This chapter looks at the relationship between papyrology and race from a historical and disciplinary perspective. European imperialism, from Napoleon’s expedition onwards, enabled the legal and illegal transfer of a hundred thousand papyrus fragments from Egypt to Europe and North America. The process was sustained by White race supremacy ideas, which most scholars embraced, according to which Egyptians and their Ottoman ruling elite were incapable of appreciating the real meaning of antiquities, including manuscripts, putting at risk their preservation. The accumulation and archival of papyri in European and North American collections went hand in hand with a programmatic exclusion of Egyptians from studying the material and was functional to the creation of a new academic field, papyrology, controlled by White classicists. The chapter’s conclusion opens question about future directions, regarding both colonial collections and institutional inequality.

Chapter 6 analyses how legal procedures were included in the Paris Peace Treaties in order to solve one of the most sensitive and politically controversial questions of the post-war order: the payment of reparations from former Central Power governments or individuals to Allied individuals. In accordance with the peace treaties, 39 Mixed Arbitral Tribunals were established after 1920 to decide on private Allied claims for damages that had occurred during the war due to acts by former Central Power governments or individuals. The fact that an international court system permitted private individuals to raise claims against foreign governments was seen as a radical novelty; and even more so since tens of thousands of claimants throughout Europe and beyond attempted to receive compensation for claimed losses. From an Allied point of view, these new tribunals served justice, deemed to be at the core of the Paris Peace Treaties system. Yet, for the former Central Power governments, their legal advisers, and scholars, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals were nothing but elaborate examples of victor’s justice characterized by unclear competences and applicable law.

After the shallow stabilities of the mid 1920s, marked by Locarno and modest economic recovery, the Great Depression returned Europe to crisis. The Versailles order crumbled, from Stresemann’s western conciliation to national minority protections. Then, presaged by his predecessors’ burial of reparations and plans for rearmament, Hitler’s aggressively distinctive program unfolded: accelerated German restoration; economic autarky; racially defined Lebensraum in the east; heedless antisemitism. In response, Britain and France wavered. French policy oscillated among cynicism, fatalism, and confusion. Prioritizing imperial security, Britain decisively rearmed, aiming to counter Japan and Italy, while containing Hitler in western Europe. By 1937, under new Prime Minister Chamberlain, that approach solidified into “appeasement”: satisfying Hitler in eastern Europe would reduce Britain’s European obligations; free its ability to protect the Empire; create time to rearm. With the naivety of imperial arrogance, Chamberlain expected Hitler to be lastingly bought off. During the intensifying brinkmanship of 1937––1938, culminating in the Munich Conference, he followed that course to its end.

The rules of state responsibility are set out in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. This chapter introduces the basic features of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, beginning with an explanation of what constitutes an internationally wrongful act. It then discusses the circumstances precluding wrongfulness that may be invoked by states seeking to avoid responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The chapter then covers the aftermath of an internationally wrongful act, which can involve legal consequences, such as reparations, as well as countermeasures. This chapter focuses specifically on the responsibility of states, rather than the responsibility of international organizations or individuals.

Reparation programmes for redressing human rights harms form a central pillar of transitional justice. Reviews about the success of such programmes, however, remain mixed: in terms of outcomes, they often fail to meet the justice needs of affected populations; in terms of process, there is agreement about the importance of meaningful participation, but only a minimal understanding of how to carry this out effectively. To develop a sound theoretical framework to guide actors interested in developing reparations programmes, this chapter builds on the theory of relational justice to provide both an instrumental and legal justification for inclusive processes in the design, implementation, and evaluation of reparations programmes. We argue that reparative processes should be mindful of building and repairing relations, especially between affected populations and the government that failed to protect them. We conclude by proposing four criteria we believe are fundamental for taking a relational justice approach to reparations.

Victims’ demands for reparations are epitomised as a non-violent resistance to the violence they have suffered. The chapter explores how victims resist state narratives, coercive tactics, and violence in their claims for reparations, reflecting on the long-term impact of such resistance. Drawing on interviews with over 100 victims across six case studies, the chapter develops three themes around resistance: social mobilisation; self-repair; and the struggle for reparations. It examines various forms of non-violent resistance, including bottom-up approaches, documentation of violations, and the creation of subalternate perspectives. The chapter also addresses the role of social movements in reparations, emphasizing the dynamic process of collective identity formation, grievance framing, and the negotiation of justice. In conclusion, the chapter underscores the importance of understanding reparations as a multi-faceted struggle involving legal, political, and social dimensions, and the need for continued advocacy and research to address the complexities and challenges faced by victims in their pursuit of redress.

