This article looks at how the Czech national identity is constructed in the print media, covering the November 17, 1989, anniversary commemorating the end of the communist rule in Czechoslovakia. It examines front-page articles published in the four most circulated nationwide dailies on November 18, 1999, and front-page articles published in the four most circulated nationwide dailies on November 18, 2019. It pays closer attention to two speeches repeatedly referred to in these articles — a speech by Václav Havel from 1999 and Andrej Babiš from 2019. The underlying research questions are whether the discourse of the 2019 coverage of the November 17 events is different and, more specifically, whether and how the construction of the Czech national identity in the media has changed. It draws theoretically on the work of Michel Foucault, Stuart Hall, Pierre Bourdieu, and Norman Fairclough in relation to concepts of power, discourse, and symbolic power. It adopts the constructionist approach to national identity, which it links to modernity and industrialization and draws on the works of Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Eric Hobsbawm in this regard. The research uses critical discourse analysis as its methodological tool, and briefly explains its use.

External forces have pushed Central-East Europe's nascent political science disciplines toward convergence: the European Union's educational policies, the funding and training activities of public and private Western players, most prominently the ‘Open Society’ institutes and organizations established by financier George Soros. However, considerable disparities persist regarding national and international cooperation, research quality, and representation of professional interests. These disparities are in large part explained by the fact that the institutionalization of political science has been stunted in places where ‘hybrid’, semi-autocratic political regimes have emerged.

This article discusses the thin socio-legal conceptualisation of the rule of law in Hungary. Employing a culturalist perspective, it first shows how the rule of law had a thin foundation prior to the Second World War in this country. Then, the contribution demonstrates how, contrary to previous understandings, even in the most advanced stages of rule of law building in Hungary, in the early 1990s, the resulting concept had been thin mainly focusing on institutional guarantees and legal certainty. The remaining part of the contribution then critically discusses whether and to what extent it is possible to use backsliding to frame the ongoing legal changes in Hungary.

The study addresses the absence of a comprehensive institutional analysis framework in the academic literature on state-minority relations. It does so by employing a framework of analysis based on Skocpol’s analysis of structural factors and Ostrom’s multi-level institutional analysis to understand the processes of radical and incremental institutional change. The article is empirically grounded in a case study of Roma communities in Slovakia. More specifically, it maps and analyzes the evolution and change of institutional frameworks of state-minority relations in the context of Roma communities in Slovakia from the 1960s to 2020. Drawing from archival materials, interview findings, and document analysis, this article shows how post-socialist Slovakia radically redefined and diversified its institutional framework for Roma communities at different institutional levels, which subsequently continued to change at an incremental pace. Overall, the study aspires to offer a more dynamic institutional approach to the study of state-minority relations, which are currently dominated by more static regime- and rights-based approaches, and to contribute with a prospectively useful framework for understanding the developments of state-minority relations in the broader post-Soviet space and beyond.

Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this article re-assesses ‘post-communist’ transformation in the Baltic countries from the perspective of labour. The argument is based on a historical materialist approach focusing on the social relations of production as a starting point. It is contended that the uneven and combined unfolding of ‘post-communist’ transformation has subjected Baltic labour to doubly constituted exploitation processes. First, workers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have suffered from extreme neoliberal restructuring of economic and employment relations at home. Second, migrant workers from Central and Eastern Europe in general, trying to escape exploitation at home, have faced another set of exploitative dynamics in host countries in Western Europe such as the UK. Nevertheless, workers have continued to challenge exploitation in Central and Eastern Europe and also in Western Europe, and have been active in extending networks of transnational solidarity across the continent.

