Estimates of sensitive questions from list experiments are often much less precise than desired. We address this well-known inefficiency problem by presenting an informative Bayesian approach that combines indirect measures with prior information. Specifying informed priors amounts to a principled combination of information that increases the efficiency of model estimates. This framework generalizes a range of different modeling approaches for list experiments, such as the inclusion of direct items, auxiliary information, the double list experiment, and the combination of list experiments with other indirect questioning techniques. As we demonstrate in real-world examples from political science, the informative Bayesian approach not only improves the utility but also changes the substantive implications drawn from list experiments.

How do partisan differences in mass behavior and attitudes vary across contexts? Using new individual-level panel data on the COVID-19 pandemic from 54,216 US adults between March 2020 and September 2021, we consider how partisan differences vary according to the personal costs and benefits of behaviors, their public symbolism, and elite-level policy choices. Employing various panel data estimators, including difference-in-differences, we evaluate how partisan gaps evolve across changes to the political and health contexts, including the national vaccine rollout, individual vaccination status, and within-state policy variation. We find partisan divides are substantial even in (ostensibly) apolitical domains, although they are tempered by higher net personal costs to actions, lower public symbolism, and elite policy choices that counter national party cues.

The estimation of voting blocs is an important statistical inquiry in political science. However, the scope of these analyses is usually restricted to roll call data where individual votes are directly observed. Here, we examine a Bayesian mixture model with Dirichlet-multinomial components to infer voting blocs within longitudinal referendum data. This model infers voting bloc mixture within municipalities using state-level data aggregated at the municipal level. As a case study, we analyze the vote totals of Maine referendum questions balloted from 2008 to 2019 for 423 municipalities. Using a birth–death Markov chain Monte Carlo approach to inference, we recover the posterior distribution on the number of voting blocs, the support for each question within each bloc, and the blocs’ mixture within each municipality. We find that these voting blocs are structured by geography and largely consistent across the study period. The model finds that blocs exhibit both spatial gradients and discontinuities in their structure. Examining the statistical fit of the model, we uncover a small number of questions that show inconsistency with the statewide bloc structure and note that the content of these questions relates to specific regions. We conclude with possible statistical extensions, connections to other statistical frameworks in political science, and detail possible locations for model applications.

Scholars typically assume that congressional party leaders whip their members and influence their voting behavior, but little evidence convincingly separates the effects of party leaders from the selection of members into parties. I find that a switch from a relatively moderate to a relatively extreme party leader causes rank-and-file members to cast more extreme roll-call votes (and vice versa). I further find that party leaders even influence the members who did not support their leadership bid, and rank-and-file members are less likely to cast partisan votes when there is no party leader. This study also sheds light on a historically anomalous period of Republican moderation, and it helps to explain the increase in congressional polarization over the past 50 years.

Do voters punish local politicians for raising taxes? In California, proposed tax increases must be approved via local ballot measures. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits the narrow passage of local tax initiatives, we find that incumbents do not generally suffer a penalty when cities raise taxes, with the notable exception of business taxes. We explore several mechanisms behind this result and uncover suggestive evidence that business interests may be particularly likely to mobilize following a tax increase. These results suggest that interest groups likely play an important role in determining whether new taxes generate voter backlash.

Using a model, we explain why propaganda in autocracies can be blatantly false and unconvincing. We model two news outlets that report on a hidden state of the world, motivated by the ex-post beliefs of the audience about the state of the world. News outlets face a tradeoff when making egregiously false statements. On the one hand, such statements are easily verifiable as false. On the other hand, a demonstrably false report reduces the credibility of the report made by the competing outlet. This is especially true for audiences in autocracies that are characterized by high media cynicism and are prone to making sweeping generalizations about the self-serving nature of all media.

Inattentive survey respondents are a growing concern for social scientists who rely on online surveys for their research. While inattentiveness has been well documented in lower quality sample sources, there is less understanding of how common the phenomenon is in high-quality surveys. We document the presence of a small percentage of respondents in Cooperative Election Study surveys who pass quality control measures but still exhibit inattentive behavior. We show that these respondents may affect public opinion estimates for small subgroups. Finally, we present the results from an experiment testing whether inattentive respondents can be encouraged to pay more attention, but we find that such an intervention fails.

