The chapter outlines the long history of the maker’s knowledge tradition from Hippocrates to Vico. It explores five specific paradigmatic moments during which the fundamental intertwinement between making and knowing was problematised. First, it addresses the Hippocratic cogitations on the nature of knowledge as a practical and theoretical activity. Second, it engages with Plato and Aristotle’s desperate attempts to purify episteme from any practical concerns. Third, it follows the transformation of the concept of episteme in the post-Aristotelian debates on the so-called stochastic arts. Fourth, it explores how the very concept of ‘knowledge by making and doing’ is gradually concocted in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Finally, it shows how the idea of knowing by making is gradually integrated into the epistemology of modern science and history since Giordano Bruno.

The Introduction states the book’s main purposes in examining Thomas Aquinas’s (1225–1274) famous five arguments for God’s existence, or “Five Ways,” in Summa theologiae Ia q.2 a.3. Even philosophically trained readers find them difficult to understand and often misread them. There are few extensive books in English solely on the Five Ways in the last few decades. Reading the Ways requires familiarity with positions Aquinas holds in his metaphysics, theory of causation, logic, semantics, theory of knowledge, philosophy of nature, and other areas of philosophy. This book recovers that necessary background for the reader. Careful attention is given the arguments’ premises and the reasoning behind them. Ample consideration is given to historical and contemporary objections to the various Ways and how Aquinas might respond. The Introduction closes with a summary of the book’s nine chapters. It is hoped that readers will think along with Aquinas on issues surrounding God’s existence and reach greater clarity in their own conclusions.

In this text, Aquinas discusses the question of whether the powers of the soul are the same as the soul. The text is part of Aquinas’ analysis of Augustine’s doctrine of the image of the Trinity. Like his teacher Albert the Great, he argues that the soul and its powers are distinct, and, like Albert, he holds that the soul’s powers are to be viewed as necessary accidents “flowing” from the soul. But Aquinas goes beyond his teacher in an important respect. He devises a new argument in favor of the distinction theory—an argument that we may call the Category Argument. The argument goes like this. A power must be in the same category as its act. All acts of the soul, like thinking, seeing, etc. are accidents. Hence, the powers of the soul must be accidents too. Aquinas justifies the major premise that a power must be in the same category as its act by appeal to what we might call a Causal Proportionality Principle. According to this principle, a cause must be like its immediate effect, where the cause is a power, and the immediate effect is its operation. The Category Argument proved very influential for the subsequent debate over the relation between the soul and its powers.

In Ordinary Question 4, of which we have translated a large excerpt, Thomas of Sutton argues that the soul and its powers are distinct. Sutton’s strategy for defending the distinction theory is, roughly, two-pronged. First, Sutton develops his own conception of power and act. Second, he aims to show that Aquinas’ arguments for the distinction theory, in particular the Category Argument, are sound, despite objections to the contrary. Key to Sutton’s own conception of power and act are two ideas. The first is that a power is a kind of possibility. Specifically, a power is a possibility that remains when it is actualized. The second idea is that powers and acts are mutually exclusive kinds of being. No act is a power, and no power is an act. Since the soul is a kind of act according to the Aristotelian view, this entails, for Sutton, that the soul is not its powers. In this text, Sutton also seeks to rebut Henry’s regress argument against Aquinas. He argues that this argument is predicated on a mistaken conception of how necessary accidents or propria relate to their bearers.

In this text, Godfrey asks whether a created substance can be the immediate principle of its operation. ‘Power’ and ‘immediate principle of operation’ are synonymous terms here. Hence, the question that Godfrey raises is this: is a substance a power? Godfrey’s answer is nuanced. Like Albert and Aquinas, Godfrey adheres to the view that powers like sight and the intellect are propria or necessary accidents distinct from the soul. However, he openly rejects Aquinas’ Category Argument for the distinction theory because he finds Henry’s regress argument against the claim that a power must be in the same category as its act convincing. The regress argument also leads Godfrey to argue that there is, in addition to such powers as the intellect and sight, what we might call a higher-order power of the soul. This higher-order power is the soul’s power to bear such powers as the intellect and sight. Unlike the intellect and sight, this power to bear powers is identical to the soul, Godfrey thinks. Thus, Godfrey defends the Thomistic distinction theory; but he also makes a concession to Henry by arguing that the soul is at least one power through its essence, namely, a higher-order power.

This chapter examines the role of the papacy in the history of marriage regulation in a long-term perspective. The core theme of corporeality is investigated between doctrine and practice. On the one hand, the body is a central good whose rights of use are mutually exchanged by the spouses within the framework of the marriage contract; on the other hand, it is a deadly burden, the place where the flesh manifests itself with its law that contradicts reason. In the light of this tension, the position of papal authority – in particular the power to bind and dissolve – is addressed by examining its pronouncements, especially the Decretales, conciliar legislation, and the publication of encyclicals and apostolic exhortations up to the most recent on the subject: Amoris laetitia, by Pope Francis I. Finally, some cases that have been dealt with by courts such as the Penitentiary, the Holy Office, and the Rota are examined.

This article explores the notion of worship as a natural and universal disposition, described by Thomas Aquinas in ST II-II, q.81. Worship, however, is for Aquinas most relevant in the context of divine friendship or caritas with God, which Aquinas describes in ST II-II, q.23. This article, therefore, explains a possible connection between worship and love. How can the task to worship God grounded in the debt to God qua creator and the appreciation of the excellence of God be reconciled with the proximity and closeness with God that caritas implies? Drawing from Jewish philosophy, especially Martin Buber’s I-Thou relationships, and new findings in experimental psychology, in particular joint attention, a second-personal model of worship can be developed. This form of worship encompasses, on the one hand, the intimacy and sense of presence of God that worship can involve, and on the other hand, the distinctiveness and pre-eminence of God, essential for a worshipful attitude. The aim of this article is to explore how second-personal relatedness with God is possible in worship directed to God. Since God seems to be present in worship in a twofold manner, the interest is in the role the Holy Spirit can play in worship.

Apart from the myth that he failed his theology exam in the Society of Jesus, Gerard Manley Hopkins’s scholastic training is largely unstudied. This chapter outlines Hopkins’s philosophy course at Roehampton and his theology course at St Beuno’s, identifies his various teachers, and assesses his modest contribution to Catholic theology. Taking into account the ways the Society of Jesus modified and updated its curriculum in the second half of the nineteenth century, it argues that in Hopkins’s day the Society of Jesus was never merely ‘Suárezian’ – even at St Beuno’s – but rather diverse and at times even genuinely creative.

The introduction looks at the different ways that the unique, but troublesome, injunction at the heart of the Sermon on the Mount for the followers of Jesus to ‘Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect’ (Matt. 5.48) has been interpreted within Christian history. It looks specifically at the interpretations of John and Charles Wesley, John Calvin, Thomas Aquinas, Augustine of Hippo, Gregory of Nyssa and Tertullian and argues that Aquinas’ is the most sophisticated. It suggests how each reflects the influence of their particular social contexts and their radically different theological takes on humanity, while holding in common a clear distinction between human and divine perfection.