In one view, scientific explanation depends on laws, and generalizations in psychiatry let us explain the symptoms of individual patients. These generalizations might themselves be explained by being subsumed under further generalizations. Insofar as individual, idiosyncratic aspects of the patient’s behavior cannot be subsumed under laws, they cannot be scientifically explained. In contrast, though, the psychiatric interview, one of the basic data points for psychiatry, may include the therapist using idiosyncratic details of the patient’s delusions and working through the way in which one stage in the patient’s psychological history generated another. This involves understanding how one thing caused another, but there seems to be no subsumption under laws. Campbell proposes we think of causal explanation in psychiatry as not solely law based but as giving weight to the idea of the patient’s illness over time as a single construct, unfolding in accordance with general patterns. The role of generalizations in psychiatry is to define those constructs that develop over time. Nonetheless, the idiosyncratic detailed causal development of those progressions can be understood at a subjective level by the therapist following the patient’s line of thought and feeling as the disorder develops.

This chapter seeks to examine and further clarify the relationship between two main conceptual approaches to causality in psychiatric research: counterfactual and mechanistic. The author suggests that psychiatry may pose some relatively unique challenges for causal inference not shared with other branches of medicine. At their core, counterfactual approaches ask “what if” questions while mechanistic approaches ask “how” questions. The chapter also seeks to evaluate the Russo-Williamson Thesis for psychiatric research, which argues that causal inference requires evidence of counterfactual and mechanistic causal effects, by examining three research papers that examine causal effects on psychiatric disorders. Two of these are from epidemiological samples and employ counterfactual methods, and one is from molecular genetics and molecular neuroscience and utilizes a mechanistic approach. Kendler argues that these two methods are complementary and often mutually reinforcing. In particular, the demonstration of counterfactual evidence of causation naturally raises the question of how such an effect occurs at a mechanistic level. However, the author suggest that the Russo-Williamson Thesis is too high a threshold for psychiatry and that, in at least some cases, high-quality counterfactual evidence can be actionable.

This introduces the key themes of Spirituality in Mind, including the concept of entanglement and the importance of attentiveness as both a spiritual practice and a clinical skill. Whereas many books on psychiatry by psychiatrists emphasise controversies and fears, the intention here is to focus on spirituality as casting light on what patients most desire. This book is different from other books on spirituality and psychiatry by virtue of engagement with the humanities (especially theology and religious studies), its concern with the ‘ordinary theology’ of patients and its attention to the invisible assumptions of pragmatic atheism. This does not mean that atheists or agnostics are less likely to be spiritually attentive than those who are spiritual/religious (not infrequently the reverse may be true) and the situated perspective of the author, and of all psychiatrists, is highlighted. An outline of the book as a whole is provided, some clarifications are given in regard to vocabulary (notably in respect of ‘patients’ and ‘theology’) and general remarks are made concerning the clinical case studies.

This explores the phenomenon of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) as an example of entanglements of spirituality and psychopathology, and looks at ‘spiritually significant voices’ (identified by those who hear them as having spiritual/religious significance). Some have proposed making a differential diagnosis between ‘genuine’ spiritual experiences and mental illness, but the criteria for making such distinctions can be controversial and misleading, based on a false presupposition that the two are mutually exclusive. Research shows that patients identify some experiences as both part of an illness and spiritually significant. Patients with a psychiatric diagnosis are often subjected to epistemic injustice, wherein their claim to know things (e.g. spiritually) is discredited owing to prejudice associated with their diagnosis. A case study explores entanglement of spirituality with AVHs and considers implications for assessment/treatment. Voices of this kind may be meaningful for those who hear them, whether or not associated with a diagnosis, and affirmation of this and patients’ positive spiritual coping, where possible, can be a positive factor in promoting recovery.

The spirituality of the psychiatrist is important because of the way that it may impact the well-being of the psychiatrist, clinical practice and the understanding of psychiatry more widely. In some cases, it may influence a psychiatrist’s sense of vocation to be a psychiatrist. The case study in this chapter draws on the author’s own experience of the ways in which spirituality and formation as a psychiatrist were entangled during training. Three historical examples are offered of different ways in which religion and psychiatry might be entangled in the life, work and thought of psychiatrists: a pragmatic atheism (Maudsley), religion understood as pathology (Freud) and religion as beneficial to mental flourishing (Jung). Three more recent examples are then considered, one of a Christian attempt to integrate theology and psychiatry (Frank Lake), one of reflections on how Buddhism influences practice as a psychiatrist (Mark Epstein) and one of a personal encounter of a psychiatrist with shamanism (Olga Kharitidi).