This article advances the literature on media effects by examining how contrasting partisan narratives influence support for regulation after a real-world corporate scandal. Using both multi-wave observational and randomized experimental data, we show that self-selected media exposure and experimentally assigned information shape public opinion in distinct ways. While scandals are narratives of regulatory failure, partisan media environments differently attribute blame for that failure. In two separate observational waves, only Democrats exposed to news about the FTX bankruptcy increased their support for crypto regulation. In the experiment, only Republicans shifted in favor of regulation. Research on media effects needs to take into account not only media content, but also the partisan information environments that expose citizens to that content.

Recent years have witnessed considerable interest in (dynamic) issue ownership. While new insights have been gained, progress is stifled by two factors. One, research on issue ownership is typically subject to data sparsity, which has often restricted analyses to few issues. Two, research has mostly studied issue ownership as simple percentages, which are prone to random sampling error, thus disregarding uncertainty in estimating public attributions of issue ownership. To overcome both shortcomings, we propose a Bayesian multilevel model. The model can be flexibly specified to recover dynamic issue ownership. The model is applied to data from the German Longitudinal Election Study. Substantively, the model shows that parties’ issue competences display some malleability, but that changes unfold gradually over time.

Policymaking in the EU requires member states to delegate negotiations to individual ministers. For coalition governments, this creates information asymmetries because parties holding the relevant ministerial portfolio gain privileged access while their coalition partners are sidelined. This paper argues that bicameralism in the EU mitigates this problem: sidelined parties can shadow their coalition partners through the committees of the European Parliament. Committees allow parties to monitor legislative processes and negotiations in the Council, which is particularly attractive for sidelined parties. Analyzing original data on committee and rapporteur assignments between 2004 and 2024, I find that MEPs systematically shadow their coalition partners in policy areas where their national party lacks direct representation in the Council and is misaligned with its coalition partners.

What shapes attitudes toward wartime negotiation? Does exposure to violence lead citizens to take a hard-line approach to any peace settlements? Or does it make them more open to peace to make the violence stop? To answer these questions, we conducted a series of surveys and survey experiments in Ukraine in July 2022 and May 2023. First, using a series of survey experiments, we show that Ukrainians are flexible on certain issues, but others are considered red lines and not up for negotiation. Second, in the short-term, we find that exposure to violence does not turn Ukrainians against negotiations with Russia, in some cases, it makes them more amenable. Finally, over a longer duration of the war, we find that support for a negotiated solution drops. Our evidence suggests this drop is linked to exposure to violence and to beliefs about the war’s future course.

The state of American politics would be improved, many argue, if more moderate and qualified people served in government. We investigate what draws such individuals to run, focusing on a dimension of politics that has received scant attention within the candidate-entry literature—the ability of candidates, once elected, to exercise meaningful influence over policy. In a conjoint experiment, we find that the opportunity to wield greater authority differentially increases moderates’ interest in seeking office, and that more qualified people express more interest in running for offices with greater authority, lower thresholds for passing legislation, and higher staff support. These findings have implications for political representation, government effectiveness, and the relationship between institutional reform and mass politics.

Democracy faces growing threats from authoritarian ideologies, especially in terrorism-affected regions. We test whether citizen-targeted democracy-promotion intervention can bolster democratic support and resist authoritarian appeals. A randomized online experiment in Burkina Faso exposed participants to educational videos focusing on: (1) introduction of civic rights democracies offer, (2) general discussion of democracy’s advantages in combating terrorism, (3) Burkina Faso–specific discussion of democracy’s advantages in combating terrorism, (4) space exploration (placebo). Democracy-promotion videos increased democratic support. The general terrorism-advantage message produced the largest gains, whereas the country-specific message had little effect. Effects are not contingent on respondents’ proximity to attacks or direct experience. These findings highlight how democratic resilience can be strengthened in conflict-affected societies and inform future efforts to promote democracy.

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Hate speech is widely seen as a significant obstacle to constructive online discourse, but the most effective strategies to mitigate its effects remain unclear. We claim that understanding its distribution across users is key to developing and evaluating effective content moderation strategies. We address this missing link by first examining the distribution of hate speech in five original datasets that collect user-generated posts across multiple platforms (social media and online newspapers) and countries (Switzerland and the United States). Across these diverse samples, the vast majority of hate speech is produced by a small fraction of users. Second, results from a pre-registered field experiment on Twitter indicate that counterspeech strategies obtain only small reductions of future hate speech, mainly because this approach proves ineffective against the most prolific contributors of hate. These findings suggest that complementary content moderation strategies may be necessary to effectively address the problem.

