This chapter considers a number of aspects of Berlin’s celebrated essay ‘The Hedgehog and the Fox’. These include a consideration of the origins and evolution of Berlin’s famous essay; the connections between the metaphor derived from an ancient Greek poet and his more philosophically explicit visions of monism and pluralism; Tolstoy’s conflictual view of history and Berlin’s assessment of both; and finally, Tolstoy’s identity as a child of the Enlightenment and his accompanying inability to accept the foxy nature of historical contingency (even if his artistic talent expressed this peerlessly) but also his failure to discuss man’s inhumanity to man, namely evil, in the profound way we might expect of such a major writer as him.

‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ is Berlin’s best-known publication. This chapter has three main sections. The first sets the essay in the context of the Cold War and Berlin’s personal background and commitments. The second section reviews the main themes and arguments of the essay, which include the distinction between negative and positive liberty, Berlin’s association of the negative idea with liberal democracy and the positive idea with authoritarian politics, the relation between liberty and national identity, and the tracing of totalitarian thought to a foundation in moral monism, to which Berlin responds with his concept of value pluralism. The final section engages with some of the critical issues raised by ‘Two Concepts’. Is the essay too limited by Berlin’s Cold-War context? Is he too hostile to positive liberty and too uncritical of negative liberty? Is his account of identity too narrowly focused on nationalism, or is it an open-ended invitation to the excesses of identity politics? Is his value pluralism compatible with liberalism? I argue that in all these respects, Berlin’s position has problems, but also that he gives us the tools to respond to those problems.

It is not uncommon for people to observe the impossibility of ever fully knowing others, but to affirm that with sustained contact, developed intimacy and empathy, we can at least gain some sense of their inner experiences and begin to imagine life from their perspectives. The method of historical understanding which mirrors this viewpoint was introduced into modern Western European thought by Vico and Herder, and thereafter transmitted by Croce to Collingwood, and by Collingwood to Berlin. It is also common for people to observe that in important respects they know others – friends and family – better than those others know themselves. The method of historical and cultural understanding which matches this insight is that of ‘outsideness’, pioneered by Bakhtin. This chapter shall discuss these radically different yet in some ways complementary approaches, arguing that Berlin’s historical method is not wholly dependent upon ‘immersion’ but relies also on the recognition of anthropological constants across historical and cultural boundaries, in a way that echoes Bakhtin’s view that certain ideas enter ‘great time’.

Berlin’s essay begins with a standard question: Given the apparent lucidity and precision of Machiavelli’s work, why is there such enduring disagreement about its core meaning and significance? There is, however, nothing conventional about Berlin’s answer. He diverges fundamentally from the conflicting interpretations that have long dominated debate about what makes Machiavelli unique and notorious and argues that the deeper revolutionary character of his thought lies not in divorcing morality from politics but in favouring a politics that has its own ethic, albeit one fundamentally at odds with the prevailing Christian morality of his time. After giving a brief synopsis of Berlin’s account of Machiavelli’s originality, the chapter will delineate and explore how his interpretation operates on three distinct and related levels – historical, philosophical and political. It will then critically examine the questions of whether Berlin’s view of Machiavelli is historically accountable, philosophically coherent and, finally, politically plausible. My aim will be to show that whilst Berlin’s essay is by no means immune to criticism on all three fronts, it holds up remarkably well.

In Chapter 4, Minds in Psychology, the topic is the concept of “mind” and its uses in psychology and philosophy throughout history and today. A reason why it is important to investigate how “mind” is understood in psychology is that in order to evaluate psychological research, one needs a clear image of the conception of mind that underpins that research. We describe the historical background of the concept itself, as well as changes over time in how the word “mind” has been used, and some differences across languages and cultures today. We identify four historical and contemporary thinking styles – that is, different ways of conceiving of “mind.” We discuss the issues and problems connected with each of these styles.

I open Chapter 1 by outlining ‘agathic pluralism’, namely the view that (ultimate intrinsic) goodness is univocally definable yet also irreducibly plural at the metaphysical level. This is my view, but I do not embark immediately on its defence. Rather, Chapter 1 clears the way for such a view by showing how none of the ‘big three’ ethical theories – namely consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics – manages to capture goodness as I understand it. Consequentialism tries, yet fails, to reduce goodness to a single property; deontology tries to sideline or do without goodness altogether; and virtue ethics substantially mislocates goodness, finding it in our moral dispositions. In order to argue for this, I tackle (first) consequentialism’s failed proxies for goodness, namely pleasure and desire- or preference-satisfaction; and I canvas J. J. Thomson’s a priori semantic argument for the incoherence of consequentialism. Second, I look at deontologists’ paradigm examples of promising, lying and retributive punishment. And third, I look at the Stoics’ and Michael Slote’s strong over-estimation of virtue as the only, or at least primary, good.

Paranormal explanations of NDEs generally refer to the dualistic view of the world. These explanations are built upon the belief or derived from the credo that NDEs can be explained through paranormal concepts.

The distinction between international and domestic law plays an essential function in the establishment of international law as an autonomous order. During the lifespan of the League, this distinction was contested by scholars and judges in increasingly sophisticated ways. This process culminated in the debate between monists and dualists. However, the formal conceptual foundations of this debate meant that it failed to take account of the way that bureaucrats, officials and experts at the League adopted equally sophisticated normative strategies as part of the ‘experiment of international administration’. Such strategies, which lay at the heart of attempts to promote the ‘well-being and development’ of peoples subject to mandatory rule and foster co-operation across social and economic fields, creatively transformed conventional understandings of the relationship between international law and domestic law. This chapter juxtaposes these simultaneous, countervailing trends of formalisation and deformalisation in international law and administration to offer fresh insight into the crucial formative period in the history of the distinction between international law and municipal law.

This chapter highlights two distinct perspectives – international and domestic – on the judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention). The international perspective is framed by reference to article 4 of the Convention and the maximalist approach taken by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The domestic perspective is conceptualised by reference to the direct and indirect application of the Convention as permitted by the reception rules in monist, dualist, and hybrid legal systems. The chapter argues that the international and domestic perspectives on the judicial application of the Convention differ on account of the different institutional positions of the bodies that control them (the Committee vs the domestic courts). The maximalist international position promoted by the Committee is often unavailable to the domestic courts, although it may be a potential inspiration to them. Canvassing these distinct perspectives provides the context for a better understanding of the limitations in the domestic courts’ engagement with the Convention, detailed in the subsequent chapters.

The monist construction of the child-rights identity serves an important purpose of shielding the child from the harmful and abusive social and traditional practices that is part of the everyday life of so many children. However, its downside is that it does not allow children to exercise self-determination in the shaping of their own identity. The power to shape your identity sits at the heart of modern democracy and ideas of inclusion and equality. Complex intersectionality will allow the child to both maintain the protection that comes with its monist construction while also allowing for self-determination that takes the social context of the concrete child into consideration. This together with a deliberate practice of self-critique to challenge false hegemonic consciousness of the image of the child it thinks it serves. This might prepare child rights to serve a forceful and relevant theory for advocates to lean on when we are entering the full effects of the climate crisis, and this will be the most significant stress test of our democratic system we as a world community have experienced to this day.

This chapter critically reviews dualism, as developed by Heinrich Triepel, and monism, mainly formulated by Hans Kelsen. It argues that these theories can no longer comprehensively explain the relationship between international and EU or EU and national law and that, due to their emergence almost a century ago, these theories must be understood in their historical context. Historically, dualism was progress as the separation of international and national law helped international law become independent. Thus, dualism liberated international law from being understood as “external State law,” and was even referred to as a “cleansing thunderstorm” by the monist Alfred Verdross. The main characteristic of monism is the assumption of a single unified legal system. Kelsenian monism must face the criticism of having a highly fictitious understanding of the world: nothing less than the “unity of the legal world order” is proclaimed. To depict the most important assumptions of Kelsenian monism, this chapter looks into the Kelsenian adherence to neo-Kantian epistemology, and shows that this understanding refers to a very specific philosophical position, which has been rightly criticized by many philosophers.

This chapter holds that the CJEU follows two diametrically diverging doctrines regarding the relationship between international and EU, as well as EU and Member State law. From a theoretical perspective this is inconceivable. One and the same organization cannot follow two different approaches. However, from a pragmatic perspective, this chapter acknowledges that this Janus face of the CJEU is quite understandable. Autonomy understood as monism, on the one hand, is an expression of legal unity, which is absolutely necessary for the EU to safeguard its integration process. On the other hand, autonomy expressed as dualism helps to secure the stability of this integration process by separating the EU legal order from far-reaching international influences. However, at the same time, autonomy cannot provide for an adequate replacement of monism and dualism.