Festenstein begins by considering Richard Rorty’s response to authoritarian populism, a response that some critics have found to be insufficient. For example, Cheryl Misak argues that the concept of inquiry implies a commitment to an inclusive form of liberal democracy and thus a rejection of authoritarianism. But according to Festenstein, that epistemic defense of democracy is insufficient to guarantee the sort of inclusiveness required by a genuinely democratic society. He argues that pragmatist epistemic defenses of democracy should be augmented by John Dewey’s political philosophy, e.g., his diagnosis of the pathologies of democracy an analysis of authoritarian populism as a distorted form of what Dewey described as the “search for the public.” That diagnosis also affords us an understanding of the social causes and effects of anti-democratic epistemic exclusion, and according to Festenstein, Dewey’s ideas enable a better understanding of and response to authoritarian populism than those made possible by narrowly epistemic arguments alone.

Howat considers whether appeals to truth should play a role in political discourse. He examines two kinds of response: that of Richard Rorty and his followers, and of “New Pragmatists” like Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse. Rorty rejected the idea of objective truth and hailed as “anti-authoritarian” the sort of pragmatism that sets that concept aside. Howat notes some overlap between Rorty’s position and that of Hannah Arendt, who didn’t reject the idea of truth itself but still argued against the use of that idea in political contexts. Unlike Rorty or Arendt, the New Pragmatists hold that the principal goal of political discourse is not agreement but rather a view that can withstand critical scrutiny – and according to the New Pragmatists, such a view can qualify as true. While tentatively aligning himself with the New Pragmatists and against Rorty, Howat argues that not all political discourse has truth as its aim. He also argues that it is unclear whether the New Pragmatist account of democracy, truth, and political discourse has the resources to deal adequately with the ways in which “our bounded rationality” allows us to be exploited.

The chapter analyses how the climate change action plan developed by the European Central Bank (ECB) as part of its monetary policy strategy review in 2020-2021 is aligned with the ECB’s mandate set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty on European Union. The Treaties require the ECB to integrate climate change considerations into its monetary policy and to contribute to the EU’s objectives regarding climate change, as established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, the European Climate Law. However, there are also legal limits on the action the ECB can take in this field. The chapter examines the key measures proposed as part of the plan from a legal perspective, including measures related to macroeconomic forecasts and models, the collection of statistical information for climate change risk analysis, the enhancement of risk assessment capabilities, asset purchase programmes, and possible changes to the collateral framework. It also considers the questions regarding the ECB’s democratic legitimacy and accountability that arise in this context.

It has been a remarkable journey for India from the nation’s independence in 1947 to now. Economic performance has been mixed, with growth remaining sluggish during the first three decades, and picking up only after the mid-1990s. On the political front, with free media, secularism and a vibrant democracy, India was an outlier in the developing world; it resembled some of the most advanced economies in the world. This chapter is a study of this unusual growth path, over the last seventy years, with a focus on how the economy and politics impacted each other. It is argued that, while early political choices may have slowed growth during the early decades, they played a vital role in India rising to be among the world’s fastest-growing nations in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Chapter 10 offers a summary of the structure, methodology, and findings of the book. It highlights the interdisciplinary nature of the investigation, in particular how a philosophically grounded argument can bear upon the reasoning of the Court while simultaneously addressing a pressing societal challenge.

Abstract: In this chapter, the authors delve into the context of cybersecurity and explore the concept of security mindset in relation to cyber education and John Dewey’s “democratic ideal.” The chapter proposes John Dewey’s robust theory of habit in Human Nature and Conduct (1922) as a grounding foundation for conceptualizing a core component of security mindset, namely the human capacity for intelligent adaptation and growth within ever-changing environments. In submitting this linkage between Dewey’s conception of habit and security mindset, the author’s purpose is more than to advance Deweyan habit as an intelligible enrichment to current cybersecurity ideas for how to manage threats. Going further, they forward the connection between Deweyan habit and security mindset to extend the kind of foundation necessary for advancing cybersecurity’s ability to meet diverse and evolving cybersecurity threats through cyber education. With this, a process of disruption that leads to the subsequent reorganization of habit can bring into view simultaneously the threats to democracy as well as the process of democracy itself.

This chapter studies the historical evolution of the relationship between multinationals and dictatorial regimes. The chapter covers the first global economy (1860s–1930s), World War II, the Cold War (1948–1989), and the post–Cold War authoritarianism (1989–2010s) and shows that dictatorial regimes and foreign multinationals supported each other when the dictators’ political and economic agendas converged with the multinationals’ corporate goals. When these agendas stopped converging or if the multinationalss did not generate economic growth or political stability, the dictators were willing to violate existing contracts regardless of ideological affinities with the foreign investors. Moreover, multinationals were not passive actors in regime change processes that brought dictators to power, but actively promoted coups and legitimized post-coup dictatorial regimes when the previous democratic regime threatened their operations. The early twenty first century witnessed the rise of multinationals originating in dictatorial regimes, which adds a layer of complexity to these dynamics.

