Fairness norms operate in virtually every area of social endeavor. There are several common behavioral responses to exchanges between social actors. Exploitation and retaliation, both of which are threats to fairness, are closely associated with narcissism. Other behavioral responses include cooperation, reciprocity, acquiescence, withdrawal, and altruism. Social movements such as Black Lives Matter and #MeToo are collective responses to profound unfairness.

This chapter concerns international organisations, from their inception to their rise. Regional organisations are described in Europe, Central and South America, Arabia, Africa and South East Asia. This is followed by an examination of some legal aspects of international organisations, such as their definition, and the question of legal personality. A discussion of the constituent instruments of such organisations is noted before the question of their powers is examined. The applicable law of such organisations is described, followed by an analysis of the responsibility of international organisations. The liability of member states of international organisations is considered, as is the accountability of the organisations. This is followed by a consideration of the privileges and immunities of international organisations. The chapter concludes with a look at the questions of withdrawal from such organisations, the dissolution of international organisations and the succession of international organisations.

This chapter focuses on the rules set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). This chapter begins with the concept of a treaty, before discussing treaty-making, with a particular focus on the conclusion of treaties, their entry into force, and reservations to treaties. The chapter then delves into how treaties operate, namely their scope of application and their interpretation. Finally, this chapter looks at the invalidity, suspension, and termination of treaties.

On 18 August 1971, the Australian Prime Minister, William McMahon, announced that Australian forces would commence a phased withdrawal from Vietnam. In effect, this phased withdrawal had already started. When 8 RAR completed its tour in October 1970, the Australian Government decided not to replace it. By then, Phuoc Tuy province was quiet, and the enemy was close to being defeated. The two VC battalions that had operated in Phuoc Tuy, D440 and D445 Provincial Mobile Battalions, were significantly understrength and had either left the province or become inactive; highway 15, the main supply route through Phuoc Tuy from Saigon to Vung Tau, was open to unescorted traffic; the people increasingly separated from the VC; and both VC and NVA were suffering from low morale and severe food shortages, and had difficulty recruiting from within the province. The task force’s intelligence teams reinforced this picture through analysis of captured enemy documents and the interrogation of prisoners, which ‘told of shortages of men, key cadre, food, medical supplies, ammunition and weapons’.

Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon’s promise during the 1968 presidential election campaign to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War, combined with the loss of American domestic political support resulting from the January 1968 Tet Offensive, saw a fundamental change to how the war was conducted. The United States began a process of withdrawing their own combat forces and placing the burden for future combat operations on ARVN formations. While the Australian Government was aware of this change in policy, it was not actively included in American political deliberations and hence was unable to take an active position in the face of Vietnamisation. Left with no detailed guidance on the intended timelines for American withdrawal, the Australian Government could provide no direction to Army on the level of future commitment to the war, other than to reinforce the existing rhetoric that participation in the conflict remained vital for Australian national interests. In this policy vacuum, Army leadership concentrated on the military aspects of the war, with the CGS Exercises of both 1967 and 1968 exploring the implications of increasing the size of the force deployed to South Vietnam.

This chapter examines the moral foundations of personality-based justifications for intellectual property, emphasizing the alignment of intellectual works with individual autonomy and self-expression. Unlike utilitarian or labor-desert arguments, the personality-based approach views intellectual property as an extension of the creator’s personality, granting moral claims over divulgation, attribution, integrity, and withdrawal. A central wrong-making feature of violating the rights of attribution and integrity is that, in the typical case, a form of misrepresentation or fraud occurs. Additionally, it is argued that creators have a justified right to control downstream uses of their intellectual works, rooted in autonomy, free speech, and the prevention of misrepresentation or fraud. Along with considering various challenges, a contractarian framework is adopted that promotes legislative protections safeguarding the dignity, autonomy, and expressive freedoms of creators.

The Trump and Biden administrations have spent an enormous amount of energy blaming each other for the final collapse. Pompeo excoriated Biden in his memoir, fully blaming him and claiming the Doha agreement had nothing to do with Afghanistan’s subsequent collapse. In turn, the Biden White House released a twelve-page document in April 2023 with their version of events, placing blame on the Trump administration. In their mutual finger-pointing, they are both right: Trump signed the deal, and Biden implemented it. Trump was determined to withdraw from Afghanistan irrespective of what the Taliban said or did, weakening the United States’ diplomatic and military position to the point of collapse. Biden, despite having campaigned on a promise to undo Trump’s legacy, inexplicably followed Trump’s example and implemented Trump’s strategy. Thanks to Trump, Biden inherited an extremely difficult situation – one he managed to make even worse. He played a bad hand badly. And he did so, in large part, because when he looked at Afghanistan, he saw Vietnam.

The American and allied military presence in Afghanistan peaked between late 2010 and mid 2011. For the next ten years, the major debate in Washington was how many troops to withdraw, how quickly. The announced unilateral American withdrawal was the defining fact of the war for its final decade. Policymakers treated the debate over troop numbers as a proxy for a debate over larger goals. But there are other aspects of strategy, like reconstruction and diplomacy, that simply cannot be subsumed within a debate about troop numbers, aspects that went unaddressed during the US’s gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan. Withdrawing troops without achieving the other objectives is how the United States gradually abandoned the rest of its war aims as slowly and expensively as possible.

Did the surge work? The surge had a major impact on the military situation, reversing the Taliban’s momentum and rapidly growing the Afghan army. Yet it seems equally clear that, by the beginning of the withdrawal in July 2011 – or even by the transition in 2014 – Afghan governance had not improved enough and there was no self-sustaining psychological dynamic of growing optimism and confidence. Importantly, the military surge cannot be evaluated apart from either the civilian surge or the withdrawal timetable because they were components of a single strategy. The civilian surge largely failed, replicating many of the same problems the Bush administration had seen when it tried to ramp up assistance for governance and reconstruction. But even more consequentially, the timetable – the most distinctive aspect of the Obama administration’s war – drove so much of the implementation and the decision-making as to become the controlling dynamic of the war. Together, the timetable and the civilian failure squandered whatever military gains the surge accomplished. By 2011, the insurgency had lost momentum, but the Afghan government was no closer to victory.

Chapter 28 covers the topic of opioid use disorder. Through a case vignette with topical MCQs for consolidation of learning, readers go through the management of a patient with opioid use disorder from from first presentation to subsequent complications of the condition and its treatment. Topics covered include symptoms and diagnosis of acute intoxication and withdrawal symptoms of opioids and management including that of use in pregnant women.

Chapter 27 covers the topic of stimulants use disorder. Through a case vignette with topical MCQs for consolidation of learning, readers are brought through the diagnosis of a patient with stimulants use disorder on first presentation. Topics covered include symptoms and diagnosis of acute intoxication and withdrawal symptoms of stimulants use.

Chapter 26 covers the topic of cannabis use disorder. Through a case vignette with topical MCQs for consolidation of learning, readers are brought through the diagnosis of a patient with cannabis use disorder on first presentation. Topics covered include symptoms and diagnosis of acute intoxication and withdrawal symptoms of cannabis use and amotivational syndrome.

The literature on school maladjustment is too much engaged with its explicit expressions (e.g., school dropout), while only partially discussing its more implicit expressions. It is arguable that school maladjustment can have many faces. A student’s selection of the way to express maladjustment is a derivation of the person’s characteristics, the environmental characteristics, and the broader context within which the person adjusts (e.g., wartime). Thus, the discussion has to address four general aspects of school maladjustment: (a) silent expressions of school maladjustment, the ones that are commonly addressed by researchers and especially by school teams and parents; (b) indicative expressions of school maladjustment, which are the buds of maladjustment and of major importance in the context of students’ educational flourishing; (c) how both the indicative and the silent expressions can be integrated into a flowchart that summarizes the process of sinking into school maladjustment; and (d) vulnerability to school maladjustment as an additional aspect that deserves a different type of preventive intervention: that is, an intervention that addresses the students’ future adjustment to transitions (e.g., from elementary school to middle school)

Chapter 9 summarizes our theoretical expectations and empirical findings about IO exits. It outlines the implications of IO exit for international cooperation, future research, and policymaking. It also provides additional insight into IO exits that have occurred as regional conflicts have engulfed the world in recent years, exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The chapter analyzes how IO exits might affect international cooperation as multilateralism is being contested on several fronts. It also discusses that patterns of democratic decline and polarized domestic politics may lead the future of IO exits to be different than the past. Even while this contestation is happening, however, we show that IO exits (as well as threats and reentry) extend beyond current affairs; they have been a relatively steady occurrence over time. We conclude by arguing that despite – and sometimes because of – occasional exits, international cooperation continues through IOs and a robust set of other international institutions. We outline several exciting areas for future research that may be inspired by the findings from this book.