A case study of a patient diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder demonstrates the entanglements of phenomenology of spirituality and psychopathology, and the implications of failing to properly understand the importance of these entanglements when planning treatment. The concepts of entanglement, pragmatic atheism, spirituality and religion are introduced. Spirituality and religion are both complex and contested concepts which elude simple definition, but a person-centred holistic model of psychiatry requires giving attention to the whole person, ‘body, mind and spirit’. The biopsychosocial model does not explicitly address spirituality, but spirituality is entangled with the biological, psychological and social aspects of the matrix. The chapter discusses the secular context within which psychiatry is generally seen to be practised (at least in the Western world), the perceived tension between science and religion that it often evokes, the nature of psychiatry as concerned with the study and treatment of mental illnesses, and the way in which these illnesses affect our self-understanding and identity as human beings.

This illustrates the theme of patient-centred spirituality by way of two case studies: one of a clinical encounter of the author with a patient in which neither spirituality nor religion was explicitly mentioned, and another in which the author was asked to see a patient because of a specifically religious concern. The first of these is interpreted in light of the work on spirituality in psychotherapy undertaken by Jeremy Holmes who, in turn, takes up the thinking of Donald Winnicott about transitional space. Spirituality is concerned with an ability to adopt a viewpoint outside oneself and to develop humility and a ‘negative capability’. The published views of patients suggest that spirituality/religion are explicitly important to many, even in a secular country like the UK, and that they would like them to be taken into account in treatment. It is proposed that there is ‘no such thing as a patient’, only encounters between human beings, one of whom is professionally identified as a physician (psychiatrist) and one as a patient. The authenticity of the human encounter, albeit within certain professional constraints, forms the basis for an effective therapeutic alliance.

It is proposed that spirituality and psychiatry, commonly held to be separate concerns, are in fact deeply entangled and inseparable. Meaning-making, an important concern of spirituality, is important to human well-being and needs to be taken more seriously by psychiatry. The damage done by historical antagonisms between psychiatry and religion needs to be undone by affirmation of spiritual concerns within psychiatric practice and by closer partnerships between psychiatry and faith communities. Professional boundaries need to be understood not as protecting psychiatry as secular space (which many religious patients find hostile to their spiritual concerns) but as protecting safe therapeutic space within which psychological recovery and spiritual growth may occur. Psychiatrists need to develop an interest in clinical theology, as a way of understanding the ordinary theological concerns of patients (including their ‘atheologies’). Psychiatry needs to be more spiritually attentive – to shed light on what patients desire spiritually and psychologically – rather than focussing only on the metaphorical shadows of psychopathology. Psychiatry needs to keep spirituality in mind.

Psychiatrists have responded nationally and internationally to the growing scientific evidence on spirituality and psychiatry and to concerns about bad professional practice, by developing good practice guidelines/policies and by way of continuing professional development initiatives (special interest groups, conferences, etc.). Professional boundaries have historically been understood as keeping psychiatry, as a secular concern, separate from patients’ spiritual and religious concerns. However, as earlier chapters demonstrated, this is unrealistic in light of the entanglements of spirituality and psychiatry, and unlikely to be helpful for many patients. It does not address the importance of religion to patients worldwide or the transition in Western countries from a secular to a post-secular age. The Jungian concept of temenos is taken up as a way of understanding boundaries as protecting safe therapeutic spaces for psychological and spiritual transformation. Boundaries in clinical practice are thus created not to keep the psychological and spiritual domains separate but to protect a safe psychological and spiritual space within which positive therapeutic change may occur.

Broader debates about possible ways of addressing the tensions between science and theology/religion have not often been applied to psychiatry, and yet it is to a large extent scientific research on spirituality and mental health over recent decades that has generated current interest in the importance of spirituality to psychiatry. The four models of relationship between science and religion, developed by Ian Barbour – conflict, independence, dialogue and integration – each have their correlates in the literature on spirituality and psychiatry. However, in clinical practice it is the ‘ordinary’ theology of patients that assumes greater importance than the formal, or academic, theology of philosophical debate. As an example of the importance of a kind of ordinary theology which has been subjected to scientific research, the concept of God images is explored. It is proposed that, in the course of assessment and treatment, a kind of ‘clinical theology’ is needed, in which psychiatrists take into account inner representations of God and other ordinary theological beliefs which inform understanding of a patient’s illness and spirituality.

Psychological therapies are another focus for entanglement with spirituality. Prayer has caused concern in the literature, particularly in respect of boundary issues arising when clinicians pray with patients, but the nature of prayer is explored here rather as a way of giving attention to things that are most desired. Scientific evidence suggests that prayer is a form of positive religious coping for patients. Mindfulness, with its roots in Buddhism, is widely applied as a secular spiritual intervention that is helpful in a range of mental health conditions. Silence has long been recognised as a significant and meaningful phenomenon within psychotherapy, but also has its place in contemplative spiritual practices. A theme running through these three practices is that of careful attentiveness, in which spiritual and psychological concerns become entangled. Good clinical practice requires careful attention-giving, so there is a sense in which treatment planning in psychiatry can be considered a kind of prayer, understood as careful attentiveness to what is most desired by patients. Examples are drawn from Christian, Islamic and Buddhist spirituality and practice.