From the year 2000 on, Chechen official international relations – called “paradiplomacy” – have centered around legitimacy-building, security cooperation and investment attraction, priorities set by the republic’s first official, pro-Russian president, Akhmat Kadyrov (in office 2000–2004). Kadyrov’s successors, Alu Alkhanov (2004–2007) and Ramzan Kadyrov (2007–to date) developed Grozny’s international engagements further, introducing new partners – such as China – and new dimensions to the external action – such as militarization. At each step, Grozny operated between full autonomy and collaboration with Moscow, involving itself in high-level diplomacy and furthering Moscow’s agenda abroad, primarily in the Middle East. In this article, I argue that Chechen paradiplomacy is an instrument for the inclusion of Chechnya into the governance structures of Russia’s federal order. The argument rests on two premises: Chechnya’s paradiplomacy is framed by the Kremlin’s proactive support and coordination, and Chechnya’s paradiplomacy is closely connected to the Kremlin’s security priorities. Since reincorporation, Chechen paradiplomacy has not been an addition to Russian federal relations but an intrinsic part of the post-2000 political arrangement between Grozny and Moscow. To empirically ground this argument, I trace the evolution of Chechen paradiplomacy across the three post-incorporation presidencies, ending in 2020.

For more than six years, Ukrainian society has been constantly searching for ideas as to how to write a new “national biography.” In a society divided by armed conflict, the so-called decommunization process is considered to be an idea capable of uniting a nation. This process started back in 2015, with the passing of a specific law that required not only the deconstruction of Soviet-time monuments in public spaces, but also a huge decommunization of place names. The article will explore the main practices of place (re-)naming during the different stages of the decommunization (but not de-ideologization) of spaces, as well as describing the problems that may emerge in society as a result of a rapid transition from one narrative to another. Based on a case study of spatial identities of internally displaced people, I am going to answer the question of how people perceive renamed spaces, and how they reclaim and re-appropriate these spaces in the midst of an identity crisis.

Previous research has either equated religion- and language-based group identities or asserted that their social effects are the same. This article proposes a novel differentiation between religious and ethnic self-identification that accounts for in-group income inequality and the social role of the group. The study argues that ethnicity-based identities tend to be associated with economic activities, thereby increasing the demand for income equality within such groups. Religious identities, on the contrary, are centered around noneconomic activities and have the ideological framework for reconciling material inequalities. The observable implication of this distinction is that the high-, low-, and middle-income categories of the multicultural society will display differential association with ethnic and religious identities. Ethnic groups will have lower in-group income inequality as a result of the exclusion of the poor and the departure of the rich. Religious groups, on the contrary, will have higher in-group income inequality due to the capacity of religion to accommodate both poor and rich. Relevant empirical tests from the ethnically and religiously diverse Russian North Caucasus region indicate support for the proposed theory.

This article situates the development of the kin-state politics literature within the context of post-Cold War scholarship on ethnicity, nationalism, and conflict. It outlines how an increasingly mature literature emerged around the domestic political and foreign policy drivers of kin-state politics as scholars drew from a number of perspectives, from the literature on irredentism to that on diaspora politics and transborder nationalism. The article then evaluates scholarship on the drivers and impacts of kin-state politics, with a focus on the consequences of kin-state politics for the cultural and political landscape of external kin communities and the impact on regional security and stability. While a rich and nuanced literature has helped to contextualize the tensions and complexities of the former, I argue that the latter needs to be developed further. Careful work needs to be done to more precisely establish the conditions under which kin-state politics constitute a security threat. Future scholarship should bring together a more ground level perspective of how kin-state policies are perceived, utilized, and/or instrumentalized by their intended subjects with a critical understanding of how the “game” of kin-state politics is played within the home state and the kin-state.

Poland's post-communist development is often depicted as a contrast between a unified, engaged society of pre-1989 and a passive, divisive society of post-1989. What explains the displacement of political solidarity with a fragmented political scene? A factor specific to Poland is rooted in the struggle of Solidarity against communist power. The consequences are subsequent attempts to appropriate the values of Solidarność as political capital by competing political voices, leading to contestation about the nature of the country. This normative discourse was evident first in the post-communist divide, between forces stemming from the former communist regime and those affiliated with the opposition. More recently, the saliency of the post-communist division has receded, and a new contested discourse has surfaced among voices coming out of the Solidarity tradition. This rhetoric seeks to define a contrast between a “Solidaristic Poland” dedicated to traditional and Christian values affirming notions of exclusivity and superiority, and a “liberal Poland” dedicated to market and pluralist principles based on competition and individualism. In both political divides, the legacy of Solidarity provides useful political capital to advance distinctive visions of Poland.