This chapter examines the concept of territory. While administrative space was no novelty in East Asia, notions related to space transformed in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Treaty of Nerchinsk marked the borderlines between the the Qing and Russian empires. Similar treaties in the early eighteenth century solidified them. Kangxi initiated a geographical survey spanning the country. This significantly impacted Korea, which made efforts to secure its border, altering perceptions of the state. Russian expansion along the Pacific coast raised concerns in Japan. From the late eighteenth century, Japanese intellectuals explored the Ezo region – areas that had held little interest. These developments introduced fresh concepts like territory, borders, and exclusive ownership (often considered European inventions) into traditional notions of imperial land. The new ideas didn’t supplant existing understandings, or engender a new interpolity system in East Asia.

The day after launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, in a public speech addressed to multiple audiences, Putin called for the ‘overthrow’ of the Ukrainian government, which he labelled a ‘gang of narcomany (‘drug addicts’) and neo-Nazis’ (Roth, 2022). We will return to the significance of this speech later; here we would add to the picture that after Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, in all territories under Russian occupation, opioid agonist therapy (OAT) programmes were immediately shut down, reflecting their status as being also banned in Russia.

Chapter 1 draws on the history of Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine to distinguish two conceptions of sovereign equality under international law. It argues that that international law in the twentieth century embraced a constitutional and equitable conception of sovereign equality, generating state obligations to cooperate with one another to resolve disputes over matters of common concern in accordance with equitable principles.

This chapter argues that the future form of land warfare is far from certain. For some, the future is net-centric warfare, an information and technology-focused view on the changing character of warfare. To meet the demands posed by the changing character of conflict, armies must embrace the theme of multi-domain operations. However, history suggests that in the future multiple forms of land warfare are likely to coexist because the practice of land warfare is shaped by many different political, economic, social and cultural contexts.

The rise of community capitalism since the mid-2010s is reflected in the return of protectionism, authoritarianism, nativism, and violent conflict. European capitalism was forced to adapt by being more assertive. Europeans have embraced solutions that were previously refused as too protectionist, such as European preference, free trade contingent on adhering to social and environmental norms, subsidies to industry for strategic reasons, and competition policy decisions based on reciprocity. Some of these ideas were long defended by France. Germany previously criticised them, but has embraced some in trade since 2016, and others in foreign policy since 2022. The management of Brexit has reaffirmed the basis of European soft power, which depends on the unity of the Single Market. The Covid-19 pandemic (2020–21) forced the Union to adopt protectionist and interventionist measures. The Russo-Ukrainian War has led to very strong sanctions packages, as well as the Union’s foray into military matters. But the Europeans still remain heavily dependent on the US for defence. Donald Trump’s return to power in 2025 has forced Europe to think harder about organising community capitalism.

States require an accurate perception of the external environment to thrive in a competitive international system. With a solid grasp of the landscape, states can wisely define their core interests, assess threats and opportunities, and bring power and commitments into balance. A commonly used method to understand the external environment is the historical analogy, comparing present events and controversies to more momentous ones from the past. The present international environment has been analogized to the pre-World War I period, to Nazi Germany, and the Cold War. While they offer superficial similarities to the current state of affairs, these analogies are not helpful for understanding present times. Instead, the current system is one of unbalanced bipolarity – a system that existed from 1945 to 1970. But even though the structures are the same, there remain important differences between these two systems. This chapter discusses what is new and noteworthy about present-day unbalanced bipolarity.

To carry out its action, the Israeli state must ensure the support of its Western allies and contain criticism from its adversaries or new partners in the Arab world, whose public opinion is highly critical of Israel. To achieve these political objectives, Tel Aviv implemented an unprecedented communication strategy to disseminate its narratives and content to the widest possible audience.

This chapter examines the introduction of new lay participation systems in Asian countries. Focusing on Russia, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, I explore the social and political contexts and goals of the policymakers that motivated the incorporation of citizen decision-making into the legal systems of these countries. In each of the four countries, the adoption of new systems of lay participation occurred during periods of political democratization. Those who argued in favor of citizen involvement hoped that it would promote democratic self-governance, create more robust connections between the citizenry and the government, and improve public confidence in the courts. Policymakers drew on the experiences of other countries, including other Asian nations, to develop a distinctive model that incorporated some features of lay participation systems elsewhere, and modified them to suit the specific circumstances of their own countries.

A framing case study describes Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Then the chapter provides an overview of law on the use of force. The chapter begins by describing the historical movement to prohibit the use of force. It then discusses the use of force with UN Security Council authorization. Next, it examines the complex topic of self-defense, including how states can respond to armed attacks, whether they can prevent armed attacks, and how they can protect themselves against non-state actors. Finally, the chapter probes whether the use of force is ever legally justified for other reasons, including: protecting nationals abroad; humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect; and when states consent to intervention.

This chapter examines the US and Canadian government’s programs that allow for the sanctioning of countries as State Sponsors of Terrorism. The chapter also provides views into why countering countries engaged in state sponsorship of terrorism efforts are so difficult to counter.

A framing case study compares military action involving two hospitals in two different wars: an Israeli raid on Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza in November 2023, and Russia’s bombing of Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Ukraine in July 2024. Then the chapter examines the law of armed conflict. The chapter first discusses major principles of armed conflict and the historical evolution of treaty law. It next discusses protected people by describing how international law distinguished between civilians and combatants, and how this law provides certain protections to each group. The chapter then discusses various laws regulating military conduct, including: how states choose targets; methods of war; weapons; and the rules of belligerent occupation. Finally, the chapter briefly surveys the specialized rules that apply to non-international armed conflict.

This chapter explores the impact that participation in bureaucratic corruption has on citizen activism in an autocracy. Using an original survey of Russian adults (N = 2350), we find that when citizens feel extorted, they are most likely to engage politically – likely, because they resent having to pay bribes. Yet we also find that Russians who give bribes voluntarily are also more politically active than those who abstain from corruption. To explain this finding, we focus on social relationships within which corruption transactions occur and embed them into political structures of an autocracy. Our analyses reveal that, relative to citizens who abstain from corruption, personal networks of bribe-givers are more extensive, mobilizable, and strong. Such networks, we argue, sustain meaningful encounters among “birds of a different feather,” facilitating citizen collaboration across social cleavages. In unfree societies then, corruption networks build a structural platform that can be utilized for collective resistance.