Possession states are a complex phenomenon that takes a variety of different cultural and religious forms, which may or may not be associated with a psychiatric diagnosis. A case study demonstrates how demonic attributions may be employed as a form of negative religious coping and may lead to spiritual struggles. It illustrates the importance of understanding theological/religious context of belief in spirit possession and the difficulties of reaching a psychiatric diagnosis when the patient belongs to a faith community that understands such experiences as spiritually determined and not symptomatic of illness. Possession states are considered unusual in the UK and yet they are very common worldwide. Exorcism (or disobsession or spirit release) has in some contexts been proposed as an appropriate (if controversial) psychiatric treatment. While, in appropriate religious/cultural contexts, it can be helpful, there is also evidence that it can be harmful when applied in the wrong way to patients with certain diagnoses. This raises important questions about collaboration with faith leaders, safeguarding those who are vulnerable and not pathologising culturally normative practices.

The seven decades of Allen Ginsberg’s life and poetic work coincided with major changes in societies’ approaches to the mentally ill. Mid century, near rock-bottom in this difficult evolution, Allen burst onto the scene with “Howl” and then “Kaddish”. Allen’s shocking and monumental works said we need to face mental illness and madness, stop seeing them as apart from ourselves, find spiritual meaning, take risks, and make major changes to humanize our approaches. With the approval of Allen and later his estate, I could conduct new research to bring us closer to Allen and Naomi’s lifelong involvement with madness and mental illness and why it matters in relation to his poetry. The result was Best Minds: How Allen Ginsberg Made Revolutionary Poetry from Madness (2023). Allen’s radical acceptance of madness as a basic and potentially beneficial human capacity was far ahead of his time in inviting readers to change how we understand and engage with madness and mental illness.

This review article explores the legislative differences across Canadian jurisdictions with respect to involuntary admission and treatment pending appeal. Some jurisdictions restrict involuntary admission for mental illness to when there is a risk for serious bodily harm or physical impairment. However, the majority of jurisdictions recognize non-bodily harms or substantial mental or physical deterioration as grounds for involuntary admission when other criteria are met. Once a person is involuntarily admitted, jurisdictions differ on how treatment is authorized and whether treatment can commence while a person contests a finding of incapacity to treatment to the courts. Some jurisdictions permit treatment pending appeal while others do not. This article compares Canadian jurisdictions’ mental health legislation and addresses discrepancies through the lens of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canada Health Act.

This article presents a comprehensive neuroethical framework that seeks to deepen our understanding of human consciousness and free will, particularly in the context of psychiatric and neurological disorders. By integrating insights from neuroscience with philosophical reflections on freedom and personal identity, the paper examines how various states of consciousness from interoception to self-awareness influence an individual’s autonomy and decision-making capabilities. The discussion utilizes a multidimensional, bottom-up approach to explore how neurobiological processes underlie different levels of conscious experience and their corresponding types of freedom, such as “intero-freedom” related to internal bodily states and “self-freedom” associated with higher self-awareness. This stratification reveals the profound impact of neurological conditions on patients’ freedom of choice and the ethical implications therein. The insights gained from this analysis aim to inform more tailored and effective treatments for psychiatric patients, emphasizing the restoration of autonomy and respect for their inherent dignity. This work underscores the essential unity of the human person through the lens of neuroethics, advocating for healthcare policies that recognize and enhance the personal freedom of those with mental health challenges.

This article, titled “A Unified Understanding of the Human Mind - A Neuroethical Perspective,”examines the evolution of the concept of the human mind in Western thought and its integration with neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, and relational dimensions. The author explores how the understanding of the mind has changed over time, influenced by shifts in philosophical paradigms, scientific advancements, and societal perspectives. The article traces the historical development of the mind’s concept, starting from ancient Greece, through influential thinkers like Plato and René Descartes, and progressing to contemporary perspectives. It highlights various philosophical and scientific approaches, including structuralism, functionalism, empiricism, and associationism, which have shaped our understanding of the mind. The article also delves into contemporary integration, where advancements in neuroimaging and the rise of holistic approaches offer a more nuanced understanding of the human mind. The author emphasizes the importance of the relational dimension and the interconnectedness of mental processes, the brain, and the external environment. This integrated perspective can benefit psychiatric treatment and psychological assessments by fostering a holistic approach to mental health. In conclusion, the article advocates for a multidimensional perspective that bridges subjective and objective aspects of human experience, offering promise for theoretical knowledge and practical applications in psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience.