During times of crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers and the public reveal a strong preference for fairness in pricing even when that would reduce efficiency. For example, they support the application of price gouging laws that prevent prices for necessities from skyrocketing but probably also dampen incentives for firms to produce more and alleviate the shortage. More generally, a growing body of research reveals that consumers have a strong preference for fairness over wealth maximization. This suggests that in making price policy, governments should abandon neoclassical economics and its wealth maximization criterion in favor of an approach that treats fairness in pricing as a first principle and paramount value. The chapter considers the implications of this "neo-Kantian" approach to price policy for antitrust law and policy in particular.

Contemporary interest among American progressives in using antitrust law to address wealth inequality lacks a firm intellectual foundation. Indeed, both the original American progressives of a century ago and Thomas Piketty, whose work sparked contemporary interest in inequality, agree that inequality’s source is scarcity, rather than monopoly, and so inequality will persist even in perfectly competitive markets. The only real solution is taxation, not a potentially destructive campaign of breakup. Why, then, is antimonopolism so popular among American progressives today? There are two reasons. The first is American anti-statism, which has closed off tax policy as a viable political solution to inequality, forcing progressive scholars and activists to seek a second- or third-best workaround in antitrust policy. The second is the American press, which is actively promoting antimonopolism as a way of fighting back against Google and Facebook, two companies that have badly outcompeted the press for advertising dollars in recent years.

The US corporate tax is over 100 years old, and many academic observers have doubted its value. The standard explanation for why we tax corporations is that it is an indirect tax on shareholders, but that is not a valid reason to have a corporate tax because (a) shareholders can be taxed directly and (b) many shareholders are tax-exempt and should not be taxed at all. However, there is another reason to tax corporations, which was in fact the original rationale why we adopted the corporate tax in 1909: to limit the power of large monopolistic corporations and regulate their activities. If that is the reason for the corporate tax, the US should have a different tax structure than the current 21 percent flat tax. The corporate tax should be set at zero for normal returns and at a sharply progressive rate for supernormal returns (rents).

Academic plagiarism norms enable successful scholars to monopolize ideas. The New Brandeis School in antitrust has sought to expand antitrust’s scope and ought, therefore, to support antitrust action against enforcers of plagiarism rules. However, the New Brandeis School includes many scholars, writers, and other creatives and has tended to support monopolization of intellectual output by creatives. For example, New Brandeisians have called for expansion of intellectual property laws to include news and for the non-enforcement of the antitrust laws against cartels of musicians. As a result, it is unlikely that this School will champion antitrust action against plagiarism norms.

After having argued against most current regulatory reform proposals directed at social media, this final chapter considers some regulatory initiatives worthy of consideration. It begins, however, with a call for caution. The principle of "First, do no harm" in medical ethics is highly relevant here. Social media is too new, and too rapidly evolving, for regulators to be able to confidently predict either the current impact of regulation or its long term effects, so regulators must act with humility. That said, social media also is not a law-free zone. Long-standing bodies of law, such as antitrust, contract, tort, and even family law, can and should be applied to social media firms in the same way as other private actors. Furthermore, even Section 230 in its current form should not be sacrosanct, and there is also room to consider granting platform users modest procedural protections against arbitrary content moderation decisions. Finally, there are strong arguments for a federal data privacy law, not directed at social media in particular but certainly applicable to it. In short, social media should not be above the law – but nor should it be the target of lawfare.

This chapter examines the transformative effects of generative AI (GenAI) on competition law, exploring how GenAI challenges traditional business models and antitrust regulations. The evolving digital economy, characterised by advances in deep learning and foundation models, presents unique regulatory challenges due to market power concentration and data control. This chapter analyses the approaches adopted by the European Union, United States, and United Kingdom to regulate the GenAI ecosystem, including recent legislation such as the EU Digital Markets Act, the AI Act, and the US Executive Order on AI. It also considers foundational models’ reliance on key resources, such as data, computing power, and human expertise, which shape competitive dynamics across the AI market. Challenges at different levels—including infrastructure, data, and applications—are investigated, with a focus on their implications for fair competition and market access. The chapter concludes by offering insights into the balance needed between fostering innovation and mitigating the risks of monopolisation, ensuring that GenAI contributes to a competitive and inclusive market environment.

The exercise of monopsony in labor markets is limited to one degree or another by public policy. Employer conduct aimed at creating monopsony power is governed by the Sherman Act of 1890, which forbids collusion among employers as well as competitively unreasonable conduct by a single employer.

This chapter discusses private suits and the prohibition of §1 and the sanctions for violations. Corporations are subject to fines while individuals may be fined and/or imprisoned. Section 1 forbids collusive restraints of trade. In the past, there was some confusion regarding the applicability of §1 to labor markets. These days are gone. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have issued their Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals in which the agencies make it crystal clear that they will pursue criminal convictions for collusion in labor markets. In addition to public sanctions, §4 of the Clayton Act provides a private right of action for antitrust victims.

In our final chapter, we summarize the antitrust law and economics of monopsony in the labor market. We provide some policy recommendations that are consistent with economic principles and empirical reality.

Monopsony is the label that Joan Robinson attached to a market in which a single employer faces a competitively structured supply of labor. For some reason, her early theoretical analysis, along with the insights of A. C. Piguo and J. R. Hicks, did not gain much traction. Recently, however, economists and policymakers have recognized the ill effects of monopsony and have offered some actions aimed at mitigating – if not eliminating – the monopsony problem. In our view, vigorous enforcement – both public and private – of the antitrust laws can play a large role in reducing the ill effects of monopsony power in the labor market.

One of the world’s greatest experiments in open innovation is mobile wireless. Technology enterprises have invested billions of R&D dollars to develop 2G, 3G, 4G, now 5G, and hopefully 6G soon. Technology developers make investments and look to the patent system and associated regulators to reward them for risky investments, should their patented technologies become included in the standards. In recent years there has been an uptick in the number of technology implementers. But because patents are not self-enforcing, unlicensed use occurs, which is corrosive of the open innovation system that allows non-vertically integrated firms to compete at the device level. This chapter reviews antitrust theories that some implementers have used to avoid paying royalties to patent owners. This is examined in the context of the FRAND licensing regime established by ETSI, a standards development organization. “Hold up” and “hold out” theories are examined. Hold up theories lack empirical support and are misused by some implementers—particularly those in China—who would prefer to free ride on the R&D investments of others. Restoring and revitalizing technology markets for mobile wireless likely requires limits to be placed on the availability of FRAND licenses with respect to recalcitrant technology implementers. Otherwise, the innovation ecosystem will be harmed, and open innovation (that is, licensing) business models will collapse.

Times are changing as our global ecosystem for commercializing innovation helps bring new technologies to market, networks grow, and interconnections and transactions become more complex around standards, all to enable vast opportunities to improve the human condition, to further competition, and to improve broad access. The policies that governments use to structure their legal systems for intellectual property, especially patents, as well as for competition—or antitrust—continue to have myriad powerful impacts and raise intense debates over challenging questions. This chapter explores a representative set of debates about policy approaches to patents, to elucidate particular ideas to bear in mind about how adopting a private law, property rights-based approach to patents enables them to better operate as tools for facilitating the commercialization of new technologies in ways that best promote the goals of increasing access while fostering competition and security for a diverse and inclusive society.