Paranormal explanations of NDEs generally refer to the dualistic view of the world. These explanations are built upon the belief or derived from the credo that NDEs can be explained through paranormal concepts.

The distinction between international and domestic law plays an essential function in the establishment of international law as an autonomous order. During the lifespan of the League, this distinction was contested by scholars and judges in increasingly sophisticated ways. This process culminated in the debate between monists and dualists. However, the formal conceptual foundations of this debate meant that it failed to take account of the way that bureaucrats, officials and experts at the League adopted equally sophisticated normative strategies as part of the ‘experiment of international administration’. Such strategies, which lay at the heart of attempts to promote the ‘well-being and development’ of peoples subject to mandatory rule and foster co-operation across social and economic fields, creatively transformed conventional understandings of the relationship between international law and domestic law. This chapter juxtaposes these simultaneous, countervailing trends of formalisation and deformalisation in international law and administration to offer fresh insight into the crucial formative period in the history of the distinction between international law and municipal law.

This chapter highlights two distinct perspectives – international and domestic – on the judicial application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention). The international perspective is framed by reference to article 4 of the Convention and the maximalist approach taken by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The domestic perspective is conceptualised by reference to the direct and indirect application of the Convention as permitted by the reception rules in monist, dualist, and hybrid legal systems. The chapter argues that the international and domestic perspectives on the judicial application of the Convention differ on account of the different institutional positions of the bodies that control them (the Committee vs the domestic courts). The maximalist international position promoted by the Committee is often unavailable to the domestic courts, although it may be a potential inspiration to them. Canvassing these distinct perspectives provides the context for a better understanding of the limitations in the domestic courts’ engagement with the Convention, detailed in the subsequent chapters.

The monist construction of the child-rights identity serves an important purpose of shielding the child from the harmful and abusive social and traditional practices that is part of the everyday life of so many children. However, its downside is that it does not allow children to exercise self-determination in the shaping of their own identity. The power to shape your identity sits at the heart of modern democracy and ideas of inclusion and equality. Complex intersectionality will allow the child to both maintain the protection that comes with its monist construction while also allowing for self-determination that takes the social context of the concrete child into consideration. This together with a deliberate practice of self-critique to challenge false hegemonic consciousness of the image of the child it thinks it serves. This might prepare child rights to serve a forceful and relevant theory for advocates to lean on when we are entering the full effects of the climate crisis, and this will be the most significant stress test of our democratic system we as a world community have experienced to this day.

This chapter critically reviews dualism, as developed by Heinrich Triepel, and monism, mainly formulated by Hans Kelsen. It argues that these theories can no longer comprehensively explain the relationship between international and EU or EU and national law and that, due to their emergence almost a century ago, these theories must be understood in their historical context. Historically, dualism was progress as the separation of international and national law helped international law become independent. Thus, dualism liberated international law from being understood as “external State law,” and was even referred to as a “cleansing thunderstorm” by the monist Alfred Verdross. The main characteristic of monism is the assumption of a single unified legal system. Kelsenian monism must face the criticism of having a highly fictitious understanding of the world: nothing less than the “unity of the legal world order” is proclaimed. To depict the most important assumptions of Kelsenian monism, this chapter looks into the Kelsenian adherence to neo-Kantian epistemology, and shows that this understanding refers to a very specific philosophical position, which has been rightly criticized by many philosophers.

This chapter holds that the CJEU follows two diametrically diverging doctrines regarding the relationship between international and EU, as well as EU and Member State law. From a theoretical perspective this is inconceivable. One and the same organization cannot follow two different approaches. However, from a pragmatic perspective, this chapter acknowledges that this Janus face of the CJEU is quite understandable. Autonomy understood as monism, on the one hand, is an expression of legal unity, which is absolutely necessary for the EU to safeguard its integration process. On the other hand, autonomy expressed as dualism helps to secure the stability of this integration process by separating the EU legal order from far-reaching international influences. However, at the same time, autonomy cannot provide for an adequate replacement of monism and dualism.

