In democracies, electoral mandates are meant to shape public policy. But how much leeway do elected representatives actually have to implement it? Influential scholars think that (horizontal and vertical) institutional hurdles, budget constraints and political pressure dilute mandate responsiveness, but empirical evidence for this important claim remains scarce. This article provides a theoretical model and an empirical account of the extent to which different types of constraints limit the capacity of governing parties to set their electoral priorities on the agenda. Using fixed‐effects Poisson regression on German electoral and legislative priorities over a period of over three decades (1983–2016), we conclude that policies reflect electoral priorities to a greater extent than scholarship has acknowledged so far. We do confirm, however, the constraining effects of Europeanization, shrinking budget leeway, intra‐coalition disagreement and low executive popularity. We elaborate on the implications for theories of public policy, democratic representation and comparative politics.

In recent years, scholars have observed that political parties’ policy positions frequently fit the preferences of well‐to‐do voters better than those of the less well‐to‐do; a phenomenon known as policy congruence inequality. While the existence of inequality in policy congruence is well‐established, we currently only have a modest understanding of the causes of it. We develop an argument proposing that the political mobilisation of citizens with low socioeconomic status (SES) both in the parliamentary channel, in the form of high turnout, and in the extra‐parliamentary channel, in the form of high union density, is pivotal. Both high turnout and union density force parties to pay more attention to the preferences of the disadvantaged, thereby creating lower policy congruence inequality. To test the argument, we have collected and harmonised election surveys and party manifestos covering 90 elections in Australia, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, covering several decades until today, yielding more than 120,000 voter–party dyads. Employing this new dataset, our results confirm that the political mobilisation of citizens with low SES is a strong predictor of policy congruence inequality. This finding nuances the conclusion of extant research by showing that low‐SES citizens are not always on the losing side politically. It also implies the important role of maintaining or maybe even increasing turnout and union membership among the disadvantaged in society. Places where either turnout or union density is slipping in these years are likely to witness further increases in policy congruence inequality in the years to come.

Leaders and members of parliament serve as a political party's public face. Their image casts a shadow in which observers interpret policy statements. It is hypothesized in this article that media cover and voters understand policy messages through the lens of prominent party members’ characteristics. Easy-to-observe descriptive traits, such as gender or ethnicity, cue parties’ policy priorities. Media are more likely to emphasise party messages on issues historically related to these groups when they are visible in the party's public image. Hypotheses from this theory are tested using data on prominent party members’ descriptive characteristics, policy statements and media coverage of statements from the European Election Studies. Data from the 1999, 2004 and 2009 European elections evidence support for the theory. Parties with more female representatives signal stronger emphasis on gendered issues in media reports. The results hold implications for understanding the ways in which parties deliver and voters receive campaign messages. This research offers an explanation for voters’ limited knowledge of parties’ policy positions; media reinforce existing gender stereotypes and voters’ predispositions by selectively reporting policy statements.

Here I recount my experience as a three-term Senator of the Italian Republic between 1983 and 1996. It is a personal memoir written with a modest dose of self-praise and nostalgia. I have tried to explain how the Italian parliament works, to analyse the relationships between parliamentarians and parties, with special emphasis on the Italian Communist Party, whose voters sent me to the Senate, and to indicate what I have contributed and what I have learned. For better or worse, throughout that long period, I remained a professor of political science. Hence, I have also made reference to those of my writings that have been directly influenced by my experience of ‘real’ politics, as well as to my efforts to influence ‘real’ politics. Much has changed in Italian politics and my experience, which could not be repeated today, suggests that not much has changed positively.

In this article, I address the problem of party attitudes towards European integration and show its relevance for research on Europeanisation. I discuss the interaction between domestic parties and the European issue and propose a framework for the analysis of two alternative arguments: either Europe as an issue has been internalised by party systems and absorbed into the main patterns of party competition or, alternatively, Europe has had a disruptive impact on party systems and even resulted in forms of ‘de-partification’.

Recent studies have drawn attention to the political contingencies of the media's political agenda‐setting influence, finding, for instance, that issues from the media agenda are more likely to attract attention if a party enjoys ownership of the issue. Supplementing the debate on why political parties respond to news, it is argued in this article that ownership is only part of the picture and that policy responsibility, together with news tone, constitutes a stronger explanation of news politicisation. Opposition parties respond to bad news because they reflect negative developments in social problems for which the government could be held responsible. The government responds to good news that reflects positive developments in social problems because this could politicise policy success, but is also forced to react when news explicitly address government responsibility and thereby threatens its image as responsive and competent. Furthermore, it is shown that news tone and policy responsibility condition the incentive to politicise owned issues from the media agenda. Thus, opposition parties will not politicise owned issues when news is good because this could draw attention to government success, while government is unable and unwilling to prioritise owned issues when news is bad and instead is likely to make use of its ownership strengths when news is good and the pressure to respond is low. The arguments are tested on a large‐N sample of radio news stories from Denmark (2003–2004). Opposition response is measured through parliamentary questions spurred by the news stories, while government response is indicated by references to these stories in the prime minister's weekly press meeting. Results confirm the expectations, suggesting that parties care more about the tone of news stories and the type of attention they might produce, rather than what type of issues they could serve to politicise.

How does gender shape patterns of parliamentary speechmaking? We theorize and test three types of effects. The direct effect posits that female MPs speak less than their male peers. The access effect claims that the feminization of parliaments and parties is associated with higher gender bias in speech levels. The career effect foresees a greater gender bias in speech levels among MPs holding positions of power. Drawing on parliamentary speeches in South Africa (1999–2024), where high rates of female representation coexist with sexist norms and practices, we find evidence for all three effects. Female MPs make fewer speeches, and the growing feminization of institutions and the appointment of female MPs to leadership roles are not sufficient to reverse entrenched gender biases against women. Our findings highlight the need to go beyond the politics of presence and focus on the informal mechanisms that hinder women from performing their roles even when occupying positions of power.

This article examines the political dynamics behind Portugal’s 2019 Informal Caregiver Statute (ICS), focusing on how social movements influenced the policy process through political mediation. The statute was prompted by caregiver mobilisation and advanced in parliament by partisan allies, despite initial government resistance. The movement’s influence relied on a favourable political opportunity structure, supportive media and public opinion, and the strategic securing of political allies. However, parties integrated the movement’s demands with their own, often conflicting, agendas. In the end, key demands, such as caregiver allowances, pension credits for care work, and expanded public services, were only partially fulfilled. The ICS represents a broad yet limited compromise that reinforces the family’s role as the main care provider. This shift from ‘familism by default’ to ‘supported familism’ may ultimately hinder a transition to ‘optional familism’, which would frame care as a choice and necessitate a significant expansion of formal public services.