Governments command tax revenue to provide services. The US government’s revenue is lower than that in Western European nations. The latter provide services such as universal healthcare, paid parental leave, and free education. A large portion of the US government’s revenue supports the military, which comprises almost half of the world’s total military expenditures. The richest 400 American families pay the lowest tax rate today, in sharp contrast to their paying the highest share in the 1950s. The federal government borrows to pay for services rather than resort to taxing the rich. Americans seem more accepting of not redistributing wealth than Western Europeans. Policies not supported by the elite are unlikely to become law. Poorer people are less likely to vote in the US. Since the 1950s, US states with the most liberal policies have had better mortality trends than conservative states. Americans prefer medical care spending over public health and social spending. Neoliberalism has increased economic inequality and produced a rightward political shift. Reparations can improve racial inequalities

Abstract: This chapter considers three key types of international judicial remedies, exploring their content, availability, and behavioural influence. Through Mere Adjudication, an adjudicator establishes the existence, applicability, and content of legal rules. Through a Declaration of Breach, a court declares that a party’s conduct violates legal obligations. Where a violation is found, international courts often establish Consequential Duties, determining how a wrongdoer must act to bring an end to its violation and provide reparation for injury. Overall, international judicial remedies seek to prevent states’ adoption of unilateral remedies, grounded on their own understanding of the law and facts. International courts are unable to determine the application of coercive measures against states. Thus, every remedy is a communication regarding either the interpretation of the law or the application of this law to conduct. Judicial pronouncements have remedial value if they are able to mobilise pro-compliance forces, internal and external to states, by which the international normative framework guides state conduct.

Chapter 3 argues that the Kremlin’s main goal was to win the war as quickly as possible. Its second goal was to impose friendly governments to help with the war effort and to ensure future control. Its third policy objective was the economic exploitation of occupied areas. The well-being of civilians did not register as an issue unless the Red Army’s ill-disciplined conduct became a political problem. The countries that fought against the Soviet Union – Romania, Hungary, and Austria – faced more severe occupation policies than Bulgaria or Yugoslavia.

This chapter examines the drastic deterioration of US–Soviet relations from 1945 to Stalin’s death in 1953. It argues that the “cold war” was neither inevitable nor an objective reality. Instead, the shift from negotiation to confrontation was spurred by misconceptions, and the intense mutual enmity stemmed from subjective constructions as much as divergent fundamental interests. US leaders’ expectations that America’s unrivalled economic strength and monopoly on nuclear weapons would lead the USSR to go along with US plans for the postwar world collided with Soviet leaders’ determination not to be intimidated or to relinquish their domination of Eastern Europe. Journalists and propagandists on both sides worked to reshape public images of their former allies, stoking fears and inflaming ideological differences that had been set aside earlier. Key US officials, particularly George F. Kennan, exaggerated the US ability to shake the Communist system’s hold on the peoples of the USSR. through propaganda and covert action. Meanwhile, Soviet propagandists misleadingly depicted American media demonization of their country as part of US preparation for war against the USSR.

The alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Second World War has often been seen by Americans as at best a temporary necessity to defeat Nazi Germany. In contrast, this chapter emphasizes how much American and Soviet attitudes changed during the war and how many people in both countries came to believe the wartime collaboration would be a foundation for postwar cooperation. While many American politicians, journalists, and historians have downplayed or even forgotten the vital Soviet role in the crushing of German armies, during the war most Americans were keenly aware of the enormous sacrifices made by the Soviet people. By the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in early 1943, mainstream media in the United States lionized not only the Red Army but even Joseph Stalin. The massive US Lend–Lease aid to the USSR was not crucial to the Soviet survival of German offensives in 1941 and 1942, as some have claimed, but it did significantly enhance the Red Army’s mobility and communications, thereby hastening the joint allied victory in Europe by May 1945.

Chapter 7 uses the life and career of US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis to contemplate how a Progressive social-justice advocate might seek to redress entrenched housing segregation today. While acknowledging that Brandeis did not expressly speak out for racial equality in strong and unequivocal words in judicial opinions, the chapter looks for present guidance in the kind of lawyer Brandeis was, including his Progressive cause advocacy and pioneering of the Brandeis brief using extensive social science data to support government policies addressing social and economic inequalities. Observing that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) successfully used the Brandeis brief technique to overturn racial segregation in the courts, the chapter highlights the importance of evidence from sociological study about the adverse impacts of housing segregation and the interconnectedness of race and poverty in housing conditions. Brandeis would be cautious about judicial imposition of reparations but would support legislative consideration of reparations to remedy past discrimination, tailored to balance benefits and costs, as well as state and local policy solutions as laboratories of democracy.

Chapter 3 is a critical genealogy which rests on a history of the global project’s trajectories in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to reevaluate contemporary conceptions of ‘Never Again’. It paints the picture of the material and ideational aspects of the transitional justice project in this country from the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 to the myriad of measures of institutional and legal reform implemented by the international community actors present in BiH in the early 2000s. The chapter opens with a brief description of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the war 1992–1995. It then illustrates the conflict resolution process and explains what kind of BiH was imagined in the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. Next, the chapter outlines a skeleton of transitional justice in this country to show that certain areas, such as criminal justice and institutional reform, have been significantly more developed than others, putting these developments into the context of the promises of neoliberal legalism. Finally, the chapter poses questions about the end of transitional justice in BiH.