In Chapter 6, we defend the difference-making thesis of Causal Mechanism, that is, the view that mechanisms are underpinned by networks of difference-making relations, by showing that difference-making is more fundamental than production in understanding mechanistic causation. Our argument is two-fold. First, we criticise Stuart Glennan’s claim that mechanisms can be viewed as the truth-makers of counterfactuals and argue that counterfactuals should be viewed as metaphysically more fundamental. Second, we argue against the view that the productivity of mechanisms requires thinking of them as involving activities, qua a different ontic category. We criticise two different routes to activities: Glennan’s top-down approach and Phyllis Illari and Jon Williamson’s bottom-up approach. Given these difficulties with activities and mechanistic production, it seems more promising to start with difference-making and give an account of mechanisms in terms of it.

Begins with an overview of policy development in relation to religion and the church–state relationship, giving specific attention to the disjunctive concepts of “state neutrality” and an “established church” and to policies for promoting civil society. It then outlines the relevant legal framework before exploring the nature of the current church–state relationship, explaining definitional matters and focusing on the core freedoms of religion, association and expression. This leads into the heart of the chapter, which considers the impact of equality legislation on the church–state relationship, as illustrated in evolving case law, by examining in turn the consequences for family and life, healthcare, education, employment, service provision and national security.

The chapter argues that the general right to conscientious exemption in UK law is not only available to religious objectors. Either under Art 9 or anti-discrimination legislation, the relevant statutory materials and case law explicitly make the right available to objections grounded in religious and non-religious beliefs. As associated case law makes clear, what is important is not the religious nature of the beliefs at hand but whether those sincerely held beliefs satisfy the Dignity, Importance and Intelligibility Requirements set out in the chapter. It is argued that allowing non-religious belief-holders to invoke the general right to conscientious exemption has not made that right unmanageable. This is because few holders of non-religious beliefs have so far actually invoked the right. So far, only in four cases has the right been invoked by a holder of a non-religious belief in the entirety of reported UK case law. Finally, the criteria necessary for the successful enjoyment of the right ensure that unmeritorious claims can be dismissed. It follows that the fact that the general right to conscientious exemption under UK law is not a privilege of religious individuals and does not undermine the manageability of the general right.

The chapter shows that there is a general right to conscientious exemption in UK law. There are at least two rules of law which ground the right. These are (a) the requirement that public authorities and legislation (both primary and subordinate) comply with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA); and (b) the prohibition of indirect discrimination on the basis of religion or belief in employment and provision of goods and services arising under anti-discrimination legislation. The chapter tentatively sets out another rule of law which may ground the general right. This is the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of religion in the enjoyment of Convention Rights arising under Art 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’). The reason this ground is tentative is that it has not been relied on in UK courts although it has been successfully relied on in the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) to receive an exemption from a legislative rule. Without explicit UK case law it is unwise to declare that this rule of law is another ground of the general right in UK law.