At first glance, Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) remains a marginal figure within US political discourse. However, this chapter argues that revisiting Kelsen is crucial if we are to understand present-day intellectual tendencies supportive of autocratic threats to US democracy. A neglected, yet pivotal, anti-Kelsenian moment proves decisive among influential right wing intellectuals, so-called ‘west coast’ Straussians based at California’s Claremont Institute, who enthusiastically supported Donald Trump and embraced his authoritarianism. The lawyer and Claremont affiliate John Eastman, for example, worked to prevent a peaceful transfer of power to then President-elect Joe Biden in 2020 to keep Trump in power. Trump’s Claremont Institute defenders have absorbed crucial facets of Leo Strauss’s critical rejoinder to Kelsen: Strauss’ longstanding anti-Kelsenianism has morphed into their subterranean anti-Kelsenianism. To validate this claim, the chapter revisits Strauss’ complicated theoretical dialogue with Kelsen, while also highlighting crucial moments in the arcane history of postwar American Straussianism. What is gained theoretically, and not just historically or politically, by doing so? The Claremont Institute’s apologetics for Trump corroborate Kelsen’s worries that attempts to revive natural law under contemporary conditions invite autocracy.

Contemporary constitutional theorists typically assume that a system of constitutional adjudication inevitably stands in tension with a majoritarian understanding of democracy. Kelsen’s influential defence of constitutional review, by contrast, goes along with an affirmation of a procedural and majoritarian understanding of democracy. Did Kelsen fail to spot the supposed conflict between constitutional review and democracy? Or did he identify a solution to the counter-majoritarian difficulty? Michel Troper has vigorously argued that Kelsen’s defence of constitutional review is confused and fails to cohere with his conception of democracy. This chapter defends Kelsen’s argument for constitutional review against Troper’s charges. It argues both that Kelsen’s case for constitutional review is fundamentally sound and that it carries the potential to make an important contribution to contemporary debates on the legitimacy of judicial control of constitutionality. Kelsen’s argument for constitutional review offers a compelling case for constitutional review that focuses on the conditions of the proper functioning of electoral democracy rather than on the protection of liberal rights.

This chapter considers how Constant offered “representative government” as an alternative to Bonaparte and his acolytes’ version of democracy. It begins by examining Constant’s critique of Bonaparte’s plebiscitary sovereignty, then explores his alternative theory of constitutional legitimacy – one inspired by Hume’s motto that all governments rest on opinion. The chapter then traces how, from 1814 onward, Constant pragmatically redeployed that theory as political regimes changed in France. After analyzing Constant’s arguments against Bonaparte’s conception of opinion formation and presenting his own theory of “the government of opinion,” the chapter’s final two sections show how reconstructing Constant’s opinion-based theory of legitimacy helps explain why, in 1830, he defended both the French conquest of Algiers and the newly founded July Monarchy.

The response describes initiatives at the University of Cambridge Primary School (UCPS) and Laborschule Bielefeld in Germany that promote democracy education and provide children with the tools and opportunities to engage meaningfully in democratic processes. At UCPS, a Children’s Congress allows students to participate in school decision-making processes, a collaboration with academic researchers sought to understand how children think and feel about their disenfranchisement and a democracy curriculum teaches children key concepts and empowers them to form their own opinions and articulate them effectively. Laborschule Bielefeld focuses on peaceful conflict resolution as a foundation for democratic education. It uses the concept of ‘nonviolent communication’ to teach children how to express their feelings and needs constructively.

When the French Revolution erupted, political actors were confronted with the challenge of institutionalizing the power of the people. The debates that ensued were multifaceted as various conceptualizations of public opinion and popular sovereignty were considered. This chapter is not intended to provide a comprehensive study of the revolutionary deployment of each of these notions. Rather, the focus will be on Condorcet, Robespierre and key Montagnard theorists to illustrate how their shifting views on public opinion and popular sovereignty culminated in conflicting versions of “representative democracy” in the constitutional debate of 1793. For these theorists, “representative democracy” designated a mixed regime in which the people, in addition to electing representatives (representation), directly exercised popular sovereignty (democracy) between elections by frequently voting on political issues in citizens’ assemblies spread throughout the national territory.

This manifesto advocates for granting voting rights to children, emphasising that voting is a right of citizenship, not a privilege of competence, and should be extended to all, regardless of age. It asserts that excluding children from the democratic process is unjust and impractical. It challenges common arguments against child enfranchisement, arguing that concerns about children’s competence, potential policy chaos and the sequencing of rights are flawed. It underscores the principle of political equality, highlighting that children, like adults, possess inherent moral value and unique perspectives deserving of respect and representation. Furthermore, it contends that enfranchising children would offer them much-needed political protection, ensuring their needs and concerns are considered in policy decisions.

This chapter characterizes the evolution and politicization of corporate regulation in Nigeria and crafts a theory of professional interest group politics in Nigeria. The chapter outlines how corporate regulation in Nigeria was politicized during the era of Ibrahim Babangida’s Structural Adjustment Program. In particular, the drafting process of the Companies Decree of 1990 provided a previously unparalleled opportunity for independent manufacturing, services, professional, and labor organizations to contest the revision of the most fundamental provisions of Nigerian corporate law. Informed by this history, the chapter advances a novel theory of professional interest groups in Nigerian politics, which are industry-based organizations that seek to advance their policy objectives at the federal level. Drawing their membership from across traditional regional, ethnic, and class boundaries, they are internally hierarchical and their less-prominent members also benefit from the achievement of shared regulatory objectives. Nigerian professional interest groups exercise a tangible influence over federal policy and its implementation.