions and negotiations of his character. Overall, the chapter explores how MacCormick’s character is expressed and negotiated in his role as a jurist, making law as morally intelligible as he could, seeking to limit executive power legally, and also diffusing and decentralising power as much as possible.

Chapter 11 focuses on ancient ‘contracts’, with specific reference to commerce, property and other economic activities for which there is relevant evidence. The chapter begins with urbanization in southern Mesopotamia in the fourth millennium bce, bringing together archaeological, material and written evidence in order to introduce a broad working idea of ‘contracts’. The next section moves on to a discussion of technical ancient terms and concepts, noting the ‘considerable terminological instability in the common English translations of the original terms’. The following section turns to ‘contracts’ between states, whilst the next develops a comparative analysis of ‘oaths in interpersonal agreements’. The following two sections analyse specific questions surrounding the use of writing and ’the contract of sale’, noting that there is surviving evidence for the use of (different forms of) contacts of sale across every ancient legal system. The chapter concludes by drawing together a set of generalized conceptions of ‘contract’ and briefly suggesting that long-distance trade - among other factors - may lie behind some of the similarities - for example the use of seals - evident across the extant ancient evidence.

This Handbook brings together a global team of private law experts and computer scientists to examine the interface between private law and AI, which includes issues such as whether existing private law can address the challenges of AI and whether and how private law needs to be reformed to reduce the risks of AI while retaining its benefits.

Whether AI should be given legal personhood should not be framed in binary terms. Instead, this issue should be analysed in terms of a sliding-scale spectrum. On one axis, there is the quantity and quality of the bundle of rights and obligations that legal personhood entails. The other axis is the level of the relevant characteristics that courts may include in conferring legal personhood.

The theory of law put forward in this book is founded on the idea of interdependence. Interdependence generates goods taking the form of a community. In law a community involves common legal obligations pertaining to goods. The WTO Agreement establishes a “club good.” Its essence is the equality of opportunity for economic operators in members’ markets. These legal arrangements have given rise to enormous networks of global supply and value chains. At the same time, however, they have generated unease at de-industrialization and exposed critical vulnerabilities. Whereas at the time of the WTO’s founding in 1995 the unconditional interdependence called for in the WTO Agreement might have been regarded as beneficial, today it is seen as less so. Consequently, the club good of the organization appears to be splintering into individual goods composed of specific trading relationships. Consequently, support for the organization and its dispute settlement system has ebbed. Nevertheless, there appears to be recognition of residual worth in the WTO Agreement and its dispute settlement system, which may continue to serve as a locus for transformative solutions.