Chapter 4 outlines and tests our argument about the consequences of IO withdrawal for exiting states. We argue that there should be negative reputational and cooperative consequences for withdrawing states because IOs operate as hand-tying, credible commitment devices. International actors might regard withdrawal as backing out of a commitment and a signal that decouples the state from a self-chosen “in-group.” Thus, international actors – such as market analysts and other states – may reduce their trust that a withdrawing state will follow through on other commitments. As evidence, we document that withdrawal is associated with worsened perceptions of political risk and investor confidence. We document how the negative reputational consequences vary based on states’ and IOs’ preexisting reputations. We also show that withdrawal reduces the chance of being elected to the UNSC as a non-permanent member and makes states less likely to sign future treaties with the exiting state. We expect the material consequences of withdrawal to be limited due to strategic selection, substitution, and potential gains. We test these arguments on economic IOs because they represent more than half of all IOs and they can be evaluated consistently. We find that withdrawing states on average suffer limited material consequences.

Why do states exit IOs? How often does IO exit happen? And what are the consequences of IO exit for leaving states? Despite recent attention to individual cases and the importance of membership in IOs, little is known about state exit from IOs across states, organizations, and time. Chapter 1 outlines the common logic of IO exit that links withdrawal and suspension: States often use IO exit as a strategy to negotiate institutional change when mechanisms of voice have failed. We summarize our empirical contributions that rely on a new dataset of IO exit across 198 states and 534 IOs from 1913 to 2022. We show that exit is infrequent, intermittent, and often temporary rather than terminal. Factors related to bargaining help predict IO exit, and exit generates negative reputational and cooperative consequences for leaving states. Nonetheless, IO exit is often an imperfect tool in achieving institutional change. Overall, we correct the view of IO exit as recently increasing. We also show that alternative arguments are not correct: IO exit is not widely occurring because of a backlash against globalization, nationalism/populism, IO authority, or legal rules. Moreover, exit is not inconsequential. We end with a roadmap for each chapter.

Chapter 5 traces the dynamics of our argument about the causes and consequences of IO withdrawal with three qualitative case studies: the US’ withdrawal from the ILO from 1977–1980, Japan’s withdrawal from the IWC in 2019, and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in 2020. The cases show how states often think of withdrawal as a negotiation tool and highlight states’ long-term striving for “better” institutional arrangements through other mechanisms of “voice” before exit. In each case, we use archival research and media sources to document that the desire for IO change prompted exit, that states used withdrawal threats for negotiation, and that negotiation prior to withdrawal happened but fell short of the state’s goals, leading to withdrawal. In the cases of the ILO and IWC, negotiation continued while the state was a non-member and led to its return in the case of the ILO. The case studies also underscore the effects of withdrawal: Each of the withdrawing states suffered negative reputational and cooperative consequences and sometimes material consequences from withdrawal. International actors chastised withdrawing states, and the withdrawers then engaged in rhetorical stigma management to try to lessen the impact.

Chapter 2 theorizes the causes and consequences of state exit from IOs. We explain that IOs start as being beneficial to member states but may become dissatisfying to some states as preferences diverge, power shifts, or IOs themselves evolve. Leaning on the “exit, voice, and loyalty” framework by Hirschman (1970), we argue that dissatisfied states can voice their discontent but when this does not generate desired results, states sometimes use the process of IO exit to invoke change. Threatening and enacting exit can accelerate a tipping point by presenting states with a potential future without the exiting state, which could reduce institutional benefits. The ability to use exit as a negotiation strategy shifts with a state’s bargaining power as well as institutional constraints. As part of the negotiating process, many exit threats are not implemented and many exiting states return to IOs. But exit is costly: Given that exiting states may be perceived as reneging on an international commitment, they can incur negative reputational and cooperative consequences from other actors in the international community. Exiting states may therefore engage in stigma management. And while institutional change is often the goal, exit is usually an imperfect tool for achieving it.