This paper examines relationships between AI occupational exposure and workforce patterns in U.S. federal agencies from 2019–2024. Using administrative employment data, we document systematic associations between agencies’ concentrations of AI-exposed occupations and employment dynamics. Agencies with higher AI exposure exhibit declining routine employment shares, expanding expert roles, and wage compression effects. We develop a theoretical framework incorporating institutional constraints distinguishing public organisations: employment protections, standardised compensation systems, and political oversight. The model features strategic interactions between budget-maximising directors and electoral-sensitive overseers, predicting workforce evolution under institutional constraints. Our identification exploits fixed occupational exposure scores, so observed changes in agency-level exposure reflect workforce composition shifts rather than measurement artefacts. Patterns suggest agencies with greater AI-susceptible occupations experience reallocation rather than displacement, providing insights for understanding technological change in institutionally constrained environments and informing governance frameworks balancing modernisation with democratic accountability.

Since the third wave of democracy, term limits have become a popular fixture of most constitutions intended to constrain the executive. Yet, recent constitutional reforms around the world show that presidents seeking re-election sometimes overturn the entire constitutional order to extend their power. What is the impact of these constitutional manipulations on the longevity of the executive in office? Using survival analysis of all political leaders and national constitutions from 1875 to 2015, this article demonstrates, for the first time, that when ‘authoritarian-aspiring’ presidents remove constitutional term limits, they increase their stay in office by more than 40%. Our findings contrast with a widely held position in the comparative authoritarian literature suggesting that dictators survive longer under institutional constraints. On the contrary, we argue that by removing constitutional barriers, rulers consolidate more power at the expense of their most ambitious allies and can stay in power longer.

In nations where the executive has budgetary control, how are spending decisions and allocations affected? Is intraparty conflict relevant? This article sets out to show that institutional rules and leadership roles affect budgetary outcomes. It makes the following argument: if intraparty conflict exists in a one-party dominant or majority-party system, the executive reduces spending to punish the party in the legislature; if no intraparty conflict exists, then the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party leader. If intraparty conflict exists in a minority government or majority-coalition within a competitive multiparty system, the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party or coalition leader. Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan between the 1970s and 2000 supports the theory. This study advances scholarship in three ways. First, it shows that institutional rules that provide the executive with agenda control also lead to the strategic use of the budgetary process and outcomes to generate loyalty to the executive as leader. Second, it reveals that this strategy affects spending outcomes in election years; this is an important caveat to electoral spending manipulations. Third, the strategic use of the budget to control intraparty conflict occurred prior to and following democratization; this reveals that institutional changes need to include modifications in rules for policy transformations.