Scholars debate whether the presence of multiple parties in the legislature stabilizes dictatorships or promotes their demise. We show that authoritarian regimes face a dilemma: allowing for multipartism reduces the risk of bottom-up revolt, but facilitates protracted top-down democratization. Concessions to the opposition diminish the long-term benefits of authoritarian rule and empower regime soft-liners. We test our theory in Latin America—a region with a broad range of autocracies —using survival models, instrumental variables, random forests, and two case studies. Our theory explains why rational autocrats accept multipartism, even though this concession may ultimately undermine the regime. It also accounts for democratic transitions that occur when the opposition is fragmented and without a stunning authoritarian defeat.

Does group-based tribal thinking against ethnic out-groups condition support for both liberal and illiberal policies? Our thesis is that, irrespective of the direction of the policy (progressive or conservative), nativists express selective support for policies based on different signals of group-identity: descriptive markers, group-based substantive representation, in- and out-group norms, and group-based reasoning. We test this theoretical expectation using a novel AI-powered visual conjoint experiment in the Netherlands and Germany that asked individuals to select between hypothetical educational reform proposals presented by civic actors during a public consultation. Empirically, our results demonstrate that citizens, on average, are indeed selectively (il)liberal and that this instrumental policy support is greater among those with higher levels of underlying nativism. Specifically, we show that—among our multidimensional markers of group-based identities, norms, and reasoning—group-based substantive representation and in-group norms are the strongest determinants of support for diverse reform proposals. These findings have key implications on the malleable nature of citizens’ support for the backsliding of the liberal tenets of democracy as well as the persuasive power of out-group disidentification.

Research on economic voting shows that negative economic events typically reduce government support. However, we argue that external economic shocks may have the opposite effect: when faced with a foreign economic threat, voters will rally behind their government despite worsening economic perceptions. Using the unexpected collapse of Lehman Brothers (15 September 2008) as a case, we analyze European Social Survey data from six countries and find that while satisfaction with national economies declined, satisfaction with governments gradually rose. We document that rising media and political attention coincided with a rally effect fueled by past opposition voters and muted opposition elites. These findings demonstrate that foreign economic shocks influence democratic accountability and the ability of governments to act during hard times.

Recent scholarship highlights that executive orders issued by the president are not truly ‘unilateral,’ but require cooperation from administrative agencies for implementation. I argue that, because of this role for agencies, congressional committees can use oversight to shape executive order implementation. I demonstrate this dynamic using two datasets: a sample of executive orders that have been coded using measures of executive-branch delegation and discretion, and a collection of congressional hearings focusing on an executive order or its implementation. I find that Congress engages in more oversight activity when an order delegates more authority and a wider discretionary window to agencies. This finding reveals a previously overlooked form of interbranch conflict, and broadens our understanding of the politics of unilateralism.

In multiparty systems, parties signal conflict through communication, yet standard approaches to measuring partisan conflict in communication consider only the verbal dimension. We expand the study of partisan conflict to the nonverbal dimension by developing a measure of conflict signaling based on variation in a speaker’s expressed emotional arousal, as indicated by changes in vocal pitch. We demonstrate our approach using comprehensive audio data from parliamentary debates in Denmark spanning more than two decades. We find that arousal reflects prevailing patterns of partisan polarization and predicts subsequent legislative behavior. Moreover, we show that consistent with a strategic model of behavior, arousal tracks the electoral and policy incentives faced by legislators. All results persist when we account for the verbal content of speech. By documenting a novel dimension of elite communication of partisan conflict and providing evidence for the strategic use of nonverbal signals, our findings deepen our understanding of the nature of elite partisan communication.

Do economic sanctions negatively affect democracy and human rights in targeted countries? Although often intended to improve these outcomes, their record of doing so has historically been mixed at best. Most canonical studies cover the 1980s–1990s, but sanctions practice has since undergone major innovations following debates on humanitarian harm. Given this move toward ‘targeted’ sanctions, it stands to reason that sanctions may today be achieving their intended purposes. I take up policy and methodological innovations to re-examine the effects of Western sanctions seeking to improve democracy and human rights from 1990 to 2021. I find that negative effects persist, offering an important update to the empirical literature. Beyond this contribution, I present a template for replicating and extending country-year research in international relations (IR).