Kuhn’s notion of normal science seemingly advocated doctrinaire science education. This chapter documents this in Kuhn’s writings, and considers the argument from Popper, Feyerabend, and others that Kuhnian normal science would encourage dogmatism and stifle innovation. The chapter argues that it is possible to ameliorate the dogmatism in science education while respecting the necessities of professional training. Modern science can afford to maintain multiple paradigms within a field, producing the benefits of toleration while maintaining the advantages of Kuhnian normal science within each paradigm. Moreover, it is possible to educate each scientist in a pluralist way, fostering innovative thinking. The chapter argues that such pluralism is already present in physics education to a surprising extent and that it can plausibly be extended further.

Histories of monism have generally ended with the First World War and placed it within the context of the technocratic fantasies of liberal supporters of antipolitical Kultur in late Wilhelmine Germany. This article argues instead that monism achieved its widest practical dispersal during the Weimar Republic in the socialist milieu. It follows the path of liberal intellectuals from opposition to war and monarchy into the socialist movements, where they took leading positions in local government, union educational institutions, and the expanding universe of socialist cultural associations. There they sought to revise Marxism to bring it in line with their theories of biological and sociological evolution. The article follows key four areas of the socialist workers’ culture movement and examines how monism shaped the theories and practices of sex reform, free body culture, festival culture and educational innovation. It thereby demonstrates for the first time the central role of secularist dissent and monist worldview in some of the iconic utopian projects of interwar socialism.

This chapter maps secularism as a culture, using the example of Berlin. It takes the reader through all of the venues that provided materialist monism and establishes their relationship to the socialist milieu. It begins in Free Religion, and then analyzes the city’s chief popular scientific institutions. It looks in detail at the offerings of each to illuminate how monism was communicated. This chapter argues that despite political polarization among the secularist organizations, there was nonetheless a great deal of ideological and personnel coherence across the secularist spectrum

This chapter discusses the complicated relationship between international alw and domestic law, focusing on international law is received by domestic legal orders

The primary goal of Chapter 3 is to introduce some of the important themes that have come up when philosophers think about the (human) mind, where it comes from and how it relates to the body and to the surrounding world. To this end, we visit a division of philosophy called the philosophy of mind, which will involve a review of a variety of “-isms” (such as rationalism, empiricism, mind–body dualism, monism, materialism, idealism, behaviorism, physicalism, associationism, and so on). We also meet a number of important philosophers who have developed various and often opposing views on the nature–nurture issue. We conclude with a discussion of what philosophers of mind call “the hard problem,” how to explain the notion of consciousness.

Interpreters have long recognized that there is a problem about determining what kind of activity Aristotle thinks happiness is. Some of his remarks appear to favor a single best kind of activity, intellectual contemplation. Other evidence suggests that it is an overarching activity that has various virtuous activities, ethical and intellectual, as parts. Interpreters typically view these as incompatible theses and try to show that one or the other apparent thesis is merely apparent. The problem of determining which of two incompatible theses Aristotle believes is the Dilemmatic Problem of Happiness. But the arguments that rival interpretations amass exert pressure to think that Aristotle really is committed to both of the allegedly incompatible claims. The problem of showing how he can coherently endorse both is the Conjunctive Problem of Happiness. Any dialectically satisfactory interpretation of Aristotles theory of happiness must solve it. None has done so. It cannot be solved while laboring under the weight of three common assumptions. Chapters 2–4 argue for the falsity of those assumptions and provide materials for constructing a solution to the Conjunctive Problem.

The Australian legal system is not an island, and Australian law has felt the influence of law and legal ideas from other jurisdictions, particularly other common law countries. Australian law has also been shaped by public international law both directly and indirectly and this interaction has become increasingly important as the scope and content of international law have grown. The relationship between Australian law and international law is mediated by Australia’s constitutional framework in which the separation of powers between the executive, legislature and the courts holds central place. Unlike the constitutions in many other legal systems, the Australian Constitution does not address the relationship between international and domestic law, and most of the relevant legal principles are to be found in the common law. This chapter examines how each arm of government in Australia has engaged with international law, identifying areas where the relationship is well settled (as it is in relation to treaties) and areas where there remains some uncertainty (as in relation to customary international law).