Low insurance uptake in developing countries poses a strong obstacle to financial resilience and poverty reduction. Although behavioural biases, such as ambiguity aversion, myopia and distrust, are acknowledged as key barriers, their combined effects are not directly observed. Therefore, this study relies on regulatory and administrative proxies linked to these biases. This study goes beyond analysing these proxies separately to explore how they co-occur in shaping insurance outcomes. Using a novel crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) on a sample of 40 developing countries across Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and the Americas, we identify multiple, equifinal configurations of regulatory and institutional conditions associated with higher insurance uptake. Our necessity analysis reveals that transparent pricing is central to regulatory environments associated with insurance uptake. In addition, product suitability and design standards, as well as deposit insurance coverage, are sufficient regulatory requirements when combined. The csQCA results show that no condition works in isolation; outcomes are associated with specific combinations of regulatory and institutional conditions. The findings indicate that interventions should be interpreted as configurational regulatory packages.